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ABSTRACT 
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This dissertation examines the viability of a feminist ethic of flourishing. The 
possibility of a eudaimonist, or flourishing-based, ethic adapted for the needs of feminist 
ethics and politics has recently been raised by a number of feminist moral philosophers. 
However, in these discussions, the degree to which an ethic of flourishing requires a 
substantive conception of human nature has not been adequately addressed. Flourishing-
based ethical theories appear to require a substantive account of the kind of thing whose 
flourishing is to be promoted, while contemporary academic feminism is characterized by 
a strong suspicion toward claims about human nature. 
 Chapter one situates this problem in the current literature and reframes feminist 
anti-essentialist objections to nature claims. Chapter two analyzes three historically 
influential exemplars of the ethics of flourishing: Aristotle, Hume, and Marx. Employing 
the analytic categories developed in chapter two, chapters three through five assess the 
work of Rosalind Hursthouse, Martha Nussbaum, and Lisa Tessman for their adequacy to 
serve as the basis of a feminist ethic of flourishing. I argue that each has something of 
value to offer and yet each is problematic when it comes to how they appeal (or fail to 
appeal) to human nature. 
 The central argument of this dissertation is that, properly understood, a theory of 
human nature can be a critical resource for a feminist ethic of flourishing. As such, 
feminist moral philosophers who would condemn oppression, gender-based 
subordination, and other injustices by appealing to an ideal of flourishing that is being 
denied or cut off, would benefit from greater attention to the assumptions about human 
nature that such theories of flourishing entail. On the view defended here, a normative 
conception of human nature is a necessary methodological element of a flourishing-based 
ethical theory that illuminates the reasons one has in support of a particular vision of 
flourishing. While I leave open the question of how such a conception of human nature 
could be objectively justified, this dissertation argues that a theory of human nature can 
serve as a normative resource for feminist moral criticism within a flourishing-based 
ethical framework. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
FEMINISM AND THE ETHICS OF FLOURISHING 
 
1. Status of the Question: Feminist Moral Philosophy, the Ethics of Flourishing, and 
Human Nature 
 
A number of feminist moral philosophers have, in recent years, appealed to 
flourishing-based ethical frameworks as the basis for a feminist moral analysis and 
critique of oppression and injustice. By “flourishing-based ethical framework,” I mean 
any moral perspective that either takes the flourishing or well-being of the agent as the 
goal of ethics and starting point of moral reflection (as the ancient eudaimonists do), or 
uses the notion of flourishing or well-being as a standard from which to criticize or 
endorse specific practices, norms, rules or forms of life.
1
 We might also describe such a 
moral perspective as an “ethic of flourishing.” I’ll use the phrases “flourishing-based 
ethical perspective” and “ethic of flourishing” interchangeably.2 Feminist philosophers in 
this vein include Lisa Tessman, Nancy Snow, Martha Nussbaum, Ruth Groenhout, and 
                                                 
1
 For reasons I explain later, I’m setting to the side what could be considered a form of flourishing-based 
ethic: welfare, hedonic, or desire/preference-satisfaction based forms of consequentialism. These are not 
the kind of flourishing-based ethic I am interested in here, and they do not capture what the feminists I 
reference below are attempting to revive for feminist purposes. 
2
 Is an ethic of flourishing a “moral theory”? Some philosophers have reserved the term “moral theory” for 
theories with a highly specific form and structure. For a good discussion of this, see Margaret Urban 
Walker, Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). See also, Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For an 
insightful discussion of whether or not any of the ancient ethical theories count as “moral theories” in this 
technical sense, see the introduction to Julia Annas's The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993). An ethic of flourishing (and the ethics of Aristotle in particular) has been attractive 
to some philosophers (feminist and otherwise) as an instance of “anti-theory.” I am agnostic regarding 
these debates. This dissertation indirectly raises meta-ethical questions about moral theory, what a moral 
theory is, what a moral theory is supposed to be, and whether what I refer to as an “ethic of flourishing” 
counts. I will sometimes refer to flourishing-based accounts as “moral theories,” or to philosophers offering  
flourishing-based accounts as “moral theorists,” because doing so is less cumbersome than trying to work 
my way around that phrase, but I do not intend this in a technical sense. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I leave all these questions open and put them to the side in what follows. 
2 
 
Chris Cuomo.
3
 Rosalind Hursthouse is another recent philosopher to have developed a 
normative perspective centered on the end of human flourishing, and though not working 
explicitly as a feminist, her work is relevant in this regard since she clearly wants her 
perspective to be consistent with feminist principles.
4
 
Lisa Tessman, Nancy Snow, and Rosalind Hursthouse each draw on the tradition 
of Aristotelian virtue ethics and, in the course of so doing, have advanced various forms 
of Aristotelian eudaimonism.
5
 Martha Nussbaum’s well-known ‘capabilities approach’ 
has drawn quite freely on the Aristotelian tradition, but her normative perspective is 
equally influenced by Marx and the enlightenment tradition of human rights and human 
dignity. For Nussbaum, human rights are best grounded in a notion of human dignity, 
which she sees as being realized in and through the exercise of human capabilities that 
enable human flourishing.
6
 Ruth Groenhout has advanced a form of care ethics centered 
on the notion of flourishing, and she is explicit that human flourishing is connected to the 
full development of human capacities and the perfection of human nature.
7
 Both 
Groenhout and Nussbaum can be thought of as giving objective well-being theories of 
flourishing in which an account of human nature and the development of certain 
tendencies of human nature are central. For this reason, one might say they offer 
                                                 
3
 Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); Nancy Snow, “Virtue and Flourishing,” Journal of Social Philosophy 39, no. 2 (2008); 
Martha Nussbaum, “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism,” 
Political Theory 20, no. 2 (1992); Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species 
Membership (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006); Ruth Groenhout, 
Connected Lives: Human Nature and an Ethics of Care (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004); 
Chris Cuomo, Feminism and Ecological Communities: An Ethic of Flourishing (New York: Routledge, 
1998). 
4
 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics. 
5
 Tessman, Burdened Virtues; Nancy Snow, “Virtue and the Oppression of Women,” in Feminist Moral 
Philosophy, ed. Samantha Brennan (Calgary, Alberta, CA: University of Calgary Press, 2002); Hursthouse, 
On Virtue Ethics. 
6
 Nussbaum, “Human Functioning”; Women and Human Development; Frontiers of Justice. 
7
 Groenhout, Connected Lives, 1-7, 21. 
3 
 
‘perfectionist’ theories of flourishing.8 In a quite different tradition of normative ethics, 
Chris Cuomo has developed a feminist ecological ethic of flourishing and has done so 
explicitly with the goal of “establishing a basis for rejecting oppression.”9 
The central problem this dissertation seeks to address is the tension created by the 
fact that the most well-known ethics of flourishing—Aristotle’s—relies quite explicitly 
on an account of human nature, and contemporary feminists generally turn to Aristotle 
when putting forward their own flourishing-based ethical frameworks. But appealing to 
human nature is problematic for a number of reasons within feminist moral philosophy, 
and the degree to which a flourishing-based ethic is either possible or desirable 
independent of an account of human nature has not been systematically addressed by 
feminist scholars seeking to retrieve a flourishing-based ethic.  
Nancy Snow and Ruth Groenhout recognize both the need an ethic of flourishing 
has for an account of human nature and the problem such a need presents for feminists, 
but neither addresses the problem in depth.
10
 Martha Nussbaum has argued that a 
conception of a universally shared human nature is important for feminist ethics and 
politics over and against post-modern feminist objections to essentialist definitions of 
human nature,
11
 but she has not addressed the epistemological problems I identify here as 
constituting a central source of feminist resistance to appeals to human nature. This 
                                                 
8
 For treatments of Nussbaum as a perfectionist, see Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996); see also Kimberly Yuracko, Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003). In my estimation, the label of “perfectionism” is in some 
ways misleading when applied to Nussbaum since her normative proposal is limited to support for 
capabilities and not actual functionings. In addition, “perfectionism” implies that the ideal goal is perfect 
functioning, whereas for Nussbaum, the ideal is positive freedom to function. 
9
 Cuomo, Feminism and Ecological Communities. Cited in Sarah Hoagland, “Engaged Moral Agency,” 
Ethics and the Environment 4, no. 1 (1999): 91.  
10
 Snow, “Virtue and the Oppression of Women,” 46-47; Groenhout, Connected Lives, chaps. 1-2, see esp. 
pp. 7-14.  
11
 Nussbaum, “Human Functioning.” 
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leaves her approach open to these epistemological objections.
12
 Finally, Lisa Tessman 
represents a quite different position on the spectrum of feminists who have adopted an 
ethic of flourishing. While the rest give at least a nod to the need for a conception of 
human nature, Tessman advocates for a flourishing-based ethic but seems to reject as 
spurious any attempt to support that account through an appeal to human nature.
13
  
To recap, some feminists working with an ethic of flourishing, such as Snow and 
Groenhout, recognize that human nature, although problematic from a feminist 
perspective, is important (maybe because inescapable). Others, such as Nussbaum, argue 
that feminists need to endorse an account of human nature in order to advance and defend 
feminist aims, but they do not address a major source of feminist skepticism toward the 
appeal to human nature.
14
 Finally, feminist philosophers like Tessman appeal to an ethic 
of flourishing but do not address the problem human nature presents for a feminist ethic 
of flourishing.  
Feminist philosophers hold a complex and multi-directional skepticism toward 
appeals to human nature. They have as many reasons to question its relevance as any 
other moral philosopher, but their skepticism is also rooted in the history of feminist 
theory and criticism itself. To address these objections, I give an analysis of this history 
                                                 
12
 I discuss this below, but I see these epistemological objections as being raised by Alison Jaggar, 
“Reasoning About Well-Being: Nussbaum's Method of Justifying the Capabilities,” The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 14, no. 3 (2006); Susan Moller Okin, “Poverty, Well-Being and Gender: What Counts, 
Who's Heard?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, no. 3 (2003); and Brooke Ackerly, Political Theory and 
Feminist Social Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
13
 Her position is somewhat more complicated in Burdened Virtues, but when arguing that moral facts and 
practices should be understood as a product of political contestation, Tessman says, “If on the other hand 
moral facts are taken to be true or false independent of actual, situated human practices—whether 
descending from God or existing in a noumenal realm accessible through pure reason or even determined 
by the telos of humans as a natural kind—then the political struggle over ethical values degenerates into a 
contest to show who has gotten the independently existing moral facts right.” Lisa Tessman, ed. Feminist 
Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 
2009), xv. 
14
 For another author who, like Nussbaum, argues that feminists need to endorse an account of human 
nature, cf. Yuracko, Perfectionism and Contemporary Feminist Values. 
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and argue that, rather than eschew reliance on human nature, taking this history seriously 
means giving greater attention to the various ways human nature can function within 
normative moral theory and to how it can sustain our ethical thought. This dissertation 
aims to take the history of feminist criticism seriously and thereby respond to these 
objections.  
 
2. The Ethics of Flourishing 
This dissertation seeks to defend the thesis that a theory of human nature is 
indispensable in a flourishing-based ethical theory and, furthermore, that it can be a 
critical resource for feminist moral philosophers employing an ethic of flourishing. 
Rather than try to avoid this controversial subject, we need to give much more attention 
to our vision of human nature, how it sustains our ethical thought and how it can function 
normatively within a flourishing-based ethical theory. Theories of human nature are 
regarded by many feminist philosophers as a principal theoretical source of women’s 
oppression—a far cry from a critical resource for defending a feminist analysis of 
oppression and positive vision of flourishing. Human nature can be a critical resource 
insofar as it can help articulate the available reasons in support of a feminist vision of full 
human flourishing. Beyond that, human nature is an important self-critical tool that can 
help us reflect on and clarify our own ethical outlook, especially in testing those elements 
of our ethical perspective which we suspect rest on mere convention and have little or no 
backing when we take a wider perspective.  
Some of the deepest insecurities of Western feminists pertain to a legacy of 
Western cultural imperialism—a history of those with the power to do so imposing 
6 
 
culturally specific Western values as universally normative. Conscious that we (Western 
feminists) continue to hold disproportionate power—including the power to articulate and 
defend our own positions in the academy and, in certain cases, impose our moral vision 
through influence on policy-making—these insecurities have fostered a paralyzing form 
of moral relativism in certain feminist quarters.
15
 Nevertheless, many feminist activists, 
political theorists, and moral philosophers continue to critique practices and norms they 
see as harmful to women and articulate these critiques in such a way that their validity 
extends beyond concurrent personal preferences shaped by liberal cultural values, mere 
cultural convention, or—possibly worse—our own power to advance them. A 
flourishing-based ethical perspective provides a way forward in this regard. 
 
2.1 What Is a Flourishing-Based Ethical Perspective? 
A flourishing-based ethic is, first and foremost, a distinctive stance on the nature 
of moral justification. It asserts that moral justification, in the final instance, hinges on 
the connection (of the act, rule, virtue, institution or practice) to human flourishing. An 
ethical theory based on an account of flourishing can accept the intuitive significance of 
norms and rules for human life, but when we ask why we ought to follow this rule or that 
norm, the reasons offered will make reference to some significant form of human 
flourishing these rules promote or protect. Hence, moral justification within a flourishing-
based framework is a matter of conducing to or being constitutive of human flourishing.  
To simply say that the end of a flourishing-based ethic is ‘human flourishing’ 
elides an important distinction: Is the scope of concern universal? Is the flourishing of 
                                                 
15
 I’m thinking here of instances such as the one retold by Martha Nussbaum in the introduction to Women 
and Human Development. 
7 
 
every human being at issue? Or is it my flourishing as a human being that is at issue? The 
ancient eudaimonists deal with this question in different ways. Aristotle gives an account 
of the concern we have for the good of our friends as a part of our own good, but is 
apparently uncompelled by the ideal of concern for humanity as such. The Stoics, on the 
other hand, motivate ethical concern for others by starting from the point of the agent’s 
concern for her own flourishing and then widening the scope of the agent’s motives by 
showing how her own well-being is connected to that of others.
16
 It is a matter of debate 
whether this kind of argument can motivate universal human concern. Likewise it is a 
matter of debate whether, using such a strategy, one can motivate distinctively ‘moral’ 
concern—non-instrumental concern for the other for their own sake.  
Another strategy for motivating universal moral concern is that employed by 
Martha Nussbaum, who appeals to the notion of equal human dignity and argues on that 
basis that the object of concern—‘human flourishing’—must be universal in scope. This 
solution presents a motivational obstacle since it seems the agent could be unmoved by 
the appeal to the dignity of others. (Flourishing-based ethical theories are not alone in 
facing this challenge to give an account of the motive to universal moral concern. 
Deontological and utilitarian moral theories face a parallel challenge to explain the source 
of motivation to universal human concern or to justify a more limited scope of moral 
concern.)  
However this question is answered, I take it to be the responsibility of particular 
flourishing-based accounts to resolve. Whether a theory has the resources to account for 
and justify universal moral concern is an open and an important question. This will not be 
the focus of my concern here, but it is the responsibility of each flourishing-based ethic to 
                                                 
16
 Annas, The Morality of Happiness, see esp. Section III, “The Good Life and the Good Lives of Others.” 
8 
 
show how such a high moral demand is justified and how it can be motivated, and this is 
one basis for distinction between the various accounts.  
Another relevant question: What is meant by “flourishing”? Etymologically, this 
word connotes the flowering of a tree or plant, and it can be applied to all biological 
organisms insofar as they exhibit health and vigor. Someone might object that to specify 
the end of ethics and the object of human action as flourishing is overly restrictive and 
reductionistic; the good of human life cannot be reduced to health and/or good biological 
functioning. To base moral judgments on this standard alone is therefore inadequate 
because there are many other values relevant to human life and many other goods at 
which human beings aim.  
Some philosophers who have adopted a flourishing-based ethic do indeed restrict 
their concept of flourishing in such a way as to identify it with healthy functioning. This 
is Groenhout’s concept of flourishing, for instance, and though Hursthouse has a 
somewhat expanded notion of what health is for social animals, arguably healthy 
functioning as gauged by biologists and ethologists is the primary referent of flourishing 
for Hursthouse. Others take a more expansive view of flourishing and identify it with 
some objective state of well-being that can include not only physical, but social, 
emotional, and spiritual well-being. For instance, Snow and Nussbaum both include 
discussions of these realms of human life in their analysis of what makes for flourishing.  
For my purposes, I leave the specification of what ‘flourishing’ entails open. 
Though the word has an etymological connection to the idea of healthy functioning, I do 
not constrain it to that. I will assume here that it can signify a much more expansive 
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concept of the human good, and that what it signifies is a matter for each theory to 
specify. 
While there are many issues—including the specifics of flourishing and the scope 
of moral concern—that remain to be specified by particular accounts, flourishing-based 
ethics can in general be described as consequentialist (as opposed to proceduralist) 
because they are outcome-oriented.
17
 That being said, the outcome that matters is the 
flourishing of a whole life as opposed to the outcome of some smaller, artificially 
demarcated time-slice or particular act.  
Flourishing-based ethics involve a distinctive theory of moral motivation. Unlike 
many of the modern moral theories, flourishing-based ethics assume it is appropriate for 
the agent to strive for her own flourishing, and that the agent’s desire to live a good, 
meaningful, healthy, successful, happy—in short—‘flourishing’ life is an appropriate 
motive for both the moral philosopher and the agent herself to call upon in the course of 
practical reasoning.
18
 Flourishing-based ethics entail a distinctive answer to what 
Christine Korsgaard calls “the question of normativity.” 
The normative question is a first-person question that arises for the moral 
agent who must actually do what morality says. When you want to know 
what a philosopher’s theory of normativity is, you must place yourself in 
the position of an agent on whom morality is making a difficult claim. 
You then ask the philosopher: must I really do this? Why must I do it? 
And his answer is his answer to the normative question.
19
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 Cf. David L. Norton, “Is ‘Flourishing’ a True Alternative Ethics?” Reason Papers 10 (1985). Norton also 
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An ethic of flourishing offers us an answer to the question “How should I live?” 
Let us take Aristotle as a paradigm of the ethics of flourishing. Aristotle’s answer to this 
question is, roughly, “You should live the life of virtue.” But virtue is difficult and 
taxing. In addition to being difficult to acquire, the virtues can make our lives harder in 
some ways, since once we have become sensitive to the requirements of justice, 
generosity, friendship, honesty, and so on, it is not so easy to do what we want in the 
moment and live how we want. Given these difficulties, an agent may wonder, “Why 
should I cultivate the virtues?” Aristotle’s answer (again, roughly) will be “Because you 
cannot flourish if you do not; you cannot live a successful, worthwhile or truly good life 
if you do not.” This, then, is his response to the normative question. (And he might go on 
to say something like, “Yes, I recognize that the virtues will sometimes interfere with the 
satisfaction of your desires—especially as they are right now—but despite how things 
look from here, a truly good life will depend upon the virtues.”)  
A theory of human nature becomes a crucial resource for any ethic of flourishing 
when responding to the normative question. While the normative question is answered by 
an appeal to the good of flourishing, in order to articulate the reasons one cannot truly 
live well without doing as the theory prescribes, the theory will need recourse to an 
account of what it is about me and the kind of thing I am that makes this good for me. If I 
accept the account I am given about the kind of thing I am and why this is good for me, I 
also acquire a set of reasons to do what I am being asked to do—even if it is difficult or 
painful—because I see that it is, in another sense, good for me. 
One of the central claims of this dissertation is that a robustly evaluative 
conception of human nature is indispensable for an adequately normative ethic of 
11 
 
flourishing. By “adequately normative,” I mean the theory must be able to answer the 
normativity question. It must be able to give the agent to whom it is addressed reason to 
act or live as the theory prescribes. What I will call ‘teleological’ conceptions of human 
nature can do this because they articulate certain ways of being human as worthy of our 
pursuit, because “fulfilling,” or “healthy” or “dignified” and these ways of being human 
are made intelligible as good when contrasted with the response that results from their 
absence, which is “frustrating” or “stunting” or “alienating” (all of these can be opposed 
to “fulfilling”) or “damaging” or “unhealthy” (as opposed to “healthy”) or 
“dehumanizing” (as opposed to “dignified”). These theories are then able to articulate 
what is good for the agent in living this way. 
There is another way a theory of human nature provides reasons to agents who 
wonder if they really must do what they are being told they must do (and so responds to 
the normative question). An ethic of flourishing will articulate ideals of human life. The 
higher the aspiration, the more important it is to be able to show that, while high, these 
ideals are still realistic possibilities. So, let us assume the Possibility Thesis (P) as a 
limiting condition on any theory of flourishing. 
P: If a theory of flourishing prescribes that which is beyond what human 
beings are (generally) capable of, then it is disqualified as a universal 
moral ideal. 
 
This restricting assumption is based on the broadly accepted principle that “ought 
implies can.” This means that what a theory prescribes must, in general, be possible for 
beings such as we are. But what is, in general, possible for human beings is neither 
obvious nor straightforward. This is (in part) what debates about human nature are 
12 
 
about.
20
 Because an ethic of flourishing cannot avoid making some assumptions about 
what is possible and what is (generally speaking) not, an ethic of flourishing will not be 
able to avoid some theory of human nature, thereby taking a stance on what is possible 
and what are the limits of human nature.  
Once these stances (on what is good for us and what is possible) are made 
articulate, they also provide an agent with reasons to act and live as the theory prescribes. 
In this way, a theory of human nature affects the normativity of an ethic of flourishing 
because it affects one’s judgments as to the reasonableness of the ideals of the ethic. 
From the first-person perspective, if one judges the ideals of the ethic as unreasonable, 
given what human beings are like, the theory will lose its reason-giving force for that 
person.
21
 
Because of this, a theory of human nature is important for answering the 
normativity question whether or not what I will call ‘the objectivity question’ has been 
settled. The objectivity question is, in short: Is it true? This is a fundamental question. If 
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virtue’ thesis. Cf. Marilyn Friedman, “Feminist Virtue Ethics, Happiness, and Moral Luck,” Hypatia 24, 
no. 1 (2009); also Snow, “Virtue and Flourishing.”  
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there is no reason to think the theory of human nature relied upon by an ethic of 
flourishing is true, there will be little motive to live by the ideals it sets. There must be 
some reason for thinking this account is true. However, whether this can be demonstrated  
“objectively” or not and what would be required to do so—given the complex character 
of claims about human nature—is difficult to say.  
In the chapters to follow, I will argue that a feminist ethic of flourishing needs a 
theory of human nature of a particular kind, and that the benefit of embracing such an 
account of human nature is that it provides resources for analyzing and articulating the 
harm of oppression. But, as I argue, a theory of human nature serves as a resource 
primarily in response to the normativity question. I have little to say about the objectivity 
question. If the benefit to be derived from a theory of human nature was that it gave 
feminists grounds for the claim that their conception of flourishing was “objectively 
valid” given these facts about human nature, then the objectivity of the account of human 
nature would need to be the central concern. This, it seems to me, is the role most 
philosophers expect a theory of human nature to play. The expectation is that human 
nature will enter the theory as the objective ground upon which normative moral 
judgments can be justified. Louise Antony, whose position I will say more about in 
chapter two, articulates compelling reasons for thinking that—as it is standardly 
understood—appealing to a theory of human nature to demonstrate the objective validity 
of normative moral judgments is a non-starter. Setting the question of objectivity aside, I 
will argue that a theory of human nature is, for other reasons, indispensable to an ethic of 
flourishing. 
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In the next section, I outline the features of a flourishing-based ethic that make it 
particularly attractive as a resource for feminist moral philosophy.  
 
2.2 The Attractions of a Flourishing-Based Ethic for Feminist Moral Philosophy 
An ethic of flourishing can incorporate many elements that make it attractive for 
feminist ethics and politics. Flourishing can name the kind of life for women that feminist 
moral philosophy envisions and feminist politics seeks to realize. Implicit in any moral or 
political critique is a vision of the good that is not being realized, and, in at least a general 
way, flourishing names the good envisioned for human life. An ethic of flourishing can 
make this positive vision explicit, and in doing so make clear the ground for criticism of 
the harms suffered by women in contexts of injustice and oppression.  
A connected benefit of a flourishing-based ethical framework is that it provides an 
intuitively obvious place for an account of oppression. The notion of oppression does not 
have to be “tacked on” to the theory; it can have a central and significant place in the 
moral framework. A flourishing-based ethical framework provides resources for 
articulating the harm of oppression as we articulate what flourishing is and how 
oppression interferes with the agent’s flourishing. Nancy Snow connects these ideas 
when she discusses oppression. 
Oppression is personal and political. It takes many forms. It excludes 
persons from full and equal participation in public life, imposes economic 
burdens and restrictions, curtails personal choices, stunts growth and the 
development of talents and abilities, and, perhaps worst of all, is 
psychologically internalized so that victims of oppression lose a healthy 
sense of self. In short, it forecloses possibilities for human flourishing.
22
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And Lisa Tessman argues that the concept of flourishing is significant in that it 
allows feminists to “portray oppression as a set of barriers to flourishing and think about 
political resistance as a way of eradicating these barriers and enabling flourishing.”23 If 
flourishing is taken as the goal, oppression can signify the systematic barriers to 
flourishing that exist for certain kinds of people—sexist oppression being that which 
interferes with the flourishing of women by virtue of their being women.  
Finally, Lisa Tessman argues that an ethic of flourishing “assumes that the pursuit 
of flourishing—qualified in certain ways and especially by the requirement that one 
develop and maintain the virtues—is morally praiseworthy.”24 From the perspective of 
moral psychology, this is a powerful starting point from which to resist oppression, which 
often maintains itself by co-opting the agent herself into believing that her well-being is 
insignificant and that the pursuit of her own well-being is morally inappropriate. 
Feminism embodies a fundamental commitment to the moral worth and well-being of 
women, and a flourishing-based ethic puts the agent’s pursuit of well-being center stage.  
Before I go on to discuss the problem that an appeal to human nature presents for 
feminist moral philosophy, I would like to pause to say something about why, in the 
context of this dissertation, I am using the language of a feminist “ethic of flourishing” 
rather than of a feminist eudaimonism. Flourishing-based ethics are often referred to as 
“eudaimonistic,” and almost all of the feminists discussed above who are working with 
what I call a flourishing-based ethical perspective use the term “eudaimonism” to 
describe their own position and discuss this subject matter.
25
 They do so, I believe, 
because they are generally working out of a Neo-Aristotelian framework, and Aristotle 
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was a eudaimonist. But the eudaimonist framework that Aristotle employed was a highly 
developed ethical theory, and modern philosophers are not, for the most part, adopting an 
entire eudaimonist ethical theory, but select elements of it.  
Eudaimonism as a theoretical alternative to the modern moral theories of 
consequentialism and deontology has been relatively neglected, not only by feminists, but 
by moral philosophers more generally, and there is no standard characterization of what 
eudaimonism as a theoretical stance in contemporary moral philosophy entails. As a 
result, different philosophers adopt different elements of the classical eudaimonist 
framework and therefore define eudaimonism in different ways. Many contemporary 
philosophers who discuss eudaimonism are working from within a Neo-Aristotelian 
virtue ethical framework and will define eudaimonism in virtue ethical terms.
26
 Some 
have identified eudaimonism with either the necessity of virtue thesis or the even stronger 
sufficiency of virtue thesis.
27
 In contrast to both of these, William Prior defines 
eudaimonism as a thesis on the nature of moral value, that “the fundamental intrinsic 
value in ethics is the human good.”28 Philippa Foot, a very influential figure in this 
conversation, holds that eudaimonism is the view that “humanity’s good can bethought of 
as happiness, and yet in such a way that combining it with wickedness is a priori ruled 
out.”29 In contrast to Foot, William Nelson, following Julia Annas, takes eudaimonistic 
moral theory to be not a conceptual thesis in ethics, but a commitment to a certain 
starting point for ethical reflection. For Annas and Nelson, ethical reflection in a 
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eudaimonist framework begins with the first-person question: “How should I live?”30 
Limited as this survey of the contemporary discussion of eudaimonism is, I think it shows 
with sufficient clarity that there is, as of yet, no consensus in the literature on how 
eudaimonism should be characterized.  
For all the ancient moral theorists, ‘eudaimonia’ names the agent’s final end in 
life.
31
 For Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, ‘eudaimonia,’ which we 
translate as “happiness,” “well-being,” or “flourishing,” was recognized as the agent’s 
ultimate (final) end, and the purpose of ethical theory was to refine and articulate the 
content of this goal to help the reflective individual live a life that could genuinely be 
regarded as ‘eudaimon.’ Philosophy’s role in this was to help the individual think 
critically in order to weed out the merely conventional beliefs about eudaimonia and 
thereby give the agent the benefit of rational conviction regarding the way of life he or 
she was choosing to live.
32
 
The most developed study of the structure of ancient eudaimonist ethical theories 
is Julia Annas’ work, The Morality of Happiness. In that work and subsequent articles,33 
Annas articulates and analyzes the central features of ancient eudaimonist moral theories. 
I will note here only those features that make eudaimonism (as the ancients understood it) 
difficult for contemporary persons.  
One of the key elements of ancient eudaimonism, on Annas’ view, is dependence 
on a theory of human nature. Human nature entered into all ancient eudaimonisms, albeit 
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in different ways, but contemporary philosophers hoping to rehabilitate eudaimonism for 
contemporary moral philosophy—feminist or not—have not explored the implications of 
this fact. The pre-theoretical understanding of the terms ‘virtue’ and ‘happiness’ that 
modern persons (philosophers included) hold also presents a problem. Virtue and 
happiness are the central notions of ancient ethics, but they meant importantly different 
things to ancient persons. It is not clear, in Annas’ mind at least, that ancient 
eudaimonism can be rehabilitated using the language of virtue and happiness, at least in 
part because the terms for us are rigid and do not admit of much redefining. Even if we 
could define the words technically in the context of a philosophically sophisticated 
eudaimonist theory, it would change the nature of eudaimonist ethics, which began for 
the ancients with pre-reflective common-sense notions, the desire for eudaimonia, and the 
conviction that the ‘virtuous’ person is an excellent person. 
While contemporary philosophers are certainly free to develop a eudaimonistic 
ethical theory the ancients would not recognize, I think it best to reserve this term for 
theories that are at least roughly of the form and structure observed by the ancients. If we 
do not, we risk moving too quickly to the conclusion that eudaimonism is a non-starter 
for contemporary moral philosophy.
34
 For all of these reasons, I regard it as unwise to 
equate a flourishing-based ethic with eudaimonism. Eudaimonism, on my view, is rather 
better understood as one distinct form of a flourishing-based ethic. In On Virtue Ethics, 
Rosalind Hursthouse has made significant strides in this regard, making eudaimonism a 
                                                 
34
 While her essay still presents a serious challenge for eudaimonist virtue ethics, I believe this is part of 
what is going on in Marilyn Friedman’s essay “Feminist Virtue Ethics.” She relies on a fairly intuitive 
modern conception of happiness as pleasant or pleasurable states of affairs and therefore finds the thesis 
that happiness is impossible without virtue implausible. One notable aspect of this essay is the way the 
article is framed (and titled) in terms of virtue ethics, but is really about the eudaimonist thesis that virtue is 
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full-fledged, recognizable alternative to the dominant modern moral theories, but I take it 
to be an open question what commitments contemporary eudaimonism will entail. If the 
eudaimonist perspective continues to elicit interest, there will undoubtedly be many 
contemporary eudaimonisms, just as there were many ancient eudaimonisms. In keeping 
with this conviction, eudaimonism as I will use it here refers to one form of flourishing-
based ethics, one that takes eudaimonia (however understood) to be the goal of ethics and 
the starting point of ethical reflection, but can be developed from there in a number of 
ways depending on how the relationship between nature and reason is understood, the 
weight one gives to what Aristotle calls “external goods,” and one’s intuitions 
surrounding issues of moral luck.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I will lay out the problem human nature presents 
for a feminist ethic of flourishing given the history of feminist scholarship and criticism 
on this topic. I will offer a distinctive interpretation of the history and the problem it 
raises and suggest how I think this problem ought to be understood. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, this will establish the parameters of the problem of human nature for a 
feminist ethic of flourishing.  
 
2.3 The Feminist Critique of Appeals to Human Nature 
Feminist philosophers have repeatedly challenged moral and political theories that 
make appeal to the purportedly universal facts of human nature. They have built a robust 
critique of the history of Western philosophy that points out the ways that conceptions of 
human nature and “woman’s nature” have been used to deny women full moral standing 
and equal political rights or otherwise de-value concerns and tasks associated with 
20 
 
women.
35
 Feminists have repeatedly revealed philosophical conceptions of human nature 
as male-biased. This has especially affected philosophical accounts of the uniquely 
human capacities, such as reason and moral agency. Feminists have argued that these 
male-biased theories function to sustain and legitimate hierarchical relationships between 
the sexes as well as women’s exclusion from significant forms of political participation. 
In this way, feminist theorists have made a strong case that philosophical theory—
specifically our philosophical conception of human nature—has been a significant source 
of women’s subordination and oppression. 
The examples are too numerous to mention them all, but allow me to outline a 
few exemplary cases where feminists have charged purportedly universal theories of 
human nature with male bias. Nancy Tuana calls attention to the fact that Aristotle 
regarded woman as a “misbegotten man.” He argued that her insufficient powers of 
reason made her unfit to govern herself and that she must, therefore, be governed by 
someone with the appropriate powers of reason—namely, a man.36  
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Genevieve Lloyd argues that Descartes’ ideal knower is in fact a gendered 
knower: “the man of reason.” Even though Descartes affirms that women and men are 
equally possessed of the “natural light of reason,” because the training and exercise of 
reason requires transcendence of the body and its demands (along with a certain amount 
of leisure), the social situation of the ideal knower is in fact that of a man. If a woman 
behaves according to her prescribed gender role, she will, as a rule, be unable to satisfy 
the requirements of the ideal knower because her socially prescribed role in providing for 
and attending to the bodily needs of her family and community will keep her mentally 
and physical preoccupied.
37
  
 For Kant, moral agency is a matter of acting for the sake of duty, which he sees 
as a matter of acting for the sake of the moral law as delivered by reason. When we act on 
the basis of the deliverances of reason, we are capable of self-determination rather than 
determination by the laws of causal necessity governing the empirical world. Acting on 
the basis of inclination (e.g., emotional sympathy or desire) is acting in response to causal 
stimuli from the empirical world, so it cannot be regarded as freely determined action. 
Acting from inclination is, for that reason, incompatible with full moral agency. As Kant 
would say, such action is heteronomous as opposed to autonomous. Women, who have 
characteristically been associated with the emotional life and its partialities (particularly 
for family, friends, and relatives), have been regarded as unable to control their emotions 
and desires sufficiently to engage in dispassionate and self-determining acts of reason. 
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But if women are understood to be governed by their emotions, they cannot be full moral 
agents on Kant’s view.38  
Rousseau, who also takes moral agency to be a matter of acting for the sake of 
duty, is explicit about the implication of this view of moral agency for women. Because 
women are, on his view, guided by emotion and desire in a way that interferes with the 
governance of reason, Rousseau concludes that women must “never cease to be subjected 
either to a man or to the judgments of men and they are never permitted to put themselves 
above these judgments.”39 Philosophical reasoning like this rationalized the social and 
legal subordination of women and legal practices such as coverture—the “covering” of 
women under the legal identity of their husband in marriage—as well as prohibitions 
against voting rights for women, not to mention innumerable everyday instances of bias 
against women that passed as “common sense” about what women were capable or not 
capable of doing. 
A significant theme emerges from the history of feminist scholarship critiquing 
the canon on this point: The problem is not simply with the philosopher’s 
misunderstanding of women and their capacities, but with the conception of humanity 
itself being employed. The conception has been revealed time and time again to be male-
biased in its very construction. The ideal of human nature functioning in Western 
philosophical theory has been biased by being implicitly a masculine ideal. Aristotle took 
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the male form of being human as the ideal of humanity, and on that basis, judged that 
women were defective, malformed, “misbegotten” men. Kant and Rousseau took a 
characteristically masculine form of reasoning as the ideal of impartial rationality, and 
therefore took characteristically feminine forms of reasoning attuned to feelings and 
special relationships of dependence to be defective forms of human reasoning. The 
problem feminists have identified is not just that these philosophers had mistaken views 
of women’s capacities and nature (though that was often true), but that they employed 
false conceptions of what it is to be a human being—conceptions that implicitly took 
men’s experience or masculine modes of being as the ideal of what it is to be human. 
Beyond the historical critiques feminist theorists have built, feminist philosophers 
have extended the critique in ways that transform the force of the critique from a 
methodological cautionary (suggesting we need to be careful that theories that purport to 
be universally representative really are and do not encode gender-biased concepts) to a 
methodological maxim to avoid universalizing, or “essentializing,” readings of persons or 
classes of persons altogether. In what became known as the “difference critique,” white 
feminists were forced to recognize that it was not only sexist male philosophers who were 
susceptible to theoretical problems in representation. 
In the 1960s and ’70s, cultural feminists undertook the project of attempting to 
theorize woman sans sexism. The effect was a sort of transvaluation of values insofar as 
cultural feminists valorized those qualities traditionally assigned to women such as 
intuition, emotion, empathy, and the capacity for giving life and care. These 
characteristics were taken to signify a unique and valuable feminine difference.
40
 These 
                                                 
40
 As a theoretical stance, this position is also known as “difference feminism,” in contrast to “equality 
feminism” (which describes the classical liberal feminist position). Difference feminists see in equality 
24 
 
“feminine virtues,” all of which had at one time or another been represented as the source 
of women’s (necessarily) second class status, were proposed if not as the source of 
women’s superiority, then at least as the source of their equality. One of the fruits of this 
emphasis on a unique and valuable feminine difference was the ethics of care.
41
  
However, not all feminists were persuaded by the cultural feminist accounts of the 
origin of women’s differences from men. For one, cultural feminism often explained 
women’s differences from men in terms of female biology, especially in the capacity to 
give life by bearing children. While cultural feminists valorized this capacity, some 
worried it re-introduced a new form of essentialism. Having mastered the skills of 
unmasking sexist forms of essentialism in the tradition, feminists in the social-
constructionist camp turned those arguments against essentialism inward and argued that 
cultural feminism was reproducing another pernicious form of essentialism. Social-
constructionist feminists argued that cultural feminists who appealed to an essential 
feminine nature (often understood as biological in origin) were misguided. Gender was a 
social construct with a merely contingent link to the facts of biology: Sex was a matter of 
biology; gender was the social significance of sex. The implication of the social 
constructionist position, as many understood it, was that women’s roles and social 
identities were open to intentional, progressive change, whereas cultural feminism was 
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simply valorizing women’s biological determinism.42 Social constructionists saw this as 
denying women freedom to choose and self-create and serving to reinforce traditional 
forms of women’s subordination. In this way, social constructionist feminists took a stand 
for anti-essentialist feminist theory. 
The social constructionists argued by contrast that being a woman was a matter of 
occupying a certain social role (e.g., potential sexual partner for men, wife, or mother) or 
sharing in a certain social experience (e.g., oppression under patriarchy). Social 
constructionist social and political theory emphasized commonalities among women on 
the basis of their social experience of subordination under institutional patriarchy. 
However, over time, even some social constructionist accounts of women’s identity and 
oppression came to be seen as ultimately relying on essentialist assumptions insofar as 
they implicitly took the experience of white, middle-class women as paradigmatic of 
women as a class. 
In the 1980s, lesbian feminists and feminists of color raised the charge of 
essentialism in what became known as “the difference critique.” Therein they charged 
that the “Woman” represented as the subject of social constructionist theorizing was in 
fact a white, middle-class woman—a woman who ultimately reflected the social position 
of the theorizers and not all women as it purported.
43
 And, in the same way that falsely 
universal and male-biased ideals of human nature served to privilege the values, needs, 
and concerns of the men doing the theorizing in the canon, so the ideals of Woman 
advanced by prominent feminist thinkers of the 1960s and ’70s advanced the values, 
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needs and concerns of the white, middle-class women responsible for that theorizing, 
although this occurred under the guise of advancing concerns universal to women as 
such. Alison Jaggar describes the irony inherent in the way the terms of the difference 
critique paralleled the older feminist critique leveled at male-biased theories of human 
nature:  
The so-called “problem of difference” came to be conceived of less as a 
problem between women and men than as a (cluster of) problem(s) 
between women and women. Ironically, the very feminists who had 
challenged men’s presumption in speaking for women now were told that 
they themselves were presuming too much when they claimed to speak for 
women.
44
 
 
Cultural feminists argued that differences between men and women were 
fundamental but did not make feminine modes of being any less valuable or any less 
human.
45
 Black and Latina feminists saw that differences between women were equally 
fundamental, and that the social positions that produced these differences must also be 
recognized as equally legitimate ways of being a woman.  
Through the writings of black, Latina, lesbian, and third-world feminists, many 
white feminists came to recognize that in their own attempts to theorize about women in 
a way that was non-sexist, they had unwittingly put forward theories that represented 
what it was to be a white, heterosexual, middle-class woman. In doing so, they obscured 
the lived reality and concerns of women of other races, classes, sexualities, and global 
positions and implicitly privileged the lives and concerns of those women who more 
closely approximated the theoretical ideal based on white women’s experience. Clearly, 
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the theoretical challenge involved in articulating a theory of gender differences was not 
resolved by simply including women’s perspectives or experiences in the process of 
theorizing the concept of woman. Even when women’s voices were included in the 
formulation of the ideal, the problem reasserted itself at a new level, in respect of class, 
race, or sexuality. For those who believed they were guilty as charged, it appeared there 
was some non-contingent relation between who does the representing and who gets 
represented in theory. Elizabeth Spelman captured the heart of the difference critique in 
her acerbic observation: “How lovely: the many turn out to be one, and the one that they 
are is me.”46  
Coming to terms with this led many to conclude that the problem was not simply 
that the men doing the theorizing had been sexist, because white feminists theorizing 
about women reproduced essentially the same problem. Margaret Walker describes this 
history of feminist criticism as ultimately revealing an underlying Problem of 
Representation:  
[C]laims to theorize “women’s” experiences, or to represent what 
“women’s” voices say have foundered on the same epistemological 
challenge feminists direct at nonfeminist views. Not all women recognize 
the voice or experience theorized as theirs. [. . .] Feminists have had to 
struggle and negotiate over who is representing whom, why and with what 
authority. Feminists continue to learn in hard ways that claims to represent 
are weighty and dangerous, often not only epistemically dubious but 
morally indefensible.
47
  
 
Feminist theorists have identified a consistent pattern whereby, despite the 
pretention to represent descriptively and universally, the theories actually reflect the form 
of life and ideals of those doing the theorizing. In naming the Problem of Representation, 
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feminists have identified two problems. First, in advancing philosophical accounts of 
various phenomena (e.g., rational agency, autonomy, human nature), philosophers have 
often passed off their normative ideals under the guise of descriptive analysis. Second, 
feminists have found a predictable relationship between the ideals embedded in these 
descriptions and the faces behind the ideals.  
As a result of this history, postmodern feminists are not the only camp within 
feminist theory to be generally skeptical of ‘essentialist’ theories that rely on 
universalizing assumptions regarding the essence or nature of what it is to be a certain 
kind of person—whether that is women’s essence, humanity’s in general, or that of some 
other class (African-American women, third-world women, etc.). Though postmodern 
feminists frequently voice such opposition and concern, the skepticism is seeded much 
more broadly within feminist theory because of the history of feminist theory itself.
48
  
The feminist debates over essentialism suggest several take-aways: First, 
independent of one’s philosophical stance on the epistemological/metaphysical issue of 
realism vs. anti-realism, one’s theory of gender difference and account of the concept of 
woman could be fraught with problems of representation. Metaphysically anti-realist 
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positions, such as social-constructionism, have proven just as susceptible to the problem 
of representation as realist positions, whether metaphysical or biological. Social-
constructionism doesn’t render one immune to these philosophical problems.  
As a case in point, some social constructionist, anti-essentialist feminists tried to 
respond to the problems of overly broad theoretical generalizations about ‘women’ by 
giving greater attention to the differences between various kinds of women based on 
social, economic, and racial location. Rather than speaking of ‘Woman,’ they argued one 
ought to speak of specific kinds of women, i.e., Anglo-American lesbian women, black 
heterosexual women, and working-class Latina women, etc. While this solution strove to 
remedy over-hasty generalizations about women, women’s needs, and women’s 
oppression, it was not clearly an anti-essentialist solution, since, by sub-dividing the 
subject of feminist discourse into multiple identities, it seemed to presuppose that each 
new category was possessed of “its own unique interior composition or metaphysical 
core.”49 Thus this new “solution” to the problem of essentializing discourses about 
women seemed to be itself another form of essentialism. As Diana Fuss wrote of these 
avowedly constructionist strategies, “essentialism is essential to social 
constructionism.”50 Even the self-consciously social constructionist analysis of highly 
specific categories was open to the charge of essentializing. 
Theoretical problems of representation have not been clearly distinguished from 
issues of metaphysics in the literature analyzing and criticizing essentialism. I believe it is 
best to set aside the question of what metaphysics underlies our theoretical representation 
and focus on the theoretical issue. Because the problems criticized as “essentialism” 
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arose in theories that were avowedly constructionist as well as in those that were realist, 
there is good reason to think that the problem is not, at root, a metaphysical one. I believe 
the heart of the problem is not, fundamentally, one of bad essentialist metaphysics, but a 
problem of theoretical representation. 
However, if metaphysical essentialism is not what is at stake in the feminist 
debates over essentialism, then why have so many theorists drawn the conclusion that the 
problem was precisely with lingering vestiges of metaphysical essentialism? In part, this 
seems to have happened because anti-essentialist critics frequently framed their critiques 
as a matter of unmasking the covertly metaphysical essence underlying the so-called 
“essentialist” analysis. However, I agree with Cressida Heyes’s assessment that in much 
of the literature,  
The insinuation that metaphysical essentialism is at stake . . . serves a 
rhetorical function within feminist theory, allowing the work of certain 
authors to be dismissed on the basis of more sweeping criticisms than 
should properly be allowed. Because metaphysical essentialism is an 
untenable position for almost all feminists with regard to gender, eliding 
the distinction between this form of essentialism and others gives false 
weight to charges of “essentialism”. . . . 51  
 
What has often been at issue is a kind of methodological essentialism—how we 
should represent diverse subjects as the subject of ethical and political theory—but this 
has often been obscured by critiques that draw their force from the implication that 
metaphysical essentialism is at stake. Other legitimate philosophical reasons for adopting 
a metaphysically anti-realist position exist, but the feminist critique of essentialism as 
politically dangerous and exclusionary do not speak either for or against metaphysical 
realism or anti-realism about essences or natures—whether women’s, humanity’s, or that 
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of any other group. While concern over essentialism has quite often signified a legitimate 
and important political concern about social exclusion and the dangers of oppression 
consequent upon such exclusion, it equally often obscured the solution to this problem by 
associating these pernicious effects with bad metaphysics. Given that even “good” (i.e., 
social constructionist) metaphysics are susceptible to problems of representation and 
didn’t solve the problem, eliminating “bad” metaphysics cannot be the proper solution.  
Second, anti-essentialism presented a number of theoretical and political 
challenges of its own. Alison Stone has outlined the way anti-essentialism called into 
question both feminist social critique and feminist activism directed at political change. 
Women constitute the subject of feminist social criticism, but anti-essentialism “cast 
doubt on the project of conceptualizing women as a group.”52 Furthermore, without the 
presumption of a shared group identity, feminist politics was in danger because women 
could not “be expected to mobilize around any concern at their common situation, or 
around any shared political identity or allegiance.”53  
Recognizing the implications of anti-essentialism for feminist social criticism and 
political activism, some anti-essentialist theorists responded by adopting ‘strategic 
essentialism,’ which rejects essentialism as a true description of social reality. Rather, it 
accepts the necessity of essentializing claims in politics and advocates for anti-essentialist 
feminists to “continue to act as if essentialism were true, so as to encourage a shared 
identification among women that enables them to engage in collective action.”54 At the 
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extreme, strategic essentialists suggest essentialism is necessary as a political strategy, 
even though it is false and justified purely by its political efficacy. Strategic essentialism 
as a solution to the theoretical crisis in anti-essentialist feminist theory is not very 
convincing. As Alison Stone argues, there is little reason to think an effective political 
strategy for resisting women’s oppression can be built on the basis of a fiction. If women 
do not exist as a unified group, then there is little reason to think that acting as if they did 
would be effective at combatting the challenges women as a group supposedly face.  
Alternatively, strategic essentialists may maintain that essentialism is 
descriptively false, but women’s social experience is structured by social institutions that 
operate as if essentialism were true. So, despite being false, it can be politically effective 
to act as if women share a homogeneous social experience. But this analysis faces a 
problem: It must either accept that women’s social experience is diverse or that there is 
something essentially common due not to their being women but rather to their all being 
treated as women by basic social institutions. Stone argues that this form of strategic 
essentialism is fundamentally unstable because it attempts  
to resuscitate essentialism by arguing that it can take a merely political and 
non-descriptive form. But . . . one cannot defend essentialism on strategic 
grounds without first showing that there is a homogenous set of 
essentialist assumptions that exerts a coherent influence on women’s 
social experience—which amounts to defending essentialism on 
descriptive grounds (as well).
55
  
 
Stone’s criticisms are compelling. As a response to the problems that anti-
essentialism created for feminist politics and social criticism, strategic essentialism is not 
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a very satisfying solution.
56
 I concur with the concern of “anti-anti-essentialists”57 that 
feminist theory cannot suffice without some level of universalizing discourse or—what 
amounts to the same thing—essentializing. The counsel to avoid universalizing 
discourses was tantamount to advocating that feminists quit the practice of engaging in 
social criticism on behalf of women, and stop trying to organize women around political 
issues relevant to their lives.  
While the heated debates over essentialism have subsided, it is not clear that the 
theoretical question of how to represent the subject of feminist discourse was ever 
satisfactorily resolved, and questions about how to engage in responsible representation 
in social and political theory remain. In the following chapters, I will argue that an 
evaluative conception of human nature is theoretically indispensable in a flourishing-
based moral theory. My position might be understood as a form of self-conscious 
essentialism, but at this juncture, I believe the important questions at stake are really 
about responsible representation, not whether or not one’s theory is essentializing. The 
analytical usefulness of that term has been spent. Responsible representation is advanced 
through transparency about the nature and function of theoretical representations of the 
subject of moral and political theory—whether it be women or human beings as such. 
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An added benefit of moving the discussion away from essentialism toward 
methodological issues of theoretical representation is that it shifts the emphasis of the 
problem away from the ambiguities inherent in the debate over essentialism. This debate 
was sometimes over forms of representation and sometimes a proxy for metaphysical 
debate on the part of theorists intent on rooting out the last vestiges of a languishing but 
live inheritance from a philosophical worldview premised on an ontology of substance.
58
 
 Rather than revealing a metaphysical problem, the anti-essentialist debates are 
better understood as revealing the theoretical problem of representation. As witnessed by 
the essentialist/anti-essentialist debate, feminist theory is shaped by a fundamental moral 
concern about the power theoretical representations of the subject in ethical and political 
theory have to affect people’s lives—whether those representations are of women or 
human beings. Feminists have demonstrated persistent concern over the ways theoretical 
assumptions about the nature of the subject affect the lives of the most socially 
marginalized or powerless, and they have developed a growing insight that the realities of 
these kinds of lives tend to be obscured by mainstream moral and political theory. Still, 
theory is impossible without some level of abstract theoretical representation of the 
subject. Thus, assuming feminists are not required to abstain from giving theoretical 
attention to the social and political realities of human life, the important question cannot 
be whether but how those engaged in theoretical work should represent the subject of 
ethical and political theory and how it can be done in a morally responsible way.
59
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If this analysis is correct, then the appropriate questions regarding the reliance of 
a flourishing-based ethic on a conception of human nature will address the nature and 
methodology appropriate to theoretical representation of human nature; how 
representations of various types function theoretically; and how these representations can 
be put to liberatory purposes that help realize a more just world for all.  
Whether ‘human nature’ is a substance in a metaphysically robust sense or a 
philosophical construct, I will leave to the side. Some think realism is the only way to 
make sense of truth claims in any arena. For my purposes here, I will assume the debate 
is still out on that question. I do not think we can do without a conception of human 
nature in ethics and politics, but it is not up to us to determine what human nature is. 
While this rules out certain positions, neither of these assumptions presupposes an answer 
to the question of whether we need recourse to a form of moral realism (where facts 
about human nature would count as moral facts) or whether some sort of constructivism 
is sufficient (in which case, the moral facts about human nature would be understood as 
constructs).  
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3. Outline of the Chapters 
The central argument of this dissertation is that human nature can be a critical 
resource for feminist moral philosophy functioning within a flourishing-based 
framework. The first point to be established is that flourishing-based ethical theories need 
an account of human nature. To be adequately normative, a flourishing-based ethical 
theory needs a robustly normative account of human nature. Feminist moral philosophers 
might wonder why they ought to bother with articulating and explicating their conception 
of human nature, given the difficulty and controversy involved in such an endeavor. I 
make a positive case for including reflection on human nature as a constituent aspect of 
our reflection on the nature of human flourishing by showing what is missing in 
approaches that try to evade such considerations. (I do this especially in chapters two, 
four and five.) I argue that a feminist ethic of flourishing (such as that provided by Lisa 
Tessman) can be strengthened by including a space for reflection on human nature. In the 
course of the argument, I advance an account of the proper relationship between human 
nature claims and an ethic of flourishing. This is articulated in the final chapter.  
The first task is to understand more clearly how conceptions of human nature can 
function to inform a flourishing-based ethical theory. This will be the topic of chapter 
two, for human nature can be brought to bear on a flourishing-based ethical theory in 
multiple ways, and these are importantly related to the way nature in general is 
understood. As such, in chapter two I proceed by taking a step back from the question of 
the representation of human nature and ask about the representation of nature in general, 
drawing a distinction between a ‘substantive conception of human nature’ and a 
‘conception of nature in general’ that underlies a conception of human nature.  
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I argue that there are vastly different ways of representing nature in general, some 
of which are non-starters for ethical argument. I look at the way the concept of nature in 
general functions in the thought of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx. Marx and Aristotle are 
especially significant sources of inspiration for many feminists currently working with an 
ethic of flourishing. Hume, in contrast, is not a major source of inspiration for the ethics 
of flourishing, but he operates with the same conception of nature as those who are 
suspicious of appeals to nature. Louise Antony’s arguments against making appeal to 
nature in ethics provide a particularly clear view of the problems that arise when one 
assumes a Humean view of nature in general.
60
 As a result, it is important to look at the 
way nature is conceived on the Humean model and the challenges this presents to 
thinking that human nature might be relevant to ethics.  
Following the historical analysis in chapter two, I turn to three contemporary 
figures working with a flourishing-based ethic: Rosalind Hursthouse, Martha Nussbaum, 
and Lisa Tessman. The goal is to assess these contemporary ethics of flourishing in order 
to develop a sound basis for a feminist ethic of flourishing.  
In chapter three, I examine the flourishing-based virtue ethics of Rosalind 
Hursthouse. I begin here because Hursthouse has done the most of the three to make 
explicit and defend the normative function of the appeal to nature in a flourishing-based 
ethic. As such, the discussion of Hursthouse serves as an introduction to what I take to be 
some of the major issues and potential confusions surrounding what the appeal to nature 
can properly be expected to provide and what it should not be expected to provide. For 
Hursthouse, the appeal to human nature is not a matter of justifying right action, but of 
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supporting the characterization of flourishing we use to identify the virtues appropriate to 
human life.  
As I am interested in the methodological function of the appeal to human nature, 
Hursthouse’s discussion of the argumentative limitation of the appeal to nature in ethics 
is instructive. Following John McDowell—but responding to a challenge framed by 
Bernard Williams—Hursthouse stakes out the position that human nature is relevant, not 
as a non-ethical foundation, but as part of an overall evaluative outlook on life, one piece 
of which is our view of human nature. She rejects the notion that the appeal to nature is 
intended to silence the moral skeptic or provide an absolute foundation for ethics. She 
instead argues that the appeal to human nature can offer rational support for one’s views 
regarding flourishing and the virtues, despite the fact that it doesn’t provide conclusive 
evidence “from a neutral point of view” (i.e., from the view of one with no particular 
ethical commitments).
61
 Likewise, I’ll suggest that the appeal to human nature cannot be 
expected to silence the “moral sexist,” but it can give rational support for feminist views 
of flourishing.  
I argue that while Hursthouse situates the appeal to human nature appropriately 
within a flourishing-based ethic and so gives the right methodological role to a theory of 
human nature, the substantive conception of human nature she endorses is not really 
strong enough for feminist purposes. For instance, on the assumption that both 
hierarchical and egalitarian gender relations are consistent with stable and functional 
forms of human sociality, on her view as it stands, it seems impossible to account for why 
a social collective characterized by gender equality would be morally superior to one 
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strongly characterized by gender hierarchy. A feminist ethic of flourishing that follows 
Hursthouse’s lead will need a “thicker” account of the proper ends of human nature. 
 In chapter four, Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is the subject of 
discussion. In her thought, we see the influence of both Aristotle and Marx. The tradition 
of Marxist thinking with the most evident influence in Nussbaum’s writing is that which 
appeals to the value of full human development to marshal an ethical critique of systems 
that stunt or inhibit this value. Nussbaum’s account of human flourishing is implicit in 
the list of human capabilities she argues deserve protection as constitutive of a dignified 
human life. This chapter brings together the two major themes of the dissertation: 
feminist objections to human nature claims stemming from the problem of representation, 
and concern for the proper methodological role of appeals to human nature in a 
flourishing-based framework. I will argue that Nussbaum’s account of human nature is 
substantive enough to defend the liberal vision of flourishing to which she is committed, 
but she is ambiguous about the status of her appeal to nature. Thus, at times, she 
misrepresents the role of the appeal to nature.  
In chapter five, I turn to Lisa Tessman’s work in Burdened Virtues. Tessman 
offers a significantly different flourishing-based ethical framework from Nussbaum’s and 
Hursthouse’s. Tessman’s explicit aim is to use a eudaimonist moral theory to analyze the 
moral harms inflicted by oppression. Her method is unorthodox in that she resists arguing 
for a full account of flourishing. Instead, she appeals to the vision of flourishing she finds 
implicit in the projects of political resistance carried on by communities of activists 
committed to resisting oppression. In Tessman’s account, human nature plays quite a 
limited role. Her goal appears to be to avoid controversial questions of human nature, but 
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I argue that embracing the conception of human nature that is already implicit in her 
account of the burdened virtues would bolster her case that the ‘burdened virtues’ 
constitute a moral harm of oppression. In this way, I argue that a theory of human nature 
can be a critical resource for analyzing and defending an account of the harm of 
oppression. 
In the sixth and final chapter, I review the ground covered in the body of the 
dissertation and elaborate on the proper role human nature has in a flourishing-based 
ethical theory. I focus especially on the limitations of an appeal to human nature and 
suggest that the theories of human nature informing an ethic of flourishing may profitably 
be understood as “essentially contested.” While I discuss this possibility briefly, an in-
depth study of the topic will have to wait for another time.  
Before I conclude this chapter, I need to address some relevant issues and 
questions that I will not be able to deal with in any depth in the context of this 
dissertation, and I want to conclude with a short excursus on feminist moral philosophy 
and how this dissertation can be situated within the field of feminist moral philosophy. 
 
4. Boundaries of the Study 
I cannot take up any of the general philosophical objections to a flourishing-based 
ethical theory here. There are important philosophical objections to flourishing-based 
ethical frameworks as moral theories at all on the grounds that they are “egoistic” and 
cannot account for the especially stringent nature of a moral obligation. These objections 
owe especially to Kant,
62
 though others feel similarly.
63
 I limit myself to the unique 
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concerns that arise from the feminist project of appropriating this moral framework. 
These objections stem from the history of feminist critiques of essentialism and are 
related to the problem of representation as laid out here. 
While I examine a variety of flourishing-based ethics, I do not address the 
possibility of a “subjectivist” ethic of flourishing, that is, a theory which defines 
flourishing by reference to desire-satisfaction or preference-satisfaction. This decision 
means that I exclude from the parameters of this discussion a whole school of thought 
about flourishing, a school sometimes referred to as the “subjective welfare approach” to 
flourishing. At least on the face of it, subjective welfarists seek to give an account of 
flourishing relatively independent of human nature. However, desire- and preference-
satisfaction-based accounts of flourishing seem to face an insurmountable objection with 
regard to the problem of preference adaptation. This is particularly problematic in regards 
to oppression, since oppression tends to systematically limit the scope of one’s life 
possibilities. Whether the problem of preference adaptation is decisive against 
preference-based accounts is a subject of intense debate that I do not have time or space 
to consider here.  
 
5. Coda: Feminist Moral Philosophy 
Feminist moral philosophy has developed significant critiques of the standard-
bearing ethical and political theories of the Western philosophical tradition, showing how 
they suffer from gender and other bias. Following a period of intense scrutiny and 
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criticism, feminist philosophers have also re-envisioned and recast these theories in ways 
that make them more amenable to feminist purposes and less susceptible to these 
criticisms.
64
 This project sits in the space created by the flowering of feminist theory as 
both critique and reformulation, and it aims to carry this tradition forward in rethinking 
flourishing-based ethics for feminist purposes.  
This dissertation is a work in feminist ethics, or perhaps, since “feminist ethics” is 
still so often identified with the ethics of care or as a subset of applied ethics, it would be 
better to call it a work in feminist moral philosophy. It takes up an age-old question 
within moral philosophy—the relationship between human nature and ethics—and 
examines that question in light of the theoretical concerns articulated within feminist 
theory. Of the study of feminist ethics, Margaret Walker has said:  
“[F]eminist ethics” is more like Kantian, Aristotelian, or utilitarian ethics 
than it is like, say, environmental ethics or biomedical ethics. It is not a 
subject matter but a method of approach with certain prior convictions 
about human agency, knowledge and society. I see feminist ethics as one 
such approach within moral philosophy conceived as the continuing 
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Ethics. For further discussion of the ways Aristotle’s eudaimonism must be modified for feminist purposes, 
see Burdened Virtues, 7, 75-76. 
43 
 
project of exploring the form and content of answers to the question “how 
shall we live?”65 
 
I concur. Feminist ethics is more like Kantian, Aristotelian or utilitarian ethics 
than environmental ethics or biomedical ethics. Like those ethical theories, it requires 
certain assumptions as starting points—assumptions that have traditionally been 
discussed in terms of ‘human nature.’ For a variety of reasons (some of which are 
addressed above), some feminist theorists have been reluctant to commit themselves to a 
robust conception of human nature.
66
 Feminist moral philosophers have the same 
philosophical reasons as any other moral philosopher to be skeptical of appeals to human 
nature, but they also have a distinct set of reasons arising out the history of feminist 
theory itself. I cannot defend against the other reasons philosophers have wished to avoid 
reliance on claims about human nature. My goal here is to address what I see as 
distinctively feminist objections to appeals to human nature within ethics. As such, I will 
limit myself to the concerns I understand to arise out of the history of feminist inquiry 
and debate outlined in this chapter, culminating in the questions and concerns that I will 
call, following Margaret Walker, the Problem of Representation. 
Careful articulation and examination of the grounds upon which feminist moral 
philosophy can defend its claims regarding the oppression of women is important because 
feminists must ultimately rely on ethical arguments to defend the rightness of their 
practical and political goals. Amy Baehr notes that “One weakness of much feminist 
political theory is that it does not directly address the question of its normative 
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foundation.”67 This dissertation seeks to provide resources for the remedy of that problem 
by advancing the conversation among feminists about the possible normative resources 
available in an articulated conception of human nature. That being said, “foundations” 
might not be the right word here because I do not ultimately see human nature as the 
objective ground, or foundation, from which ethics can be derived. Human nature on my 
view is, rather, more like a resource from which we draw. Like many of our natural 
resources, it must be used carefully. It can be abused, misused, and put to use in 
detrimental ways. It can also be neglected to the point of becoming a wasteland—so 
neglected that it no longer has the power to nourish what it once sustained. But if used 
with care, stewarded as we steward the land, human nature is a conceptual resource that 
can nourish our thought, providing us with a moral source from which to draw inspiration 
and grounds upon which we can articulate a vision of a good human life. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
NATURE AND FLOURISHING IN THE THOUGHT OF ARISTOTLE, HUME, AND 
MARX 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I gave the outlines of a problem in contemporary feminist 
moral philosophy: In the process of re-appropriating the ethics of flourishing, there has 
not been sufficient attention paid to the degree to which such an ethical framework 
implies or depends upon a robust theory of human nature. I also argued that although the 
essentialism/anti-essentialism debate in feminist theory is often taken as a debate 
delimiting the bounds of acceptable feminist metaphysics, it may be more usefully 
understood as pointing out certain problems of theoretical representation. If the problem 
is a lack of transparency about the status of claims about human nature, the solution I 
propose is transparency about the status of our claims about human nature. 
This chapter examines Aristotle, Hume, and Marx for their significance as 
exponents of a flourishing-based ethic. My concerns in this chapter are methodological: 
What function does a conception of human nature play in articulating and justifying 
normative moral claims within a flourishing-based ethic? In order to focus on 
methodological questions, I distinguish the substantive conception of human nature—that 
is the particular content of the account of human nature—from the conception of nature 
in general. I’ll explain this distinction more fully below, but what emerges from this 
analysis is a distinction between different ways of representing nature in general, either as 
teleological (Aristotle and the early Marx) or as empirical (Hume and the later Marx). I 
conclude that a teleological conception of nature in general provides a flourishing-based 
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ethic with a source of normativity that is unavailable given an empirical conception of 
nature in general, but the teleological conception is much more epistemologically 
contentious than the empirical conception, and it does not “ground” (i.e., provide an 
objective justification in a value neutral realm independent of the ethical theory) the 
normative claims of the theory in the way it is sometimes expected that claims about 
human nature will. As we will see in the course of examining the normative moral 
criticisms leveled by Hume and Marx, the normative force of their claims implicitly relies 
upon a teleological conception of human nature.  
In “ ‘Human Nature’ and Its Role in Feminist Theory,” Louise Antony argues that 
“feminist theory needs an appeal to a universal human nature in order to articulate and 
defend its critical claims about the damage done to women under patriarchy, and also to 
ground its vision of equitable and sustaining human relationships.”1 Notions of ‘damage’ 
and ‘harm’ presuppose a positive conception of what flourishing is and what is good for 
human beings. If it is the flourishing of human beings as such that is morally relevant, 
then positive conceptions of what it is to be human and to flourish as a human being are 
important for providing a standard by which to criticize treatment that cuts off or denies 
this possibility to women. Two years later, in her article “Nature and Norms,” Antony 
reverses her position, and in the course of criticizing Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach, argues that the attempt to ground ethics in human nature is misguided and 
doomed to fail. In this later article, Antony maintains, “The fact—if it is one—that such 
human universals as exist are due to our nature as human beings is itself of no ethical 
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importance.”2 Antony reasons as follows: Persuasive arguments from nature will 
represent what is “true by nature” as “a matter of simple observation or an 
uncontroversial finding from a neutral science,” and this entails a conception of nature 
that is modally and normatively flat where nature signifies either what is “independent of 
human agency” or “statistically normal” or even “part of our genetic endowment.”3 But, 
Antony points out, if the appeal to nature is to be rhetorically effective in ethical 
argument, the notion of nature at work must somehow also preserve the normative import 
that the term ‘nature’ carries, and these two goals are at cross purposes.4  
I agree with Antony’s analysis of the problem with appeals to a normatively flat 
concept of nature. Without additional premises, the recognition that certain human 
universals exist that are a function of our genetic endowment or are statistically normal is 
of no ethical importance. These universals must be seen as good or bad according to 
some standard of evaluation if they are to be understood as ethically significant. 
However, there may still be an important role for appeals to nature in ethics. Rather than 
reject the use of the concept of nature in ethical argument, I think we ought to reject 
Antony’s first assumption—that the conception of nature we need in order to “ground” 
feminist ethics is an “empirical”—or, as she puts it, “normatively flat”—conception of 
nature. Antony’s concern is that only empirical conceptions of human nature will 
ultimately be persuasive in ethical argument. The reasons an appeal to human nature can 
provide may not be able to persuade convinced members of “the opposition” (whoever 
that is), but there are few arguments that can do that, and the reasons a theory of human 
nature can be used to articulate may be important, even if they cannot decisively sway 
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opinion. One of the upshots of this chapter is that a feminist ethic of flourishing need not 
accept Antony’s first assumption, and, instead, feminist ethicists working to develop an 
ethic of flourishing ought to begin by assuming that a conception of human nature that is 
relevant to the ethics of flourishing will be an evaluative one with normative significance 
by virtue of the fact that it draws qualitative distinctions between possible ends of human 
life. What I identify as a ‘teleological concept of nature in general’ does precisely this. 
Teleological conceptions of human nature will not be uncontroversial, but these 
evaluative interpretations of human life are inescapable in a flourishing-based ethic, and 
acknowledging them allows us to be articulate about an important set of reasons we have 
to endorse a particular vision of flourishing. 
Throughout this chapter, I’ll refer to conceptions of nature that aspire to be purely 
descriptive the way Antony describes as “empirical” conceptions of nature. Their 
“purity” as descriptive can be gauged by the degree to which they avoid invoking 
evaluative or normatively-loaded concepts. Thus, the “empirical” and “purely 
descriptive” will be, by definition, opposed to the evaluative and normative.5 If 
judgments about human nature are to be relevant to ethics—and, in particular, if they are 
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to be relevant to a flourishing-based feminist ethic—they will need to be formed by a set 
of evaluations. These evaluations come in the form of judgments that discriminate 
between proper and improper ends of human life, and, consequently, make possible a set 
of discriminations regarding a host of other things in human life, primary among them 
being human needs and desires. I’ll refer to accounts of human nature that encode such 
evaluative judgments as ‘teleological’ because they are based on a set of judgments that 
draw distinctions of worth between possible ends of human life.  
The body of this chapter offers a schematized survey of the way three different 
conceptions of human nature have functioned to inform three historically prominent 
flourishing-based ethical theories: those of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx. The goal here will 
be to begin building the categories that will be used later on in the dissertation to discuss 
and evaluate the thought of Rosalind Hursthouse, Martha Nussbaum, and Lisa Tessman. 
While Aristotle is a natural figure to focus attention on in this regard, I have chosen to 
focus on Hume and Marx because they offer forms of a flourishing-based ethic which are 
substantially different from Aristotle’s, so they can show how a flourishing-based ethic 
might take a different form from that of classical eudaimonism, modeled by Aristotle.
6
 
My attention will be devoted especially to the role human nature plays in supporting their 
visions of flourishing and the moral critiques they can legitimately defend in light of that 
conception of human nature. Aristotle, Hume, and Marx offer distinctive approaches to 
this question and are illustrative of influential ways of understanding the significance of 
human nature for a flourishing-based ethic. While I will ground my discussion in the 
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writings of these three figures and note as I go along some of the more important 
interpretive controversies, I cannot take up in any serious way the complicated matters of 
historical interpretation surrounding each figure—of which there are many. Instead, I 
suggest we understand them as “ideal types.” As such, each of these figures will serve as 
representatives of how a distinctive way of thinking about human nature might inform a 
flourishing-based ethical theory.  
After laying out the basic outline of each figure’s theory of human nature, I will 
give a short analysis, the goal of which will be to identify the substantive conception of 
human nature and the general concept of nature that undergird their ethical thought. 
What I am here calling a “substantive conception of human nature” would, within the 
wider philosophical discourse, probably be thought of simply as the content of the 
philosopher’s theory of human nature. However, in order to get clarity in this 
conversation, we need a way to distinguish the content of their account of human nature 
from the way they conceive of nature in general, which, in the wider philosophical 
discourse, would likewise be thought of as part of the philosopher’s theory of human 
nature.  
By “general concept of nature,” I don’t mean their view of the environment or 
their ecology. Rather, I am referring to what Aristotle would call an “essence.” I favor the 
phrase “general concept of nature” because “essence” so connotes what Aristotle meant 
by that term that it pollutes our attempt to understand alternative ways of thinking about 
natures. To the extent Marx thinks essences exist, they are not Aristotle’s essences, and 
Hume definitely does not accept the real existence of Aristotelian essences. But both 
Marx and Hume have a general concept of nature that undergirds and informs how they 
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think about human nature—or so I will argue. Hence it is with the singular aim of 
conceptual clarity that I suggest thinking in terms of a substantive conception of human 
nature, and distinguishing this from the general concept of nature. The way I draw this 
distinction, it should be possible, in principle, to identify both of these aspects within any 
philosophical theory of human nature. In principle, any theory of human nature will have 
both a substantive conception of human nature and a general concept of nature that 
undergirds and shapes thinking about human nature and its significance for moral 
philosophy. 
In the conclusion of this chapter, I summarize the main functional differences—
not between these figures’ substantive conceptions of nature, but between their 
competing general concepts of nature. This chapter has two goals: First, through an 
analysis of Aristotle, Marx, and Hume, to formulate a set of categories that can be used to 
evaluate the role a theory of human nature is playing within an ethic of flourishing. These 
will then be used to evaluate contemporary versions of the ethics of flourishing in later 
chapters. The second goal is to motivate the case for a teleological conception of human 
nature in a flourishing-based ethical theory. This chapter argues that a teleological 
conception of human nature is indispensable for an adequately normative theory of 
flourishing. 
 
2. Aristotle 
Ethical reflection, on Aristotle’s understanding of it, begins with a very general 
question: “How should I live?” What we all want in life, ultimately, says Aristotle, is 
eudaimonia, and the question is really how to attain this. Eudaimonia is commonly 
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translated either as “happiness,” “well-being” or “flourishing.” Happiness is, for a 
number of reasons, the better English translation, but in saying this, we must bear in mind 
that eudaimonia is best thought of as a concept that expresses something like “true 
happiness.”7 For Aristotle, the purpose of both politics and ethics is to make genuinely 
good, happy lives possible, and “political science” is the field of study devoted to 
acquiring knowledge of how we ought to live in order to attain this goal.
8
  
True happiness for human beings, according to Aristotle, can only be found in the 
life of virtue. He argues for this conclusion by appealing to human nature—to the ergon 
(the characteristic activity or “function”) of a human being. Thus, in his argument for the 
human function, as in several other places, nature enters into Aristotle’s arguments as a 
normative concept, where what is “natural” is understood as providing a standard for 
human life. We can say that ethical argument involves an “appeal to nature,” when one 
                                                 
7
 In classifying eudaimonist ethics as a kind of ‘ethics of flourishing, I am obviously privileging the 
concept of flourishing, but ‘flourishing’ is a technical or philosophical term, whereas ‘eudaimonia’ and the 
English word ‘happiness’ are words at home in commonsense and everyday parlance. This is one of the 
reasons ‘happiness’ is a better translation, but there are several points to keep in mind. First, translating 
eudaimonia as ‘happiness’ can be misleading since in English ‘happiness’ is closely associated with the 
idea of pleasure, a subjectively felt state about which we usually take the individual’s opinion to be 
decisive, whereas eudaimonia implies a state of well-being about which one could be mistaken. One can 
think one is living a good life and be self-deceived or misguided. However, (and this is the second point) 
‘well-being’ is awkward because there is no adjectival form of well-being in English, and this creates 
translation difficulties. Third, common usage of ‘happiness’ permits the application of the concept for even 
short-lived periods of time. In contrast, the intuitive extension of ‘eudaimonia’ concerns one’s life as a 
whole. Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 43-46; “Virtue 
and Eudaimonism,” Social Philosophy and Policy 15, no. 1 (1998). When we consider a complete life as 
the referent of eudaimonia, the concept of ‘success’ (as in ‘a successful life’) has some important 
conceptual similarities to ‘eudaimonia.’ Hutchinson’s discussion of Aristotle’s ethics emphasizes this. D.S. 
Hutchinson, “Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
8
 Politics aims at living well, and ethics is, according to Aristotle, a subset of politics. Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1999), 1095a14021, 1094b11-
12. [Hereafter cited as EN.] Political science is, according to Aristotle, the field of inquiry devoted to 
knowledge of what is good and to the actions that most reliably produce this. The goal of political science 
is a practical one: to produce the highest good achievable in action, i.e., happiness (EN 1095a14-19). In the 
strict sense, politics is not a science because a true “science” or knowledge (epistēmē) of a subject is the 
result of a demonstration based on deductive inference in which the premises serve to explain the 
conclusion and the conclusion holds universally. Terence Irwin, Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, in 
Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999), 343, 347. Political science, in contrast, can 
only give us guidelines that hold usually or for the most part (EN 1094b12-27). 
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argues that because some aim or practice is natural for us, we should act in accordance 
with it, and this is how Aristotle often argues.
9
 
While there are important instances in which Aristotle appeals to nature as a norm 
in ethical argument, interestingly, Aristotle’s ethical writings do not uniformly appeal to 
what is “natural” as a standard for human behavior. Sometimes Aristotle takes nature as 
something that needs shaping and further development to be improved.
10
 In this sense, 
nature is not functioning as a standard. This suggests there are two different senses of 
nature in Aristotle’s thought. In what follows, I review select texts that illuminate these 
two different senses of nature. That there are two senses of nature in Aristotle’s ethical 
writings is well-recognized by Aristotle scholars. There is less consensus on how these 
two senses—once distinguished—are to be related, but the broad outlines of the 
differences are clear. My own understanding is heavily informed by the work of Julia 
Annas and Fred Miller, and I follow Annas in using the terms ‘mere nature’ and ‘nature 
proper’ to distinguish between the two senses of nature we find at work in Aristotle’s 
thought.
11
 
For our purposes here, what is most important is the concept of nature proper, 
which sets the stage for an understanding of a teleological conception of nature in 
general. As we will see, the ethical appeal to nature is an appeal to nature proper and not 
to mere nature. There are a number of philosophical and exegetical difficulties that arise 
when we begin to interpret Aristotle as employing two different senses of nature in 
                                                 
9
 Julia Annas, “Ethical Arguments from Nature: Aristotle and After,” in Beiträge zur antiken Philosophie: 
festschrift für Wolfgang Kullman ed. Hans-Christian Günther and Antonios Rengakos (Stuttgart: Franz 
Steiner, 1997). 
10
 Aristotle, EN 1103a15-19; 1144a2-26; 1118b9-19. 
11
 My own analysis of nature proper diverges from Annas’s, and I will footnote these differences as the 
discussion progresses, but for the sake of time and space, I have avoided belaboring these points in the 
body of text. 
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ethical argument. My purpose is not to resolve these difficulties, but rather to highlight 
that nature proper is distinct from mere nature (whether Aristotle himself understood 
them to be distinct or not) and that Aristotle’s appeal to nature in ethical argument is an 
appeal to nature proper. Nature proper provides an evaluative understanding of our 
nature. It encodes judgments about the proper development of our form of life and what 
is good for us. While it purports to be a true description of the way things are, it clearly 
involves taking an interpretive lens on the human condition. When nature enters into 
Aristotle’s ethical writings as an ideal that sets a norm for human life—and not simply as 
a starting point we can improve upon or as a constraint we must accommodate in some 
way or other or—it is nature proper to which Aristotle is appealing rather than mere 
nature. 
In the terminology of this study, nature proper expresses a teleological conception 
of nature in general. A teleological concept of nature in general is important because it 
distinguishes which outcomes of human life are “fulfillments” and which are not, and 
thereby what our genuine needs are and which desires we ought to endorse in the pursuit 
of flourishing. If nature is going to enter into a flourishing-based ethic as a normative 
concept that is more than a directiveless constraint we must accept and accommodate (in 
some way or other), I take it that it will have to be something like Aristotle’s concept of 
nature proper and not mere nature that is entailed. The following discussion is devoted to 
clarifying the distinction between these two senses of nature. 
The validity of taking nature as a normative standard against which to judge 
human practices and goals depends entirely on what is meant by “natural.” Therefore, in 
order to evaluate the role nature plays in Aristotle’s ethical arguments, we must first 
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consider how Aristotle uses the term and clarify the meaning of “nature” as it appears 
when Aristotle invokes it as a norm. If by “natural” Aristotle simply means what happens 
usually and for the most part—or what is statistically “normal” or common—Aristotle’s 
appeal to nature will be open to devastating objections because, unfortunately, many 
things in human life that are usual and common are evidently unjust. In that case, on 
moral grounds, we should reject Aristotle’s appeal to nature in ethical argument as an 
untrustworthy source of guidance for ethical goals and aims. Despite Aristotle’s 
identification of nature with what happens “always or for the most part” in the Physics,12 
there are good reasons to believe that when Aristotle appeals to nature as a standard for 
human aims and action, he is not simply taking what is natural to be what is ‘usual,’ 
‘statistically normal,’ or ‘commonly the case.’ As I will argue, the concept of nature in 
Aristotle’s thought provides a stronger basis for normative moral claims because it names 
what is good for the thing in question, encoding a distinction between what happens in 
the course of life (even quite typically or predictably), and what would be ideal for the 
realization and full flowering of a thing’s potential. Naming what is ‘natural’ in this sense 
also names what is good for the thing. But even if, in the course of ethical argument, 
Aristotle himself mistakenly conflates the normative sense of nature with what happens 
always or for the most part,
13
 the normative concept of nature in Aristotle does not 
depend on this conflation. 
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 Aristotle, Physics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 197a30; 198b34-35; 199b14-18; 199b25-26. [Hereafter cited as 
Phys.] 
13
 As Annas argues he does in Politics Book I. Annas, “Ethical Arguments from Nature.” 
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2.1 Two Senses of Nature: Mere Nature and Nature Proper 
As a number of scholars have observed, and this brief discussion has already 
highlighted, there are two quite different senses of nature at work in Aristotle’s 
philosophical thought.
14
 In what follows, I will show, exegetically, the basis for the claim 
that there are two distinct senses of nature in Aristotle, but let me say in brief the main 
differences between these two senses. Following Annas, I think we can best understand 
these two different senses of nature as corresponding to two different functions for the 
concept. In one sense, Aristotle uses ‘nature’ to refer to the material starting points of 
human life. Nature is thought of as providing the “raw materials” of human life in terms 
of inclinations, aversions, powers, potentials, and limitations. These starting points can be 
developed or stifled, but even in those cases where we cannot change them, they can 
often be accommodated in a number of different ways. Constructing the best kind of life 
out of what nature offers depends on giving these raw materials the proper treatment. I’ll 
call nature in this sense ‘mere nature.’ In another sense, Aristotle uses ‘nature’ to refer to 
the end of a complete process of development in those things which possess an internal 
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 Terence Irwin simply calls them ‘nature #1’ and ‘nature #2’. These two must be understood as distinct 
since, as he notes, some but not all of the potentials given as a part of nature #1 will be included in nature 
#2. Irwin, Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, 339-340. Fred Miller also distinguishes between two senses 
of nature—what he calls the ‘strict sense’ of nature and the ‘extended sense’. As will become clear in the 
discussion that follows, I do not think the way Miller draws the distinction is philosophically adequate, 
nevertheless, Miller is another scholar who has seen the need to distinguish two different senses of nature 
in Aristotle’s philosophy. According to Miller, Aristotle’s analysis of nature in the strict sense is given in 
Physics II, i where a thing is said to exist by nature “if and only if, it has a nature, in the sense of a source 
or causes of moving or being at rest, which is internal to it as such” (Miller 1995, 37). According to Miller, 
in the extended sense anything can be regarded as “natural” if it “has as its function the promotion of an 
organism’s natural ends and it results, in whole or in part, from the organism’s natural capacities and 
impulses” (Miller 1995, 41). As with Annas’s concept of nature proper, Miller’s extended sense of nature 
“serves as a standard of value” because it identifies what it is when it is perfected (Miller 1995, 45). 
However, a problem arises on Miller’s reading. Carving up the concept of nature in this way leaves Miller’s 
reading without any name for the sense of nature that is independent of human choice and can be set in 
opposition to reason and habit, and this is an important category, since for Aristotle we make use of reason 
and habit to improve what nature has provided. Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice and Rights in Aristotle’s 
Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 60-61. 
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principle of development. The nature of a thing, according to Aristotle, is shown through 
the proper actualization of its innate potentials, and thus ‘nature’ indicates an ideal: a 
state of complete and proper development, consistent with a thing’s flourishing. I’ll call 
nature in this sense, ‘nature proper.’15  
While I believe that drawing this distinction has value for Aristotle scholarship, it 
also has a wider significance because this feature of Aristotle’s thought is taken up—and 
the puzzles it creates are replicated—in Aristotelian moral philosophy more broadly. This 
distinction between mere nature and nature proper is transmuted and transmitted with the 
Aristotelian tradition, such that something similar can be found even in contemporary 
Aristotelians. The Aristotelian starting point on human nature is that human beings are 
rational animals. Rationality is definitive of our nature, and Aristotelians take reason and 
the use of reason to be “natural” for us. Yet, when it comes to ethics and normative 
questions, a distinction will be drawn between the authority of our nature and the 
authority of reason. For example, John McDowell challenges the idea that nature can 
have any normative authority over rational beings. In McDowell’s thinking, reason is 
authoritative for rational animals, not nature.
16
 However, by Aristotelian lights, reason is 
the definitive mark of human nature. The ambiguity in the concept of nature allows 
reason to be both “natural” and at the same time an authority independent of our nature.17 
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 Cf. Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 142-158. 
16
 McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism.” 
17
 Micah Lott, “Why Be a Good Human Being? Natural Goodness, Reason, and the Authority of Human 
Nature,” Philosophia 42 (2014). 
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2.1.1 Mere Nature 
Aristotle’s use nature leaves conceptual space for the judgment that there are 
things that are ‘natural’ and yet in need of improvement, which is to say, they are not 
good. Even though (as I will discuss below) there is a normative sense of nature in 
Aristotle, the simple identification of a characteristic or quality as ‘natural’ does not 
automatically imply that it is therefore good. We can call the aspects of our constitution 
in need of improvement, aspects of ‘mere nature.’ 
We can find references to nature in the sense of mere nature in Aristotle’s 
discussion of the conditions of moral praise and blame and in the distinction he makes 
between natural and full virtue.
18
  
Aristotle clearly recognizes that certain aspects of human constitution obtain 
independent of human choice and agency, and he attributes some of these to nature.
19
 
Aristotle opposes what is natural, or ‘by nature,’ to what is voluntary and ‘up to us.’ 
While we are properly held responsible for things that are up to us, we are not morally 
responsible for things that are due to nature. Thus, Aristotle observes that  
we never censure someone if nature causes his ugliness; but if his lack of 
training causes it, we do censure him. The same is true for weakness or 
maiming; for everyone would pity someone, not reproach him, if he were 
blind by nature or because of a disease or wound, but would censure him 
if his heavy drinking or some other form of intemperance made him 
blind.
20
 
 
This suggests that Aristotle regards that which is ‘by nature’ as both involuntary 
and intractable. What is due to nature is not only not a product of human choice—
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 This is not intended as an exhaustive catalogue of references to mere nature, just a few exemplary 
instances. 
19
 Only some of what is independent of human choice is attributed to nature; some is considered due to 
chance. Aristotle, Phys. 196b10-16; 199b19-26. 
20
 Aristotle, EN 1114a23-31. 
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Aristotle implies that what is due to nature is impervious to change through voluntary 
action, which is why we are not morally responsible for what is due to nature.  
Appealing to the same principles, Aristotle elsewhere reasons that since the 
virtues can be brought about through habituation, we are right to hold one another 
responsible for their acquisition, and the virtues, therefore, cannot be regarded as a 
product of nature.  
[I]t is clear that none of the virtues of character arises in us naturally. For 
if something is by nature in one condition, habituation cannot bring it into 
another condition. A stone, for instance, by nature moves downwards, and 
habituation could not make it move upwards, not even if you threw it up 
ten thousand times to habituate it; nor could habituation make fire move 
downwards, or bring anything that is by nature in one condition into 
another condition.
21
  
 
Again, Aristotle implies that nature is an intractable principle. Things due to 
nature are not open to being made otherwise through human agency. Thus, he cites the 
stone which, even if it is thrown up into the air a thousand times, falls back to earth. In 
contrast, he thinks the virtues can be developed through intentional human action, and 
thus Aristotle reasons that they are not due to nature. 
Aristotle thinks (quite reasonably) that some aspects of human constitution are 
outside our power to control by voluntary acts of choice,
22
 and he attributes these aspects 
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 EN 1103 a19-24, cf. 1179b20-32. 
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 Through the development of modern technology, many aspects of what is due to nature that would have 
been intractable in Aristotle’s time are no longer outside of our power to control or change. For example, 
many diseases and disabling conditions (such as blindness or cleft palate) would have been completely 
beyond the power of people in Aristotle’s day to change, but they are now within our power to change and 
remedy. I do not take the fact that technology has narrowed the bounds of what is intractable in nature to 
discount the validity of Aristotle’s general point. First, there are still some things due to nature that we 
cannot change, but must simply accept and do our best to accommodate. Second, even in cases where 
technology gives us the power to change things formerly intractable, producing change via technology does 
not make the individual any more morally responsible for what is due to nature. For example, take the 
person blind from birth who can now be given sight through surgery. Even if a person can now choose to 
have blindness corrected through surgery, the person is neither blameworthy for having been blind, nor 
would she be praiseworthy for no longer being blind. She might be praiseworthy for overcoming her fear of 
the surgery, or for having taken other voluntary steps to make the surgery possible, but the philosophical 
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of our constitution to nature. Where nature is intractable, Aristotle sees nature as a 
limiting force in human life and a constraint on rational action. We are not morally 
responsible for what belongs to mere nature, but if we hope to flourish, we must 
accommodate it as best we are able—sometimes simply bearing with it23—since it is not 
amenable to being made otherwise. 
But Aristotle does not always assume that what is natural is intractable. 
Sometimes, Aristotle uses nature to indicate aspects of our given constitution that are 
what they are independent of human choice, but they are malleable, and Aristotle regards 
it as up to us what we do with what nature has provided. So Aristotle will say there are 
“three things that make men [sic] good and excellent; these are nature, habit and 
reason.”24 He explains the inclusion of nature by saying, “In the first place, everyone 
must be born a man [sic] and not some other animal; so, too, he must have a certain 
character, both of body and soul.”25 This suggests that nature is a pre-condition of virtue 
because nature provides the faculties and capacities needed for developing the virtues. 
However, even though possessing the right material constitution—for example, being 
rational, being sensitive to pleasure and pain, and honor and shame—is a pre-condition 
for developing the virtues, Aristotle regards the virtues themselves as principally a 
                                                                                                                                                 
point remains valid. I’ll discuss the relevance of ‘force’ below, but the surgery is like a permanent 
application of force to the functioning of the eye. For the individual, receiving surgery is not voluntary in 
the way that would make it praiseworthy or blameworthy. What technology really does change is the status 
of our moral responsibility vis-à-vis others we can help by making technology available. But the difference 
is that here technology puts helping into the realm of the voluntary where it used to be beyond our power to 
help. 
23
 Aristotle, EN 1149b5-7. In this passage, being “natural” (and intractable) is taken as grounds for excuse. 
Aristotle says, “Further, it is more pardonable to follow natural desires, since it is also more pardonable to 
follow those natural appetites that are common to everyone and to the extent that they are common.” The 
idea is that following our nature in this area is leading us wrong, but since it is difficult to resist doing what 
comes naturally—even though we should—there should be less condemnation for those who go wrong in 
this way. 
24
 Politics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 1332a39-40; c.f. 1334b6-7 (hereafter cited as Pol.). 
25
 Ibid., 1332a40-41. 
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product of proper habituation and the development of reason, not a product of nature.
26
 
Nature may provide the materials, but reason and habituation provide the proper guidance 
so that the malleable elements in our nature develop in the right sorts of ways, which is to 
say, ways that accord with virtue. 
Perhaps the clearest and most instructive example of this malleable element of 
nature in Aristotle’s ethical writings is the case of natural virtue. In considering how we 
acquire virtue, Aristotle observes that some people are apparently born possessing the 
virtues. For instance, some are said to be naturally courageous, while others exhibit a 
natural generosity. He calls these states “natural virtues.” However, he denies that the 
states of character essential for happiness are acquired by nature. Possessing natural 
virtue is not what makes for the best kind of life. Because it lacks the necessary 
understanding, natural virtue may, in certain circumstances, actually be harmful and 
contrary to happiness.
27
 Natural virtue is not, therefore, the norm of character, but rather 
simply a disposition we are born with that is susceptible to development in various 
directions. 
While certain people possess natural virtue from birth, ‘full virtue,’ by contrast, 
requires a firm basis in good habits and teaching. Full virtue depends upon habituation to 
cultivate one’s sense of pleasure and pain at the right sorts of things,28 as well as practical 
wisdom, which only comes about with experience and the development of reason.
29
 
Happiness and success in life depend on the acquisition of prudence and full virtue.
30
 We 
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may be born with certain ‘natural’ traits which are qualitatively similar to the virtues, but 
despite being ‘natural,’ Aristotle does not take them to be the norm of virtuous character 
or the controlling feature of happiness. In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle comments that 
there are “two marks by which we define the natural—it is either that which is found with 
us as soon as we are born, or that which comes to us if growth is allowed to proceed 
regularly.”31 Natural virtue is natural in the first sense—being something certain people 
are just born with—but it is not rigid or intractable. These dispositions are malleable and 
can be developed into full virtue if formed in the right ways. 
The picture we have so far of Aristotle’s thinking about the role of human nature 
is this: Nature is a set of “raw materials” out of which we must build our life. Some of 
these are intractable and must simply be accommodated. (Depending on what it is, there 
may be multiple ways of accommodating our nature.) Others are more malleable, but 
need the proper shaping by reason and habit to become excellent and contribute to the 
best kind of life. Nature in this respect is subject neither to praise nor blame, but it might 
be in need of improvement. We can call nature in this sense ‘mere nature.’ It simply 
names the starting points of human life. Aristotle does not take nature in the sense of 
mere nature to be establishing normative standards for human conduct or development. 
As Julia Annas observes, mere nature “is what we start from, but hardly serves as an 
ethical guide of any kind.”32 It seems to be Aristotle’s position that the normative 
standard for how we ought to deal with the raw materials provided by our nature is a 
matter for reason to determine, since “nature on its own can be developed either for the 
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better or for the worse, so that it is up to humans to make use of their reason to control 
their nature by means of habit.”33  
If we think about human nature as providing the raw materials of human life, we 
can use an instructive analogy to art to make sense of the ways in which nature can 
function both as a limit, or constraint, on rational action and, at the same time, a set of 
potentials susceptible to development in different directions. In every art, the media of 
the art—whether sound, paint on a canvas, stone, or a found object— both holds potential 
and sets limits on possibilities for creative expression. Success depends on understanding 
and working within these limits, and on working with, rather than against, the potentials 
internal to the media. This can involve playing creatively with its boundaries, and great 
artists often push the boundaries beyond what was formerly conceived to be possible. 
When we think of human nature as providing the raw materials of human life—as 
Aristotle does when considering aspects of mere nature—it is reasonable to think that 
success in life, too, depends (not only on this, but at a minimum) on doing what is in 
one’s power to make the best out of “what nature has provided,” and this depends on 
development of the potentials of one’s nature as well as a healthy respect for the limits of 
what is possible. 
One possible concern with using mere nature as a category for ethical analysis is 
that it will obscure individuality and difference in human life. However, there is no 
reason that accepting mere nature as a category of philosophical and ethical analysis 
needs to be opposed to common-sense facts of individuality and difference. Thinking 
about mere nature and what this entails can serve (at least) two very different purposes. 
First, it can be done as a matter of private reflection. In order to gain personal insight, one 
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might ask about one’s own basic dispositions and tendencies, asking which are 
experienced as entrenched and intractable and which might be molded differently in order 
to better cope with the world (e.g., a quick temper, a too-tender spirit, a physical 
disability, etc.). Either way, though, it is essential to first identify the “starting points”—
one’s basic dispositions and orientations. What is a ‘given’ part of mere nature for one 
individual might be quite different from that of another.
34
 
However, for the purposes of setting public policy with the aim of making 
flourishing lives widely available, one’s assumptions about mere nature are going to need 
to be generalizations that hold true for the most part, even if not universally. At this level 
some differences will almost certainly be obscured, but I don’t regard this as a decisive 
objection against the use of mere nature as a category for analysis. Law and public policy 
must be generalizable and hold good for the majority of cases, so one must have a 
generalizable account of what can be expected of people and what must simply be 
accommodated. This is what mere nature expresses.
35
 
Returning to the discussion of Aristotle, in one sense—the sense we have called 
‘mere nature’—nature is simply the raw materials of human life. But Aristotle has 
another sense of nature, according to which what is ‘natural’ for us is what is good for us. 
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 “Personality tests” (such as the Myers-Briggs scale, the Enneagram) are contemporary ways of naming 
the psychological elements of mere nature. The more sophisticated uses of personality testing recognize 
that identifying and naming one’s own natural psychological inclinations can be useful for coming to terms 
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Nature in the sense of nature proper shows up in Aristotle’s famous function argument 
and in his argument that the polis is the natural form of human association. 
 
2.1.2 Nature Proper 
Traditionally, Aristotle’s “human function argument” has been interpreted as 
involving an appeal to the proper development of human nature, arguing that a good 
human being is one who acts to achieve the end proper to her nature.
36
 Aristotle identifies 
the “natural end” for a human being as the excellent use of reason, i.e., the virtues. 
Similarly, Aristotle argues that the polis is the natural form of human association, the 
implication clearly being that the polis is best because it is natural.
37
 Aristotle thus holds 
that both virtue and life in the polis are “natural” for us, but by this he does not mean that 
virtue and life in the polis are the starting points of human life that we need to improve 
upon. He clearly means that virtue and life in the polis are ideal for human beings. 
Nature, in this stronger sense, expresses what is ideal for human life. 
Julia Annas argues that the model for understanding this stronger sense of nature, 
which Aristotle then extends to ethical argument, is provided by his analysis of nature in 
Physics II. There, Aristotle distinguishes between different types of causes, and he 
distinguishes the products of nature from the products of art by the fact that the products 
of nature have an internal principle of changing and not changing: “Nature is a kind of 
principle and cause of changing and not changing in the thing whose nature it primarily 
is, in its own right and not accidentally.”38 The products of art, on the other hand, “have 
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no innate impulse to change.”39 Rather, any changes we observe are brought about by a 
principle external to the thing itself. Aristotle goes on to identify the nature of particular 
things with this internal principle of development that tends toward the final end or 
completed form proper to a thing of that kind. Reasoning that the nature of a thing is 
known best by identifying the end-point of this process, Aristotle argues that, “Nature is 
an end (telos), since what we say the nature of each this is, is what it is when its coming-
into-being is completed.”40 
Regarding Aristotle’s distinction between the products of nature and the products 
of art, Annas observes that “The obvious antithesis to nature so understood is force; 
forced movement is brought about by other things impinging on a thing in such a way as 
to overrule the internal sources of change which operate in this thing itself. Aristotle’s 
Physics puts to extensive use this idea of the fundamental contrast between natural and 
forced behavior.”41 Indeed, we see this contrast between natural and forced behavior 
show up again when Aristotle distinguishes nature from chance. Some of Aristotle’s 
interlocutors apparently wanted to attribute those things that come about independent of 
human agency in the natural world simply to chance and not to nature as a distinct 
principle. Aristotle acknowledges that chance is a possible cause in addition to nature and 
art,
42
 but insists that nature is a principle distinct from chance. According to Aristotle, we 
know this is true because what happens by nature comes about in the same way “always 
or for the most part,”43 and when nature is the cause “always the tendency in each is 
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towards the same end, if there is no impediment,”44 but this is never true of chance. What 
happens by chance is random.
45
 Aristotle defends the thesis that nature is an internally 
directed principle of change that—absent interference and external force—will operate 
toward an end: the complete or ‘perfect’ form of a thing of a given kind. He invokes it in 
order to contrast nature with both art and chance.
46
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of nature to ethical argument, he is not simply appealing to what is usually or commonly the case in human 
life as a standard for what should be. 
Annas interprets Aristotle’s arguments in Politics I that the polis and slavery are natural social 
institutions to be, essentially, based on the idea that these social institutions are natural because they arise 
usually and for the most part in human life. She believes that because of their ubiquity, Aristotle has a hard 
time resisting the thought that they are natural and therefore appropriate and justified. Aristotle may be 
relying, as Annas claims, on the supposition that given the ubiquity of these institutions in Greek life, they 
must have some basis in human nature, but his arguments clearly invoke the idea that these arrangements 
are for the best because they make the best kind of life possible. Annas recognizes that Aristotle’s argument 
against “unnatural” ways of making money entails an appeal to an ideal of what is best, which is in open 
conflict with common economic practice. In Pol. I, Aristotle is actually arguing against the common and 
usual way of making money. He regards what was, as a matter of fact, quite common and usual to be 
“unnatural,” and so Annas argues that this makes the money-making argument distinct from the other two 
arguments in Pol. I. Despite the fact that slavery and the polis were commonplace and Aristotle’s economic 
ideal was not, I think there is more continuity between the three arguments than Annas recognizes, and all 
three arguments involve an appeal to Aristotle’s own conception of what is best, given human nature. 
Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 146-158; See also “Ethical Arguments from Nature.” 
While I agree with Annas that ‘nature proper’ should be understood via the Physics II analysis of 
nature, I think the Physics account of nature is thoroughly normative, and judgments about what is natural 
must be made in light of a judgment about what ought to happen and the course that development ought to 
take. Aristotle thinks that what ought to happen usually will if nothing interferes. Aristotle’s appeal to 
nature, then, is not simply an appeal to what happens usually or commonly, statistically speaking. Aristotle 
assumes that if natural processes unfold as they ought to without interference, then they will culminate in 
the natural end of the thing in question, which is the best state for the thing to be in (Phys. 194a28-33). 
While this account of nature is certainly open to objections (and I discuss some of the difficulties in the text 
below), it is not open to the one important and devastating objection mentioned at the outset of this chapter, 
which is that if the appeal to nature is simply an appeal to what is usual or common, it is an intrinsically 
unreliable guide to ethical aims and objectives, since what is usual or common in human life is not 
infrequently also unjust. 
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More than anything else, Aristotle’s philosophy of nature is defined by his 
insistence that the nature of a thing should be identified not with the efficient cause nor 
with the matter of the thing, but with the form and the telos—the final endpoint of the 
process of change. Aristotle argues that “what each thing is when fully developed, we call 
its nature,”47 and “a thing is more properly said to be what it is when it exists in actuality 
than when it exists potentially.”48 Thus, the fully realized form is the true nature of the 
thing, and, according to Aristotle, “nature is the end or that for the sake of which. For if a 
thing undergoes a continuous change toward some end, that last stage is actually that for 
the sake of which.”49 In saying this, he does not mean that whatever comes last, 
temporally speaking, is the end. Rather, only “that which is best” can “claim to be an 
end.”50 Thus, the “natural” process of development, understood in light of Physics II, is 
the one that leads to the fully actualized, ideal form of the thing in question. Aristotle 
conceives of nature as operating regularly to bring about the thing’s “natural end” (in 
classical terms, the “perfection” of its natural capacities), but nature can only be expected 
to operate this way given a crucial caveat: only if there is no impediment or external 
inference. His concept of an “impediment” or “external interference” is whatever 
prevents the thing from realizing its full form and perfected state of being—whatever is 
ideal for it. Thus, the account of a thing’s natural ends is thoroughly normative, informed 
by a conception of what the ideal would be for this kind of thing given the proper inputs 
and absent interfering forces. 
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In light of his account of nature as an internal principle of change oriented toward 
an end, which is not simply the last point in a temporal sequence of events, but that which 
is best for a thing of this kind, the sense in which the excellent use of reason is natural 
and, because it is natural, understood to express a standard for human life can be made 
clear. 
Aristotle argues that human beings are rational animals, living beings whose 
defining characteristic is their capacity for rational activity. It is reason that distinguishes 
a human form of life from other forms of life—such as that of plants and non-human 
animals—and it is the use of reason that elevates human life, making it fine and noble 
and capable of participation in the divine.
51
 To be human is to live a life defined by this 
capacity, and a good human being is one who exercises this capacity well, or 
“virtuously.” Aristotle famously argues this by appealing to the idea that human beings 
have an ergon, or characteristic function, so just as we say of other things with a 
characteristic function that the excellent performance of that function makes for a good 
thing of its kind, so it is with the human being. A pen is good if it writes and writes well. 
Likewise, eyes are good if they see and see well. And a flute player is good if she plays 
the flute well. In each of these cases, the thing in question has a characteristic activity, 
and it is the excellent performance of this activity that guides our judgment. The object 
might be useful for other purposes or the person may have other roles, but a pen’s 
goodness is judged based on how well it writes, not on how well it holds back my long 
hair or slices through packaging tape. In the role of a flute player, a person is good if she 
plays the flute well. Aristotle identifies the human function—the characteristic human 
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activity—with the activity of reason and concludes that a good human being is one who 
exercises his or her reason virtuously.
52
 
Because rationality is, for Aristotle, the form and essence of the human being, the 
appeal to rational activity as the human function constitutes an appeal to human nature. 
Aristotle argues that the human natural end is realized in the life of virtue, which is an on-
going activity and not a static state, and that the attainment of this end constitutes human 
fulfillment—our “perfection” in the actualization of our nature.53 Given Aristotle’s 
account of human nature as essentially rational, Aristotle argues that virtue is the final 
end of a being with a rational nature: “The human good proves to be activity of the soul 
in accord with virtue.”54 
Understood in light of Book II of the Physics, Aristotle’s claim in the 
Nicomachean Ethics that reason is the function of the human being and the good human 
being is one who uses reason well clearly implies that full virtue is “natural” not because 
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it is common or usual or inborn, but because it is the natural end of human nature. This 
way of being “natural” for us is quite different from the way natural virtue was said to be 
“natural” for us. The claim that full virtue is “natural” is strongly normative. It requires 
taking a normative perspective on the complete process of development and 
distinguishing proper contributions to development from external interferences with 
development. For Aristotle, full virtue will result if development proceeds as it ought 
to—if we receive the right teaching and the proper kinds of habituation and nothing 
adverse interferes.  
Similar to the function argument, Aristotle’s argument in Politics I that the polis 
is the natural form of human association can be understood as invoking a claim about 
nature proper. Fred Miller argues that Aristotle considers the polis “natural” for human 
beings, not because it possesses its own internal principle of development like a 
biological organism, but because it promotes the human “natural end”—the fullest state 
of human development.
55
 According to Miller, “The polis arises out of human nature (in 
the strict sense) and is also necessary for the fulfillment of human nature (in the sense of 
an end).”56  
There are (at least) two ways the polis qualifies as natural. First, for Aristotle, our 
natural end is not bare survival, but flourishing, which is a state of “self-sufficiency.” By 
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calling a person self-sufficient, Aristotle does not mean that one is capable of “going it 
alone” Robinson Crusoe-style with no need of other people.57 Rather, to be self-sufficient 
is to possess everything needed for a truly good life. One who is self-sufficient is 
“lacking in nothing.” It is only in the polis that Aristotle thinks we achieve a life of self-
sufficiency. While human beings can survive in family groups that meet our everyday 
wants and can have “something more than the supply of daily needs” met in the village, 
we can only achieve self-sufficiency through the wider association of the polis.
58
 Here we 
can imagine Aristotle is thinking of the external goods necessary to get one past the point 
of eking out a meager existence day to day. In the Republic, Glaucon mocks Socrates’s 
first city as a city “fit for pigs.” Addressing this criticism compelled Socrates to expand 
the city and introduce entirely new classes of artisans and farmers (and warriors) to 
provide the “relishes” and comforts that Glaucon seemed to believe a good life for human 
beings demanded.
59
 Like Glaucon, Aristotle thinks the good life for a human being 
depends on the relishes and comforts that can only be provided through differentiation of 
tasks and a widened network of cooperation for mutual benefit. 
Second, the polis is an association ruled by law rather than the will of an 
individual (as Aristotle imagines the family and the village are), and law is, according to 
Aristotle, essential for cultivating virtues in the young and maintaining them in the 
mature.
60
 Additionally, there is in Aristotle’s view a special class of political virtues that 
can only be cultivated in a polis, where citizens take turns ruling and being ruled in turn 
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in “a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible”61. If the acquisition of 
external goods and political virtues are as Aristotle presents them—genuine fulfillments 
of human nature and requirements of human perfection and happiness—then the polis 
will be the natural form of human association because it is what promotes full human 
development. As Julia Annas says, “That the state is a natural form of community, then, 
amounts to the claim that it is the form of community in which people’s needs are most 
fully met and their interests best ensured.”62  
This discussion has been devoted to explaining and defending the claim that there 
is a plural conception of nature operative in Aristotle’s moral philosophy. We’ve called 
the two sides of Aristotle’s concept of nature ‘mere nature’ and ‘nature proper.’ Both 
mere nature and nature proper will be significant for one’s judgments about flourishing 
and how it can be achieved, but Annas describes nature proper as a “stronger” sense of 
nature because, in articulating an ideal of ethical development, it carries significant 
normative weight for judgments about how we ought to develop or work to accommodate 
mere nature. It is nature proper, not mere nature, which guides how we ought to deal with 
our limitations and deal with our potentials, but the way we understand the basic 
possibilities and limitations set by mere nature has implications for what we think the full 
or proper actualization of human potentials will look like. Mere nature will be important 
for ethical reflection because it expresses our sense of what creatures like us are capable 
of, but nature proper expresses the standard of what is good for us to do and become.  
Aristotle is not explicit about the distinction between mere nature and nature 
proper. It is unclear if he even sees he is using the concept in these two different ways, 
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but the distinction is at the root of an ambiguity that is characteristically Aristotelian. 
Aristotle and his followers will very typically oppose nature to reason and habit—nature 
(in the sense of mere nature) being understood as something in need of correction and 
improvement—but then, at the same time, consider the workings of human rationality 
and the acquisition of habit “natural” (in the sense of nature proper) for us and normative 
because it is good for us.
63
  
Despite his own failure to recognize the concept of nature at work in his moral 
philosophy as ambiguous, it seems clear that we must read into Aristotle something like 
these two different senses of nature. Nature in one sense (mere nature) identifies the “raw 
materials” of human life—the starting points and potentials of human development where 
these potentials also set constraints on what is possible—while nature in another sense 
(nature proper) names an ideal because it names the endpoint to be realized through an 
appropriate process of development. In human beings, nature can name an ethical ideal 
because it can name the proper development of a rational nature, which involves our 
power of choice and therefore makes us subject to ethical evaluation. In extending the 
concept of nature proper to ethical argument, Aristotle renders the telos of the change an 
ideal of ethical development. Thus, we find in Aristotle a conceptual model for 
conceiving of virtue as natural in the sense that full virtue is the ideal end of human 
moral development.  
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2.2 The General Concept of Nature and the Substantive Conception of Human Nature in 
Aristotle 
 
At this point I want to distinguish Aristotle’s general concept of nature (which is 
not a single concept but plural) from the particularities of Aristotle’s understanding of 
mere nature and nature proper. These particularities fill out the substance of his account 
of human nature, which I will refer to as the ‘substantive conception of human nature,’ 
which is distinct from his concept of nature in general. Given the teleological structure of 
nature proper, I will refer to Aristotle’s concept of nature in general as “teleological” 
from this point forward. 
This is a quite abstract way of conceptualizing Aristotle’s complete account of 
human nature, which seamlessly weds together a conception of nature in general with 
particular substantive judgments about the potentials, limitations, and ideals of human 
life. But understanding the methodological function of the general concept of nature at 
work in Aristotle’s flourishing-based ethic is, I believe, central to grasping how claims 
about human nature can function as a source of normativity in a flourishing-based ethical 
theory. (In Hume—as we will see in the next section—the concept of nature in general is 
different, and this requires that Hume provide an alternative source of normativity in the 
general point of view.) It might help to think of the relationship of the general concept of 
nature to the substantive conception of human nature as one of form to matter. I do not 
intend by these terms to invoke the technicalities of Aristotle’s doctrine of form and 
matter, but simply to provide an intuitive way of picturing the distinction I am drawing. 
The point is that similar conceptions of the substantive characteristics of human life—its 
starting points, limits, and ideals (the “matter,” so to speak)—can be formed by different 
concepts of nature in general (the “form,” so to speak). Where Aristotle’s concept of 
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nature in general is teleological, Hume’s is “empirical” (I will clarify this further in the 
next section). Conversely, we might have very different substantive characterizations of 
human life while holding a similar set of assumptions about nature in general. What is 
distinctive about Aristotle’s concept of nature in general is that, by virtue of its judgments 
about nature proper, it is teleological. 
It is useful to distinguish the concept of nature in general from the substantive 
conception of human nature. One can imagine agreeing with Aristotle that ethical 
analysis needs concepts that function as Aristotle’s concept of nature in general does—
providing an account of the starting points of human life (mere nature) as well as an 
account of what would best satisfy our needs and fulfill our potentials for a full human 
life (nature proper). And yet, one might nevertheless disagree with Aristotle about the 
proper account of those starting points (i.e., what precisely is intractable and what is 
malleable, given the right upbringing), or about the proper specification of our natural 
end, and hence what our true needs and interests are. In this way, one could take from 
Aristotle the general concept of nature, but revise or even substantially reject the 
substantive conception of human nature he endorses. 
How should we characterize Aristotle’s substantive conception of human nature? 
It can rightly be characterized using the classical definition: for Aristotle, human beings 
are rational animals. Rationality is the defining capacity of human life, and at the same 
time, the cultivation of a rational form of life is also aspirational. To be rational expresses 
an ideal of nature proper in which the full development of our rational nature issues in the 
moral and intellectual virtues that order our passions and shape our lives. 
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If we emphasize Aristotle’s account of the human good as found in the 
Nicomachean Ethics and stemming out of the function argument, the ideal of human 
flourishing that Aristotle offers is quite attractive. The moral and intellectual virtues he 
articulates are (for the most part) widely accessible, and, as such, appear to be a viable 
candidate for an account of human flourishing. But competing strands exist in Aristotle’s 
ethical thought. In the Politics, Aristotle gives a more specific (and parochial) account of 
the best kind of life for a human being. The ideal of human life depicted in the Politics is 
not one which is widely available. In the Politics, the highest of human virtues are virtues 
of political rule and theoretical activity, and these are tied to concrete activities and a 
form of life only available to the elite. 
It is important to acknowledge that Aristotle’s full account of the good life 
(provided in the Politics) assumes that different kinds of persons will have different kinds 
of functions, which is reflective of a general hierarchy regarding the worth of different 
kinds of human beings. On Aristotle’s view, only the best kind of people will lead or be 
capable of leading the best kind of life. The best kinds of people are those in whom 
reason and unqualified virtue predominate, but for Aristotle, unqualified virtue belongs to 
the citizen and ruler who can lead a “masculine, noble and leisured” life.64 The activities 
of politics and contemplation depend on a culture that makes leisure (for some) possible, 
and Aristotle seems to take this as justification enough for organizing society so that the 
best kind of life will be available to those most capable of leading it (i.e., male citizens). 
As such, Aristotle treats the lives of women, slaves, and free but wage-dependent artisans 
as mere instruments for providing a life of leisure for free, male citizens. Aristotle’s ideal 
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of a life of unqualified virtue exercised in politics and the life of philosophical 
contemplation does not apply to women, slaves, or free but wage-dependent artisans, all 
of whom, Aristotle argues, lack either the rational capacity or the leisure necessary to 
pursue the good life.
65
 While Aristotle affirms that every sphere of human life contains 
specific virtues,
66
 the best and most noble (Aristotle sometimes says “divine”) virtues are 
those that employ that which is best in us to the highest degree possible. Making a life of 
leisure—in which such virtues can be employed—possible for some will require that 
many others supply and attend to the daily necessities of the leisure class. Given the 
needs and limitations of human beings, Aristotle’s is not an ideal that could be made 
widely available even in principle. He embraces the conclusion that achieving this end 
necessitates a subgroup to provide the material conditions of its achievement without so 
much as questioning its validity as an account of human excellence. He argues instead 
that nature has made some people fit to fulfill this need.
67
 
If we take Aristotle’s conception of human nature from the Politics and read it in 
the way I have described above, then a principled commitment to the moral worth and 
equal dignity of persons will lead us to reject Aristotle’s conception of the human good, 
the realization of which depends on the involuntary subordination of some so that others 
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may lead the good life. But rejecting this substantive conception of human nature and its 
concomitant conception of human flourishing is consistent with taking from Aristotle a 
conception of nature in general that is teleological in form.  
I have already provided a general account of the outlines of Aristotle’s 
teleological concept of nature in general that includes two functions for the concept of 
nature, which we’ve expressed as mere nature and nature proper. Here I want to make a 
few specific remarks about the normative implications of a teleological concept of nature 
in general and remark on the philosophical difficulties as well as the potential 
significance for a feminist ethic of flourishing. 
While mere nature carries normative implications by setting constraints we must 
work with and not against if we hope to flourish, the constraints established by mere 
nature turn out to be relatively weak. The human species is amongst the most flexible, 
inventive, and adaptive of species, and this means human beings can actualize their 
unique potentials and accommodate psychological and physical needs in a wide variety of 
ways. Mere nature demands accommodation, but in the human case it also makes 
possible a wide variety of accommodations. Mere nature neither dictates how it should be 
accommodated nor defines the ideal in terms of what is best if we hope to live well and 
flourish. 
Nature proper, on the other hand, identifies not merely a set of raw materials, 
more or less malleable, out of which we must construct our lives, but the direction in 
which the ideal development of these materials leads. Nature in the sense of nature proper 
identifies not whatever happens to be the case, but the best and fullest state of 
development. Aristotle will often say of things with a nature that the end is that which 
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comes about usually or for the most part, as long as nothing interferes. Clearly then, what 
is natural in the sense of nature proper is strongly normative. Concepts of ‘proper 
development’ and ‘interference’ are strongly normative and intrinsic to judgments about 
nature proper. Identifying the end of nature proper depends on identifying what the 
proper process of development should be and the interfering causal factors that distort 
such a process. 
Nature proper thus presupposes that we can, in fact, distinguish between natural 
and forced changes—between outcomes that are a product of interfering forces and 
outcomes that are not. As Julia Annas notes, this is no simple task, since every outcome 
is the product of some complex combination of factors, especially in human life. 
Aristotle tries to draw the necessary distinction by distinguishing between internal 
and external forces. Natural developments are depicted as the product of internal causes, 
while external causes are forms of interference.
68
 But this is crude and inadequate, 
particularly when it comes to human life, because so many external contributions are 
absolutely indispensable for proper human development—both biologically (i.e., a 
healthy environment, an adequate diet) and morally (i.e., early childhood discipline that 
establishes good habits, which are the foundation of full virtue). As such, it will often be 
far from clear which external causal factors should count as interference and which 
should count as a properly contributing factor, the absence of which we should count as a 
form of interference.
69
 Still, even if Aristotle’s attempt to distinguish between natural and 
unnatural developments merely shifts the difficult questions to what should be considered 
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an external interference and what should be considered an external but appropriate 
contributor to an internally-directed process, the fundamental distinction between natural 
and forced change is a valuable tool for normative critique. 
For example, in The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill describes the English 
woman in his day as “an eminently artificial thing—the result of forced repression in 
some directions, unnatural stimulation in others.” Women’s moral development 
resembles the growth of the tree where half has been “kept in a vapor bath and the other 
half in the snow.”70 Mill’s point is that, given the social context, there is no reliable way 
to judge women’s true potential, nor their true nature, because we have no experience of 
how women’s development would proceed absent the pervasive social forces that distort 
the development of women’s (natural) capacities. His argument gains significant traction 
by invoking the idea that women’s present condition is the product of highly artificial 
forces. Implicit in his critique is the idea that this is not how they would be naturally if 
they were free to develop absent such distorting influences. 
Arguments from nature have a history of being used to support unjust status quo 
arrangements, making skepticism about the appeal to nature warranted and worthy of 
careful scrutiny. But appealing to nature in opposition to artifice and force can function 
as a quite powerful, counter-conventional ideal—as it does in John Stuart Mill’s 
argument from The Subjection of Women—even if we have little idea of the 
circumstances that would be necessary for establishing any claims about the “true nature” 
of the persons in question.
71
 Like Mill, we may often need to remain agnostic or open to 
revising our claims about nature, but it is worth emphasizing that Mill’s argument 
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implicitly invokes the same distinction as Aristotle’s. They share the assumption that 
there is a difference between natural developments and unnatural developments, between 
free and forced developments. 
Returning to Aristotle, his teleological view of nature means that, for him, there is 
a proper process of development for human beings as rational beings. Beyond that, 
though, it is not clear that the proper process of development can be spelled out on the 
basis of nature alone, at least not on the basis of mere nature. Articulations of nature 
proper and what constitutes the proper ends of human nature are likely to be contested 
because they depend on qualitative judgments about what is good for creatures like us. 
This is itself an interpretive responsibility of reason. If we say that the proper process of 
development is to be specified by reason itself, then in some sense we will acknowledge a 
role for nature in determining how human life ought to be ordered. But this role will be 
played by nature proper, not mere nature. If we say that the proper process of 
development is to be specified by nature proper, because the development of a rational 
nature implies deliberation and choice, this does not take the matter out of the realm of 
human decision, as though rational nature were somehow “a foreign power, ordering our 
animal nature about from outside the natural world.”72 
 
3. Hume 
For Aristotle, what is natural functions as a source of normativity insofar as nature 
(what belongs to nature proper) signifies a proper end of development for beings of a 
certain kind. Hume rejects Aristotle’s teleological perspective on nature in general, as 
that was developed by Christian ethicists such as Augustine and Aquinas and then by the 
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modern natural lawyers and Enlightenment deists. Hume especially rejects the 
supernatural rendering of the human end embodied in these developments. In the thought 
of David Hume, we have a powerful response to the developments that grew out of 
Aristotle’s philosophy. 
What Hume embraces in place of this teleological concept of nature in general is a 
view of nature inspired by the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, which advanced a new ideal of understanding. This new ideal of understanding 
sought to abstract from the particularities of the human perspective and from the view of 
the world colored by human sensibilities, including our sense of the significance of things 
for ourselves. It aimed thereby to achieve an understanding of the natural world totally 
independent of the colorations of human subjectivity.
73
 This significance-free perspective 
on nature rendered what was once the basis of a relevant moral distinction irrelevant: to 
say that something is “natural” on Hume’s view will not imply any evaluative judgment 
about how it ought ideally to be in light of what is good for it. I will call the conception 
of nature in general that Hume substitutes for the rejected teleological view of nature in 
general “empirical.”74  
In place of a normative conception of human nature, Hume must provide an 
alternative source for making normative moral judgments of how we ought to be and how 
we ought to morally judge the various character traits human beings display. In place of a 
                                                 
73
 Charles Taylor, Philosophical Papers: Human Agency and Language, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 2-3. Also Sources of the Self (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
34. 
74
 Such a label is less than ideal because respect for empirically grounded study in general may bias 
contemporary persons in favor of such a view of human nature, but I’m at a loss for a more appropriate 
description. Equally unfortunate is that in order to argue against this conception, one has to argue against 
the supposedly more realistic “empirical” conception of nature, but precisely the question at stake between 
the “thinner” view of nature and the normatively saturated teleological view of nature is which account can, 
all things considered, best account for all the observed features of human life, including the realm of 
evaluation and normativity. 
84 
 
teleological conception of nature in general, Hume appeals to sympathy and “the general 
point of view” as the origin of moral distinctions and, thus, the origin of moral 
normativity.
75
 The general point of view offers a normative perspective from which we 
can form our moral judgments. However, when we look at what is really required for 
Hume to substantiate his condemnation of the “monkish virtues,” we find that Hume 
needs the resources of a teleological conception of human nature. In order to justify his 
condemnation of the monkish virtues, Hume must in fact presuppose his own positive 
conception of what is truly good for human beings, given the kinds of beings we are. 
My goal in what follows is not to defend an interpretation of the historical Hume, 
but rather to articulate a “Humean” alternative when it comes to conceptualizing the 
relationship between human nature and an ethics of flourishing.
76
 Humeans differ on this 
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issue, and I am taking the historical Hume as the basic source for this position. My 
understanding of the historical Hume is heavily indebted to Annette Baier, Jennifer Herdt 
and Michael Gill.  
The Hume I represent here will be Baier and Herdt’s in the sense that I take Hume 
to offer a normative account of moral judgment. Hume is not simply describing the 
perspective from which we make moral judgments, but the perspective from which we 
should. I believe Gill is right to argue that Hume’s project aspires to be a descriptive one 
and not a normative one with respect to human nature. At least with respect to human 
nature, Hume wants simply to describe how we are. Given Hume’s perspective on nature 
in general, what is natural cannot be the source of normativity in his moral theory. But 
with Herdt and Baier, I think there is a normative perspective to be found in Hume, and it 
comes from the ‘general point of view.’ When Hume categorizes the “monkish virtues” 
as vices, he is not simply describing how people judge these character traits. He is 
indicating how such traits ought to be judged. The perspective from which we ought to 
judge is a constructed, “artificial” point of view, as we shall see. The general point of 
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view is not justified on the basis of its origin in human nature nor its role in bringing 
human nature to perfection, but on the basis of its utility in solving the conflicts of human 
social life.
77
 However, this being said, the impartiality required by the general view drags 
in unacknowledged evaluative judgments about the “ends of man,” and hence an 
unacknowledged teleological conception of human nature, or so I shall argue. I turn now 
to a discussion of Hume’s moral philosophy and the philosophical problems to which it is 
a response. 
 
3.1 The New “Science of Man”: Human Nature and the Problem of Self-Interest 
In the introduction to A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume announces his intention 
to build a science of human nature on the model provided by “Lord Bacon” in the natural 
sciences.
78
 He hoped thereby to emulate the great successes of the natural sciences in the 
moral sciences by adopting and adapting its “experimental” procedures.79 Hume contends 
that he together with Locke, Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler “have 
begun to put the science of man on a new footing” by applying the methods of 
“experimental philosophy,” grounding their conclusions in experience, and limiting their 
philosophies to what experience can teach. It is only, he says, by “careful and exact 
experiments, and the observation of those particular effects, which result from its 
different circumstances and situations” that we can hope to come by any reliable “notion 
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of [the mind’s] powers and qualities.”80 According to Terence Penelhum: “To say there 
can be a science of the mental, as Hume sees the matter, is to say that what we think, feel, 
or will can be explained as the effect of a cause and the instance of a natural law. Human 
minds are not strangers in nature, but inextricably part of it.”81 This is indeed what we 
find at the heart of Hume’s moral philosophy in the Treatise: an attempt to set down the 
general rules—the governing “laws”—of our moral judgments and the necessary 
conditions under which they obtain in order to advance the “science of man.” 
While the intellectual landscape of Hume’s day was being re-shaped by the new 
ideal of scientific understanding coming out of the natural sciences, moral philosophy 
was dominated by the theory of natural law. Hume’s moral philosophy can profitably be 
understood as a response to the problems of moral philosophy in the modern natural law 
tradition, which accepted the view that human nature is the foundation of morality but 
faced a new challenge in reconciling this with an understanding of human nature backed 
by the methods of the new science.
82
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Like the classical natural lawyers, such as Aquinas, modern natural lawyers such 
as Grotius and Pufendorf were intent on building a science of morals on the basis of the 
study of human nature.
83
 “The modern natural lawyers, beginning with Grotius, 
emphasized the notion that the natural law governing human interactions in society can 
be derived from the salient features of human nature, which include both the tendency to 
pursue one’s own well-being and the inclination toward sociability.”84 However, unlike 
the classical natural lawyers who maintained that the true good of the individual is 
fundamentally common and shared, the modern natural lawyers take it that human beings 
are fundamentally separate and self-interested. As such, the pursuit of one’s own well-
being may or may not be a pursuit of the good. For the classical natural lawyers in the 
Christian tradition, pursuing the perfection of my nature is a way of pursuing the good. 
For the modern natural lawyers, the pursuit of individual well-being is increasingly 
understood as equivalent to the pursuit of self-interest. 
For epistemological reasons, the view of human nature grounding the modern 
natural lawyers’ “science of morals” was under increasing pressure to be the view of 
human nature susceptible to study by the natural sciences: the view of nature as 
represented to us through its sensible qualities and stripped of any internal orientation to a 
good yet to be attained. That internal orientation had previously been expressed through a 
teleological conception of human nature. Empirical descriptions of human nature were 
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increasingly seen as both more “realistic” and more epistemically credible.85 On the basis 
of a detailed psychological analysis, Hobbes argued that all human action is inevitably 
driven by self-interest.
86
 For those who came after him, the insistence on a “realistic” 
description of human nature, in practical terms, meant our self-interestedness could not 
be ignored. What seems undeniable when looking at human beings simply on the basis of 
our commonly accessible, sensible experience is that we act to satisfy our interests. But 
the fundamentally self-interested characterization of human nature made it very difficult 
for modern natural law theorists to coherently defend the natural law hypothesis “that 
human nature is a starting-point for the discovery of fundamental moral principles.”87 On 
the contrary, under the “realistic” Hobbesian description, human nature seems clearly 
inimical to morality.  
Many moralists took Hobbes’ theory of human nature to imply a denial of the 
reality of virtue, and hence a denial of the reality of morality as such. For if what Hobbes 
said was true, then there could not be any truly virtuous actions because these require a 
virtuous motive, and Hobbes’ theory asserted that, at root, all our acts are self-
interested.
88
 While many after him sought to resist the apparent implications of Hobbes’ 
theory of human nature, no one after Hobbes could simply dismiss without addressing the 
drive of self-interest, which more and more seemed like an undeniable fact of human 
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nature.
89
 Thus, the thinner, more “realistic” conception of our nature presented problems 
of its own. 
Jennifer Herdt argues that it is possible to see the shift away from a teleological 
conception of nature and toward what we might call an “empirical” conception of nature 
beginning in the natural law theory of Grotius.  
In Grotius the status of “natural” is ambiguous. Like the classical natural 
lawyers, Grotius thinks that we can derive moral guidance from the proper 
understanding of our nature, but he has a truncated understanding of 
human nature, since he no longer sees it as tending toward good as 
perfection. The older, teleological view of human nature was normatively 
saturated, unlike Grotius’ “thinner” view of human nature. In Hobbes’ 
writings, “natural” has become thoroughly secularized—“natural” is just 
the way things happen to be. . . . To talk about what is natural to human 
beings is neither to discuss our final end nor to pass judgment on our 
sinfulness. It is not to trumpet a call for transformation, but simply to 
make observations about the conditions in which we find ourselves.
90
 
 
The teleological conception of nature in general that Aquinas and the classical 
natural lawyers had argued from was, as Herdt puts it, “normatively saturated.” As I 
argued above, so was Aristotle’s. It carried with it an understanding of the good to be 
achieved through the realization of that thing’s proper end. Grotius’s view of nature in 
general (and Hobbes’s and much of the modern tradition after him) is “thinner” in that it 
is operating only on the basis of—so to speak—“what the eye can see,” whereas the 
classical natural lawyers (and Aristotle) took it that the evidence given by the senses was 
only half the story. Some of these characteristics, tendencies, and capacities human 
beings display are constitutive aspects of our final good, but this is not true of all of them.  
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There are serious advantages to working with this “thinner” empirical conception 
of nature in general. The thinner, end-shorn view of nature could avoid the seemingly 
endless and intractable debates that had arisen in light of a theological interpretation of 
our nature, and which concerned the degree of human fallenness and “corruption” of our 
nature—a debate which we seemed completely incapable of refereeing. On the empirical 
view of nature in general, what is “natural” can instead simply signify the way things 
happen to be. Hence, this more limited conception of nature can be useful as a way of 
avoiding the theological (and metaphysical) controversy embroiling the teleological 
conceptions of human nature.  
Hume, it turns out, is acutely aware of these advantages. He makes this clear in a 
letter to Hutcheson in which he objects to Hutcheson’s own use of “nature” precisely 
because it is a teleological conception that assumes a final end yet to be attained. 
I cannot agree to your sense of Natural. ‘Tis founded on final Causes; 
which is a Consideration, that appears to me pretty uncertain and 
unphilosophical. For pray, what is the End of Man? Is he created for 
Happiness or for Virtue? For this life or for the Next? For himself or for 
his Maker? Your Definition of Natural depends upon solving these 
Questions, which are endless, & quite wide of my Purpose.
91
 
 
 Hume is correct in his critique of Hutcheson. Hutcheson’s definition of ‘natural’ 
does indeed depend on final causes and taking a stand on the question of the human end, 
for Hutcheson is working with a teleological conception of nature. Like Aristotle and 
Aquinas, Hutcheson maintained that the goal of ethics was to help us achieve the 
perfection of our nature.  
Hume was not alone in his rejection of a teleological conception of nature in 
general in favor of an empirical one, but the increasing insistence on a more “realistic” 
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and empirically grounded description of human nature was a double-edged sword. 
Seemingly requisite upon epistemological grounds, it proved wholly inadequate to the 
task of explaining morality as conceived by the natural law tradition. Specifically, it 
made all action appear to be motivated by self-interest in a way that undercut the natural 
lawyer’s ability to account for what was praiseworthy about acting in accordance with 
one’s nature. The empirical view of nature in general—framing as it does a description of 
ourselves encompassing not only that which is significant for our flourishing, but 
everything from the trivial to the morally repugnant—made the ancient ideal of striving 
to live in accordance with our nature appear absurd, if not downright morally 
reprehensible. 
With this perspective, we can see why Hume felt his Treatise to be a real 
contribution to the “contemporary scene” in moral philosophy. In the Treatise, Hume 
puts forward a moral theory based on the principle of sympathy. In this principle, Hume 
takes himself to have identified a praiseworthy source of motivation in human nature. 
Furthermore, he provides an account of human nature and the operation of sympathy that 
he believes makes it fully consistent with the epistemological requirements of the new 
science. Making use of the principle of sympathy was not in itself novel, but Hume’s 
account of sympathy eschewed the teleological conception of nature those before him had 
often invoked.
92
 Finally, in demonstrating that the principle of sympathy is as equally 
original to human nature as self-interest, Hume offered the necessary foundation for 
morals in human nature that it was increasingly clear the natural lawyers could not 
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provide with their “realistic,” but fundamentally self-interested, description of human 
nature. 
 
3.2 Hume’s Moral Philosophy and the Solution of Sympathy 
Hume maintains that any adequate explanation of morality must show how our 
moral judgments, such as they are, could have arisen given the facts of human nature, for 
“no action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless there be in human nature some 
motive to produce it.”93 But since what moves us, Hume famously argues, is not reason 
but passion, or “sentiment,”94 Hume’s moral philosophy essentially offers us an 
etiology—an account of the origins and causes—of moral judgment based on the 
sentiments. 
What explains the distinction we draw between “virtue” and “vice”? Why do we 
label some character traits virtuous and others vicious? Hume thinks when we reflect on 
our experience of making moral judgments, we find that common to all those attributes 
we call virtues, is a feeling of pleasure at what is useful or agreeable either to ourselves or 
others, and common to all those attributes we call vices, is a feeling of pain in what is 
harmful and disagreeable either to ourselves or others. “Each of the passions and 
operations of the mind has a particular feeling, which must be either agreeable or 
disagreeable. The first is virtuous, the second vicious. This particular feeling constitutes 
the very nature of the passion,” according to Hume.95 Given this account of the nature of 
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moral judgment, a question arises. While it is clear how we might take pleasure in, and 
therefore approve of, qualities that are agreeable and useful to ourselves since they bear a 
clear connection to our personal self-interest, how is it that our feelings extend to cover 
the benefits and harms suffered by others? We seem to approve of acts of benevolence 
and generosity whenever we witness them, whether their exercise is directly to our 
benefit or not, but why? And how is this possible? Hume’s answer is “sympathy.” Just as 
we have a natural tendency to care for our own self-interest and to seek pleasure and 
avoid pain whenever possible, we have a natural tendency to sympathize with the 
pleasures and pains of others. By “sympathy,” Hume does not mean what we might 
initially suppose. As Norton and Norton explain,  
Hume does not . . . think of sympathy as a particular feeling. The word, 
sympathy, does not there designate the feeling we have for a close friend 
who is bereaved or in serious trouble. Hume would call that feeling pity or 
compassion, while sympathy is his name for a means or principle of 
communication (2.3.6.8)—his name for a general ability of humans to 
know and to experience as their own the sentiments or opinions of 
others.
96
 
 
Hume introduces sympathy in Book II of the Treatise as a principle for the 
communication of sentiment,
97
 and hypothesizes that sympathy operates on the basis of 
the imagination’s propensity to convert ideas into impressions.98 It is because of 
sympathy that when we see another person in pain, we cringe; conversely, when we enter 
a room full of laughter, we find our mood lifted. Hume argues that it is through the 
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entirely natural (meaning spontaneous and involuntary) operation of sympathy that we 
come to feel pained by what causes others pain and take pleasure in what pleases them. 
One objection to Hume’s appeal to sympathy as an explanation of our moral 
judgments is that if our moral judgments are based solely on sympathy as he claims, then 
our moral judgments should be prone to change from one situation to another.
99
 For 
instance, I tend to sympathize more with some than with others depending on their 
relationship to myself, and, given the same kind of situation, I will sympathize more on 
some occasions than on others. But, so the objection runs, this is not how we make moral 
judgments. Our moral judgments are universal, and if an action is wrong, then it is always 
wrong, whether I feel displeasure at the act or not. Hume agrees that our moral judgments 
are universal in scope, but he argues that this is not inconsistent with the thesis that 
sympathy is the basis of these judgments.
100
 The reason is that our moral judgments are 
not made merely on the basis of our own particular, partial point of view, but rather by 
entering into “some steady and general points of view,”101 and exercising our sympathy 
out of that perspective. This is the basis of Hume’s account of “the general point of 
view,”102 and it is only by taking on the general point of view that our natural, limited 
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sympathy widens into the extensive sympathy from which mature moral judgments are 
made. 
In order to judge a particular behavior or character trait out of the general point of 
view, we must take the perspective of those most affected by the character trait or 
behavior in question, to see whether such a trait is agreeable or disagreeable, useful or 
harmful. But we must do so without entering into the person’s own particular, self-
interested sentiments, since judging from the perspective of those sentiments would be no 
better than judging from our own particular and self-interested perspective. Instead, we 
adopt their perspective, joined with the proper corrections for over-weaning concern for 
one’s own self-interest and whatever other biases tend to color our judgment. The general 
point of view is designed to yield the sentiment we would feel were we to enter 
sympathetically into such a refined and impartial point of view.
103
 
Hume divides the virtues into “natural virtues” and “artificial virtues,” and while 
his initial account suggests that natural sympathy of itself is sufficient to ground our 
approval of at least the natural virtues, ultimately both natural and artificial virtues must 
be approved by an extensive sympathy exercised from the general point of view.
104
 As 
Baier observes,  
For Hume, all virtues, natural or artificial, get their status from the fact 
that these traits are ones we in fact welcome in human persons, once we 
have the relevant facts, take up a special impartial point of view, exercise 
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our capacity for sympathy, correct its natural bias, and then finally let our 
reflective feelings pronounce judgment.
105
 
 
Successfully entering into others’ sentiments and exercising our sympathy from 
the general point of view, Hume admits, takes “a great effort of imagination.”106 This 
kind of sympathy is, therefore, quite different from the natural sympathy that is an 
unreflective, spontaneous, and largely involuntary response induced by the imagination. 
The active extension of our sympathy through the adoption of the general point of view is 
something about which we must be intentional.  
Hume’s initial description of sympathy makes it appear akin to social contagion 
or emotional infection, passive and involuntary; however, when exercised from out of the 
general point of view, sympathy observes general rules that allow it to correct for various 
kinds of bias (for example, giving too much weight to one’s own perspective). Hume’s 
developed account of the general point of view requires recourse to a kind of sympathy 
that is much more conscious, intentional, and active than the sympathy he initially 
describes as a principle for the communication of sentiment. The sympathy entailed by 
the general point of view is more akin to a kind of sympathetic understanding that can be 
sought out and into which we can actively enter. Furthermore, by incorporating the 
observance of a set of general rules into the operation of sympathy exercised out of the 
general point of view, this kind of sympathy is not something that operates just as it 
should, spontaneously and naturally. Rather, it is an activity that we can do better or 
worse and about which we must be intentional. 
I agree with Herdt that Hume’s thinking about the principle of sympathy 
undergoes extensive revision not only between the Treatise and Enquiry, but within the 
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Treatise itself. And Hume must do this because our natural and rather limited sympathy 
based on the passive communication of sentiments is insufficient to overcome the 
conflicts of human social life. Natural sympathy is what we have for those close to us—
parents, children, close relatives and friends—but it gets weaker the farther removed a 
person is from us. Furthermore, a totally passive form of sympathy leaves us vulnerable 
to the phenomenon of contagion, which can lead us to sympathize with vicious forms of 
mob mentality. As Herdt argues, when we enter into those general points of view from 
which we make trustworthy moral judgments, we must extend our sympathy and actively 
attempt to enter the point of view of those most affected by the person or character in 
question. Our judgments will never find the wide concurrence they require if our 
sympathy is not wide and extensive.  
Morality, according to Hume, should be oriented toward happiness in this life, 
here and now. This is why Hume countenances wit and high-spiritedness alongside 
generosity, integrity, and moderation as virtues. We naturally find all of these agreeable 
both in ourselves and others when we survey them from the general point of view. 
Annette Baier notes how Hume “includes in his catalogue of virtues all and only the 
qualities of head, heart and expressive body that he believes we will agree do make a 
person a welcome fellow, whether in ‘that narrow circle, in which any person moves’ (T. 
602) or in ‘the greater society or confederacy of mankind’ (E. 281).”107 It is this 
perspective that ultimately leads him to speak so derisively of the “monkish virtues”—
celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, and solitude. All 
of these, Hume thinks, make for a “gloomy,” “delirious,” and “dismal” character,108 
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hardly the ideal companion in any sphere of life. What is common to all of the “monkish 
virtues,” as Hume sees them, is that they devalue the genuine goods available in this life, 
despising physical pleasures as mere “sensual gratification,” healthy pride as “worldly 
vanity,” and good humor as “excessive gaiety.”109 According to Hume, the common and 
usual course of the passions will lead us to find physical pleasure, pride in ourselves, and 
good humor in others agreeable and pleasant. Failing to find these things agreeable 
suggests a distortion of the natural course of the passions. These virtues of Christian 
asceticism reject the natural sources of pleasure and cultivate a detachment from the 
genuine goods of this world by instilling an excessive concern for a supposed good 
available in the next.
110
 
 
3.3 The General Concept of Nature and the Substantive Conception of Human Nature in 
Hume 
 
On Hume’s view, human nature is neither good nor evil. It is neither ultimately 
benevolent (as Francis Hutcheson argued) nor ultimately self-interested (as Thomas 
Hobbes argued). From the perspective of explaining morality, Hume believes sympathy 
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is the indispensable principle of human nature, since it is the source of our distinctively 
moral approbation of the virtues, both natural and artificial. However, self-interest is 
equally important because it provides the motive to life in society and all the artificial 
virtues which are indispensable to that life. We might say that Hume’s substantive 
conception of human nature takes us to be “Self-interested Sympathizers.” Privileging 
self-interest and sympathy above the other equally original principles of our nature is, 
admittedly, an artificial simplification of his view,
111
 but emphasizing these two 
principles brings out the contradiction that Hume finds inherent in human nature. On 
Hume’s view, there is “some particle of the dove, kneaded into our frame, along with the 
elements of the wolf and serpent,”112 and we misunderstand the human condition if we 
fail to acknowledge both. These are, according to Hume, both natural for us, being 
equally “original” principles of human nature.  
Hume’s conception of nature in general is, for lack of a better term, an 
“empirical” one. He sought to apply the methods of the natural sciences to the study of 
human nature and thereby enhance our understanding of human nature and its ultimate 
principles. What we can know about the nature of anything will be known through 
investigation, observation and discovery by the human senses. These are the methods of 
investigation appropriate to the natural sciences and what we think of as the empirical 
realm. Thus, when we say that on Hume’s view we are “self-interested sympathizers,” we 
are not identifying an ideal toward which we ought to strive, as we are when we say that 
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for Aristotle we are “rational animals.” Hume’s underlying conception of nature in 
general means that the identification of our true nature and its ultimate principles simply 
informs us about what is the case, not what ought to be or how we ought to make use of 
this information. 
Many scholars, Michael Gill among them, feel that the strength of Hume’s moral 
philosophy is due in no small part to his greater reliance on an empirical conception of 
human nature and his increased reliance on empirical observation to explain morality. 
However, the downside of this method is that the more one relies on strictly empirical 
observations to explain morality, the less one will be able to normatively justify what one 
sees by those same standards of observation. On an empirical conception of nature in 
general, the discovery that a given characteristic is ‘natural’ or a part of ‘human nature’ in 
and of itself carries no normative weight. If we are thinking of our nature in these terms, 
then Louise Antony, whom I quoted at the beginning of this chapter, is certainly correct 
and “the fact—if it is one—that such human universals as exist are due to our nature as 
human beings is itself of no ethical importance.”113 Some characteristics are natural and 
good, some are natural and bad. The identification of a characteristic as natural in this 
empirical sense is, in and of itself, of no normative significance.  
This is a different conception of nature than that which Aristotle was working 
with, and the empirical conception of nature in general entails a strong distinction 
between facts and values, between nature and norm. For Hume, that a character trait or 
sentiment is natural or a part of human nature implies nothing about its moral status. 
There are character traits that are perfectly natural, but judged from the general point of 
view, perfectly vicious. There are “artificial” traits that are virtuous. Moreover, this 
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general point of view that we need in order to form reliable moral judgments is itself an 
artificial and humanly constructed viewpoint. Hume’s view on nature in general makes 
the principles of human nature he identifies significant in explaining the phenomenon of 
morality in human life, but what is “natural” is now irrelevant to the justification of 
morality. 
On Hume’s view, human nature has a strictly explanatory relevance for moral 
philosophy. Human nature is the causal source of our sentiments pertaining to virtue and 
vice, so understanding human nature is significant for moral philosophy insofar as we 
want to explain the causes of the moral sentiments. But we cannot, on the basis of human 
nature, reason about an ideal end toward which our moral lives ought to be aimed. The 
normative justification for our moral practices, on Hume’s account of morality, derives 
from the adoption of a practical perspective—a perspective which we adopt for the sake 
of achieving peace in society and harmony between differing view-points—a perspective 
he calls “the general point of view.” Is the general point of view an adequate substitute 
for the discarded teleological perspective on human nature?  
By his own standards, the successes of his project should be gauged by whether 
Hume’s new “science of man” adheres to the epistemological standards set by the new 
Enlightenment ideal of scientific understanding. This requires that he disavow the 
teleological conception of human nature. In place of a normative account of human 
nature, Hume substitutes an empirical conception of nature in general and postulates that 
sympathy is the source of morally normative judgment and the basis of the distinctions 
we draw between virtue and vice. 
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However, it is not clear that Hume’s avowed account of sympathy can substitute 
for the normative conception of human nature he sought to avoid. On the contrary, 
Hume’s moral critique of the “monkish virtues”—which ought to be based on an 
impartial judgment from the general point of view—appears to presuppose a teleological 
account of the human end.  
On the surface, the normative justification for the general point of view appears to 
rest on a straightforward appeal to what is necessary for human flourishing—specifically 
for concurrence in our moral judgments and peace in society. However, appealing to the 
general point of view in fact presupposes the normativity that Hume purports to be 
providing. What makes sympathy exercised out of the general point of view superior to 
natural sympathy is its impartiality. But the concept of impartiality is itself a normative 
concept: “What constitutes impartiality, if not the ability to give due weight to all of the 
various factors involved?”114  
Presumably, from within a flourishing-based ethical theory, one would account 
for the legitimate interest each person takes in their own flourishing by giving greater 
weight to what people find agreeable and useful for flourishing, and lesser weight to 
other sorts of sentiments. If a person finds traits agreeable and useful that do not 
contribute either to their own or others’ flourishing—for instance, the “monkish 
virtues”—there will be nothing improper about giving such sentiments less weight as we 
attempt to form a moral judgment that gives proper weight to the legitimate interests of 
all affected parties. 
When Hume condemns the “monkish virtues” as vices on the grounds that “they 
serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man’s fortunes in the world, nor render 
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him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of 
company, nor increase his power of self-enjoyment,” we see that Hume himself has an 
account of the legitimate “ends of man” which he takes to be constitutive of true human 
flourishing. It is only in light of some such account that Hume can condemn the monkish 
virtues, for he transfers the “monkish virtues” to the column of the vices in manifest 
defiance of the actual sentiments of the many people throughout history that have found 
these traits quite useful. Many religious people have found these traits useful for drawing 
closer to God in this life and preparing one’s soul for life in the next. 115 But Hume takes 
these to be totally spurious ends. Herdt is quite right when she concludes that Hume 
“cannot utterly avoid the sort of normative account of human nature which he rejects in 
Hutcheson as being dependent on ‘final causes.’ Instead, he must provide his own.”116 
Hume’s avowed account of human nature rests on an empirical conception of 
nature in general. On the epistemological grounds that final causes cannot be known 
through sense experience, Hume tries to avoid making any postulations about the ends 
proper to human nature. But Hume’s own normative critique of ascetic Christianity 
depends on certain assumptions about the ends of human nature. His assumptions about 
what constitutes true human flourishing—for instance, that it is grounded in this world—
and his judgment that the “monkish virtues” fail to contribute to this-worldly flourishing, 
underlie Hume’s judgment that such traits would never be felt as agreeable or useful by a 
genuinely impartial judge—i.e., a judge who was not biased by a spurious regard for 
other-worldly ends—from the general point of view.117 
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The general point of view, which Hume proposes to substitute as the source of 
normativity in place of a teleological conception of human nature, cannot in fact replace 
the teleological conception of human nature that his predecessors had relied on. Hume’s 
own moral judgment relegating the “monkish virtues” to the status of “vices” depends 
upon a conception of human nature which is teleological in form, a conception of human 
nature that takes our true end to be this-worldly and human flourishing to depend on a 
rejection of spurious other-worldly ends and the other-worldly virtues that go with them.  
This chapter aims to articulate the function that a flourishing-based ethic needs a 
conception of human nature to fulfill in order to be adequately normative. Thus far, we 
have examined two ways human nature can function in relation to an ethic of flourishing. 
For Aristotle, there is a sense of nature (which we called “nature proper”), according to 
which what is natural provides a normative ideal. As the proper end of ethical 
development, virtue is both natural and normative. Virtue is our “natural end” and also 
the end toward which our moral development ought to progress. Still, just because a 
quality is “natural” does not necessarily imply that it is as it ought to be. Aristotle’s 
concept of ‘mere nature’ leaves conceptual space for the judgment that there are things 
that are “natural” and yet in need of improvement. 
                                                                                                                                                 
object to the claim defended here—that Hume needs a teleological conception of human nature—by 
pointing to this explanation of why some people do not judge of the virtues and vices as they ought, what is 
effectively an “error theory” for the moral judgments of the religious. On this objection, Hume does not 
need to presuppose a positive, teleological account of human nature. All he needs to be able to do is explain 
why people make errors in their judgments for particular cases. Error theories in this arena are important 
ways of contending against competing perspectives. Having a plausible account of how and why one’s 
opponent has gone wrong in their judgment is an important way of strengthening the plausibility of one’s 
own position, but an error theory cannot substitute for the teleological judgments, in light of which some 
conclusions are regarded as faulty and need accounting for as such. 
Understood teleologically, Hume’s argument is that religion distorts (negatively interferes with) the 
operations of the passions of justice and humanity that ought to be allowed to operate unchecked. These are 
the “natural passions” that, if allowed to function naturally, would bring about greater unity and reduce the 
factionalism that interferes with peace in society. 
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In Hume, human nature has a different function. Hume appeals to the operations 
of sympathy to explain how our moral judgments are made, but his empirical conception 
of nature in general does not offer grounds for a judgment about how our judgments 
should be made. In place of an account of the ends of human nature, Hume substitutes a 
theory of the general point of view which is an “artificial,” or, as we might say,“socially-
constructed,” point of view. But, as discussed, when it comes to the critique of the 
monkish virtues, Hume’s judgment against them invokes an unacknowledged teleological 
conception of human nature. 
 
4. Marx 
In the final section of this chapter, I analyze Marx’s concept of nature in general 
as that impacts his moral critique of capitalism. Implicit in the Marxian analysis of 
capitalism is a moral condemnation of capitalism for failing to meet the legitimate needs 
of human beings. Marx’s critique of capitalism rests on the conviction that any just or 
morally acceptable economic system must serve the well-being of all members of society, 
not only the well-being of the propertied few.
118
 Furthermore, it must not prioritize the 
needs of capital at the expense of the needs of human beings. The ideal is an economic 
system that distributes the benefits of social cooperation in accordance with the socialist 
motto: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”119  
My focus in this discussion will be methodological rather than substantive. My 
purpose is not to challenge Marx’s ideal of social justice or his conception of human 
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nature per se, but to query his ability—in the terms of his own philosophy—to make 
sense of the normative significance of human needs in a way that substantiates his 
critique of capitalism for failing to meet legitimate human needs. Or, in other words, to 
give teeth to the claim that capitalism fails to meet the needs of human beings. 
Throughout his writings, Marx identifies human needs with human nature. For Marx, 
human needs express and make manifest the essential characteristics of human nature. 
Marx’s moral critique of capitalism hangs on his ability to distinguish legitimate from 
illegitimate human needs and thereby defend the claim that, in failing to meet the 
legitimate needs of human beings, capitalism is unjust.  
Between his early “humanistic” writings and his later “scientific” writings, 
Marx’s conception of human nature shifts from a teleological conception of human nature 
to an empirical one. The following discussion focuses attention on the two conceptions of 
human nature we find in Marx’s writings and elaborates the impact this has on his moral 
critique of capitalism. I argue that Marx’s critique of capitalism depends on the 
teleological conception of human nature, which we find in his early writings. When he 
moves away from this in his later writings and endorses a strictly empirical conception of 
human nature, he loses the resources needed to justify one of his central criticisms of 
capitalism—namely, in failing to meet human needs, capitalism unjustly harms human 
beings and should therefore be replaced by a socialist system that can meet such needs. 
 
4.1 Human Nature and Human Needs in the Early Works 
In his early “humanist” writings, Marx offers a critique of capitalism based on a 
vision of human flourishing. Authentic human flourishing is envisioned by Marx as the 
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highest state of human freedom: not merely freedom from the enslaving chains of 
capitalism, but also freedom for the full flowering of human potential brought about in 
and through engagement with the material world in productive activity, which is to say, 
through “labor.” Labor is the fundamental mechanism for meeting human needs. But, for 
Marx, not only is labor the means to meet our individual needs, it is also the way we 
actualize our social natures as we provide for the material needs of others.  
In Marx’s view, labor and the needs satisfied by that labor are fundamental 
expressions of the human essence. Labor, for Marx, is not the drudgery we all do our best 
to avoid. The true meaning of labor is creative human activity. In labor, we express (or 
“make manifest”) our very selves. We make manifest our intelligence, our creativity, our 
imagination, and our technical skills through labor. The product of our labor is also an 
expression of our nature in that it is our idea, our imaginative capacity, and our technical 
skill objectified. Our products embody the capacity we have to transform the world in 
ways that meet our needs, and Marx calls such products “use-values.” Anything that 
satisfies a human need—social, psychological or material—has use value, and for Marx, 
“the need of an object is the most evident and irrefutable proof that the object belongs to 
my nature and that the existence of the object for me and its property are the property 
appropriate to my essence.”120 
In this way, Marx represents human needs as intimately revealing the human 
essence. Through the double meaning of “property,” Marx exploits the idea that the 
world under a capitalist mode of production is a world turned upside-down. When in 
reality, the product of my labor should be seen as belonging to me and my essential 
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nature, under capitalism, the product of my (wage-) labor is seen as belonging to another: 
the capitalist to whom I have sold my labor. 
Under capitalism, labor takes on the unique form of wage-labor. This is the 
commodity form of labor, and it can be bought and sold in the market. This 
fundamentally changes the worker’s relationship to his or her work, and because of this, 
Marx sees the institution of wage-labor as the root of the harms of capitalism, alienating 
us from our labor and thereby from our essential nature as working beings. Marx thinks 
that under these conditions, “The purpose and existence of labor have changed.” Under 
capitalism, 
The product is created as value, exchange value, and an equivalent and no 
longer because of its immediate personal relationship to the producer. The 
more varied production becomes . . . the more does his labor fall into the 
category of wage-labor, until it is eventually nothing but wage-labor and 
until it becomes entirely incidental and unessential whether the producer 
immediately enjoys and needs his product or whether the activity, the 
action of labor itself, is his self-satisfaction and the realization of his 
natural dispositions and spiritual aims.
121
  
 
As wage-labor, it does not matter to the worker what kind of labor she performs 
because her work has become a mere means to a wage. No longer is the object of her 
labor the means for the satisfaction of her essential needs, and hence the means of life; 
instead, the wage has become the means of life. This critique of wage labor is the heart of 
Marx’s critique of capitalist alienation. Through wage-labor, the worker is alienated from 
her labor and her product. As a result, she is alienated from herself (her essential nature 
as a productive being) and others (those to whom she should be connected through her 
labor, but is not). 
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Marx’s critique of capitalist wage-labor suggests that alienation is a travesty 
because human beings are essentially creative, working beings who are in fact only 
capable of authentic self-realization through the exercise of their productive capacities. 
Productive activity is fulfilling when done in a human way because it is an expression of 
what we most fundamentally are: active, conscious, free, social beings.
122
  
Praxis is a technical term we can use to signify this distinctive, multi-faceted view 
of human activity as conscious, free, social, and productive.
123
 When we say that, for 
Marx, we are working beings, this must be understood in light of this multi-faceted 
notion of praxis. Not all work is an expression and realization of our true human nature, 
only that which is conscious, free, social, and productive. The capitalist economic system 
based on wage-labor and private property ought to be replaced by socialism because it 
cuts off access to truly human forms of flourishing by disrupting the social context in 
which the actualization of our nature as active, conscious, free, social beings is possible. 
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To summarize: the critique of capitalism found in Marx’s early economic writings 
invokes a view of human nature as capable of fulfillment only through the realization of 
the human needs for freedom and praxis. The needs of human beings are defined with 
reference to these ends, and Marx’s moral critique of capitalism is that it fails to meet the 
human need for freedom realized in and through conscious, free, social, and productive 
activity.
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4.2 Human Nature and Human Needs in the Later Works 
Before entering into the discussion of this section, which elaborates Marx’s 
empirical conception of human nature and the extent to which this can be maintained 
alongside a normative critique of capitalism, I want to remind the reader that my primary 
concern here is not with the question of whether Marx is ultimately consistent or 
inconsistent, or whether his early and later writings can be made compatible. My concern 
is with the implications of these two very different conceptions of human nature for his 
moral critique of capitalism. Marx has special significance for this chapter because his 
philosophy shows quite clearly how different conceptions of human nature impact 
normative criticism from within a flourishing-based framework. As I will argue, the 
normative force of his criticism depends on holding onto the conception of human nature 
that he articulated in the early writings. That conception is predicated on a teleological 
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conception of human nature in general, according to which some ends are consistent with 
the fulfillment of human nature and some are not. We might agree or disagree with the 
substantive conception of human nature that he advances—i.e., that human beings are 
essentially working beings—while recognizing that without a concept of nature in 
general that is teleological in form, he lacks the resources to indict capitalism as having 
failed to satisfy the essential needs of human beings.  
While Marx’s view on nature in general changes in the later writings to an 
empirical conception, what remains the same in both the early and the later writings is the 
intimate connection between human nature and human needs. Needs are the 
manifestation of our nature, and Marx sees human need as revealing the human essence. 
This does not change. What does change between the early and the later works is how our 
needs are determined, and hence how human nature is constituted.  
In The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx asserts that “all history is nothing but a 
continuous transformation of human nature.”125 And then, in the sixth thesis of his Theses 
on Feuerbach, Marx claims that “the human essence is no abstraction inhering in the 
single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble of social relationships.”126 Both 
passages have often been cited as evidence that Marx denies the existence of a stable, 
trans-historical human essence, as traditionally understood, and instead embraces a 
“historicist” or “anti-essentialist” conception of human nature.127 
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Contrary to the classical view, which takes human nature to be universal and 
common across history, read as a historicist, Marx posits human nature as itself a 
historical product, historically contingent and determined by the given social mode of 
production in any epoch. In The German Ideology, Marx develops some of the 
fundamental premises of his theory of historical materialism, in which he relates changes 
in human history to changes in the dominant mode of production. According to Marx:  
[T]he first premise of all human existence, and hence of all history . . . [is] 
that men must be able to live in order to be able “to make history.” . . . But 
life involves above all eating and drinking, shelter, clothing, and many 
other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to 
satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. . . . The second 
point is that once a need is satisfied, which requires the action of satisfying 
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and the acquisition of the instrument for this purpose, new needs arise. 
The production of new needs is the first historical act.
128
 
 
In this passage, Marx initially identifies “the first historical act” with the 
production of the means for satisfying our biological needs. But in the process of working 
to meet our basic biological needs, which Marx calls “natural needs,”129 we inevitably 
produce new needs for ourselves, since we need the tools and other means of production 
necessary for satisfying the original set of needs. Always conditioned by history, he calls 
these our “necessary needs.”130 If we are to have clothing, we must have fabric, and if 
fabric, then a loom. If we are to have cotton for the fabric, then we also need the 
machinery to sow and harvest and spin that cotton, and so on and so on. Observe that 
Marx also calls the production of these new needs “the first historical act.”  
Marx’s seemingly contradictory claims about “the first historical act” have 
occasioned much debate, but as Karsten Struhl argues, the best way to understand Marx 
here is to see these two phenomena—the production of the means to satisfy our needs and 
the production of new needs—as two aspects of the same process of productive activity: 
“Productive activity produces not only a product which can satisfy the original need but 
simultaneously new needs within the producers.”131 What this implies is that on Marx’s 
view, “the process by which we transform the material world is simultaneously a process 
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by which we continually create within ourselves new needs, and, thus, can be said to 
change our nature.”132  
The picture we get of Marx’s view of human nature on this reading is one where 
human praxis and human need exist in a “feedback loop,” as it were, in which 
developments in the one are constantly driving developments in the other. On this 
reading, praxis is the source of Marx’s dynamic view of human nature. As praxis 
changes, so do human needs and human nature. At each new stage of development as 
human nature changes, new needs emerge as genuine requirements for the fulfillment of 
human nature. 
This raises the question: which, if any, of the ‘necessary needs’ generated in a 
capitalist society are genuine needs, and which, if any, are distractions or (worse) 
obstacles to the pursuit of human flourishing? Marx cannot appeal to human nature and 
the ideal of human fulfillment, as he could in the early works, because human nature 
itself is determined by the needs created by the present mode of production—which is to 
say, by the current level of ‘necessary needs’—which is determined by the capitalist 
economy itself. Can Marx claim that capitalism fails to meet the needs of human beings? 
If the needs of human beings are determined by capitalism itself and he has no 
conception of the human with a nature that holds within it its own criteria for fulfillment, 
it is not clear Marx can condemn capitalism for failing to live up to the socialist motto of 
justice. What needs, pray tell, are not being met? 
One route open to him would be to define authentic needs in terms of basic 
subsistence needs, but Marx is not willing to limit the scope of authentic needs to some 
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minimalist list of “basic” needs as the “primitivists” are prone to do. Marx sees 
developments of culture as at least potentially progressive, and he thinks it wrongheaded 
to excoriate every development of culture with the single-minded aim of getting “back to 
nature.”133  
A human being “as rich as possible in needs,” whose very needs constitute the 
“wealth” of socialist society, is an image Marx uses elsewhere to envision the ideal of 
human flourishing.
134
 Becoming “rich in needs” requires the “many-sided” development 
of human nature, which is only possible in interaction with a sophisticated and highly 
developed culture. Human beings, on Marx’s view, can have legitimate needs for quite 
sophisticated cultural goods.  
As beautiful as such a vision of human development is, it complicates the problem 
of whether Marx has any grounds for moral critique of capitalism because it is the very 
fact that capitalism excels in creating new needs that makes Marx unwilling to condemn 
capitalism in toto. For all of the harms it perpetrates on humankind, it is phenomenally 
effective at creating ever new and more sophisticated needs. In pursuit of the valorization 
of capital, capitalism inspires 
the exploration of the earth in all directions, to discover new things of use 
as well as new useful qualities of the old . . . likewise the discovery, 
creation and satisfaction of new needs arising from society itself; the 
cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being, production of the 
same in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and 
relations—production of this being as the most total and universal possible 
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social product, for in order to take gratification in a many-sided way, he 
must be capable of many pleasures, hence cultured to a high degree—is 
likewise a condition of production founded on capital.
135
 
 
There is the suggestion in Marx’s writing that inauthentic needs are those specific 
to a given historical epoch (those whose form fails to manifest in every epoch), but this is 
a feeble attempt to draw the necessary distinction. First, it would mean that we would 
only know which needs were inauthentic once socialism had undermined their material 
basis, and they had disappeared. This is problematic since it undercuts our ability to make 
any judgment, but it is not necessarily fatal. Sometimes it is only possible to see clearly in 
hindsight. Second—this is more problematic—distinguishing authentic from inauthentic 
needs based on whether they manifest in every epoch cuts against Marx’s claim that 
human nature undergoes real change in history. If legitimate needs are those that manifest 
in some form in every epoch, then while the material objects that satisfy human needs 
may change form, human needs themselves do not really change from one era to another. 
This solution cuts against Marx’s endorsement of cultural innovation as the progressive 
and more complete realization of human nature by implying that any development that 
actually generates a truly novel need has generated an “inauthentic” or “false need.” It is 
entirely possible Marx himself recognized this response was insufficient, since he struck 
the material containing this distinction from the final published text.
136
  
In the final analysis, as Patricia Springborg notes, “Since socialism is a regime 
based on the satisfaction of genuine needs, Marx has to establish some criteria to 
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differentiate needs other than simply what historical determination has produced.”137 
Marx’s philosophy of need and human nature in his later writings is inadequate for this 
task. In his later writings, needs are determined historically in response to the contingent 
developments of technology and praxis, and they must be “open to history to determine, 
because the proliferation of tomorrow’s needs, unforeseen today, constitutes the motor of 
progress.”138 Marx’s theory of history implies that human need, and hence human nature, 
is a contingent product of history, changing with and determined by the given stage of 
historical development. In this case, unlike the understanding of human nature articulated 
in the early writings, there will be no grounds for distinguishing between authentic and 
inauthentic needs, and so on this view, human nature and its needs will not be capable of 
serving as a standard for the evaluation of the mode of social production because human 
needs will themselves be the product of the given mode of social production.
139
  
Just as with Hume’s conception of human nature, on Marx’s view, human needs 
are explanatorily relevant as the drivers of technological and historical progress, but they 
are not normatively relevant for making ethical judgments for or against a given form of 
social organization. There are, therefore, no reasons related to human nature that we can 
appeal to in order to make sense of the thought that capitalism creates “false needs” and 
socialism satisfies “true needs;” nor is there any basis for the value judgment implicit in 
such a claim. To the extent that Marx leaves human needs and, hence, human nature open 
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to historical determination, he must give up his critique of capitalism for failing to meet 
human needs.
140
  
If human needs are to function as a normative category sufficient to ground 
Marx’s ideal of social justice and subsequent critique of capitalism, Marx must embrace a 
conception of nature in general which is teleological as opposed to empirical. His 
emancipatory critique of capitalism depends on the assumption that human needs are not 
for whatever history has happened to produce, but rather that there are authentic and 
inauthentic needs and that authentic human needs in any age are for human freedom. On 
this view, needs constitute the ontological conditions of human fulfillment. Only on this 
basis can Marx say that capitalism ought to be overthrown by socialism because it is 
exploitative and that only socialism can create the conditions necessary for human 
emancipation, allowing as it does the free exercise of the totality of human potential. 
According to this latter reading, the normative justification and the moral superiority of 
socialism is grounded in the account of human flourishing, the details of which are 
elaborated by his conception of human beings as beings of praxis. 
To summarize: Marx’s capacity to distinguish legitimate (or authentic or true) 
needs from illegitimate (or inauthentic or false) needs is crucial to his moral critique of 
capitalism and to his ability to give substance to the ideal of social justice expressed in 
the socialist motto, “From each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs.”141 The practical implementation of this vision of social justice depends on a 
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normative conception of needs, and by implication, a normative conception of human 
nature, given that Marx sees human needs as the essential expression of human nature.  
To the extent that human needs and human nature are represented as empirically 
and contingently determined in history—that is, to the extent that Marx embraces an 
empirical conception of nature in general as defined in the previous discussion of 
Hume—human nature will fail to provide an adequate normative resource for Marx’s 
critique of capitalism. If human needs are determined in each era by the given social 
mode of production, then it is difficult to say that the needs produced in us by the 
capitalist system are inauthentic, illegitimate, or false in the way Marx’s earliest critique 
of capitalism implies.  
 
5. Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, what can we say about the way the differing general 
concepts of nature exemplified here in the thought of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx function 
to inform each figure’s thinking in ethics?  
Nature has two distinct roles in Aristotle, and it functions in two distinct ways in 
ethical argument. As mere nature, it functions as a limit and a constraint on rational 
action. It also functions as the potentials we are given to work with that we can develop 
and cultivate through moral and other forms of education. As nature proper, nature 
functions as an ideal of ethical development. It is an explicitly normative notion insofar 
as it discriminates between correct and incorrect ways of cultivating the capacities and 
potentials provided by mere nature. 
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Hume’s moral philosophy has a strikingly different focus from that which we saw 
in Aristotle. Whereas in Aristotle, the focus is on the nature of the human end, and the 
argument is that virtue constitutes the substance of that end, in Hume the focus is on 
explaining the origins of virtue as well as how we discriminate between virtue and vice in 
our moral judgments. Hume argues that through the operations of sympathy, human 
nature is the causal origin of our ideas of virtue and vice, and it is on the basis of the 
principles of human nature that the sentiments of virtue and vice are felt, particularly on 
the basis of our sympathy with others that we form our moral judgments. So whereas 
Aristotle was primarily concerned with what we are aiming at in life, Hume is primarily 
concerned with the efficient causes of our action—with the motivating “springs” of our 
actions and the “principles” in the sense of efficient causes of our actions and, 
consequently, our moral judgments. 
For Hume, nature functions as the “ground” of morality in the sense that the 
original principles of our constitution function as the efficient causes of our moral 
sentiments. Hume thinks that if we are interested in understanding the moral life, we must 
necessarily take an interest in human nature, since ultimately any legitimate explanation 
will need to identify the source of our behavior or judgment in an empirically discernible 
principle of human nature. Hume appeals to the principle of sympathy exercised out of 
the general point of view to give a normative account of moral judgment. According to 
Hume, trustworthy moral judgments will reflect how all those affected by an action or 
character would regard it when judging from an impartial ‘general point of view.’ If 
useful and agreeable from this impartial general point of view, then the act or character 
will be deemed ‘virtuous,’ but if painful and disagreeable, then ‘vicious.’ While the 
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general point of view appears to provide a way for avoiding controversial assumptions 
about the proper ends of human life (and hence a teleological conception of human 
nature), I have argued that judgments from the general point of view cannot avoid some 
such assumptions. The impartiality that characterizes the general point of view requires 
that we have some sense of what weight to give to the various sentiments to be 
considered. And Hume can only disregard the sentiments of those who judge the monkish 
virtues useful, and thereby arrive at the judgment that the monkish virtues are in fact 
vices by taking a stand on the question of the human end. The monkish virtues are useful, 
but only for ends that Hume believes to be completely spurious. Hume’s pronouncement 
against the monkish virtues suggests either that he failed to judge from the general point 
of view (which is why he failed to take into account the sentiments of those who judge 
the monkish virtues useful), or that in order to judge from the general point of view in 
cases where the sentiments are not all unanimous, we must know how to weigh 
conflicting sentiments. In the latter case, giving due consideration would entail a 
judgment about which sentiments reflect the legitimate interests of the parties involved, 
and I have argued that distinguishing between the legitimate and illegitimate interests of 
the parties depends upon a teleological conception of human nature.  
In Marx’s early humanist writings, we find a teleological concept of nature in 
general underlying Marx’s claims about human flourishing. In the Manuscripts of 1844, 
Marx condemns capitalism as alienating. Human beings should find fulfillment in labor 
as they creatively work to meet their own needs and the needs of those around them, but 
capitalism transforms labor into a purely instrumental means to a wage workers must 
have in order to survive. As people then experience it, wage-labor becomes an alien force 
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in human life, and we actively seek to avoid it whenever possible, because it is felt as 
forced labor.
142
 Labor should be the realization of human freedom exercised in the 
satisfaction of a full range of human needs, leading to human flourishing. But wage-labor 
is represented by Marx as an external force interfering with the full flowering of the 
human potential for the free exercise of our conscious, creative, and social productive 
capacities. 
In both early and late writings, Marx identifies human needs as an essential 
expression of human nature (inseparable from the labor that meets those needs). In the 
early writings, human needs are clearly depicted as being for that which contributes to 
human flourishing, but as Marx develops his theory of history, development of the social 
forces of production is propelled from stage to stage by felt need expressed as a demand 
for ever more sophisticated satisfactions. The drive to satisfy our needs creates in us new 
needs for the means of production necessary to meet these needs. Positing human needs 
as both the engine and product of historical change renders human nature a contingent 
product of the social forces of production. But if human needs are for whatever the 
current mode of social production has determined, then Marx cannot criticize capitalism 
for failing to meet the human need for free, conscious, social, and productive activity. 
Under capitalism, human beings have no such need, since human needs are for whatever 
capitalism has brought us to feel as a need: if we happen to be workers, then our need 
will be for a wage; if we are capitalists, then our need will be for the growth of capital. 
Marx predicts that the forces of capitalism will, as a matter of fact, lead to the implosion 
of capitalism as the masses are eventually deprived to the point where revolution 
becomes inevitable, but Marx’s purely descriptive explanation of human nature in terms 
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of felt needs leaves him unable to criticize capitalism for failing to meet the needs of 
human beings, since human needs and human nature are determined by the forces of the 
now-current social mode of production. Marx’s moral critique of capitalism requires the 
support of a teleological conception of human nature that holds that human nature is 
realized in free, conscious, social, productive activity. Our true needs are for those things 
(and, derivatively, for institutions like socialism) that will enable us to realize this end. 
Because in his later works he abandons this account of human nature for one constituted 
by the social forces of production themselves, Marx loses the grounds needed to criticize 
capitalism for its failure to meet human needs. 
Whereas Hume describes human nature as the efficient-causal source of our moral 
sentiments, the later Marx provides an account of the efficient-causal forces that shape 
human nature. In both cases, the conception of nature in general is an empirical one, 
which prevents either one from drawing conclusions about how human life should be in 
contrast to how it is on the basis of considerations about our nature.  
This analysis suggests that judgments about human nature that are relevant from 
the point of view of informing our normative judgments about human flourishing are 
going to take a distinctive form—what I’ve called here a teleological form—because they 
characteristically involve drawing a distinction between ends, character traits, or needs 
that constitute a fulfillment of human nature and those that do not.  
In the course of her discussion of the appeal to nature in ancient ethics, Julia 
Annas makes the following observations about the appeal to nature proper as the goal or 
end of human development. These observations would apply equally well to what I’m 
calling a “teleological” view of nature in general: 
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It is obvious that this . . . use of nature presupposes two things. One is that 
we can in fact distinguish between the thing’s or person’s nature and 
outside influences that count as interferences with that nature. Plainly we 
cannot do this just by looking at what actually happens; everything a 
person does is a product of some combination of factors. We need to 
distinguish between what the person naturally does and what is done to 
him by way of interference. The second assumption is that we can 
distinguish between what forms an expression of a person’s nature and 
what forms a corruption of it—between a natural and unnatural 
development 
We can see at once that the notion of nature in this . . . sense is not a 
neutral, ‘brute’ fact; it is strongly normative. . . . For ancient ethics, the 
facts in question are neither simple nor obtainable by a quick glance; they 
are facts which take some finding and the discovery of which involves 
making evaluative distinctions.
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A teleological conception of nature in general will, then, be strongly normative 
because it is based on a set of evaluative judgments about proper ends of development, in 
light of which some factors in that development could count as “interference” or 
“corruption.” 
In this chapter, I’ve argued that the kinds of claims about human nature that are 
normatively significant for a theory of flourishing will be “teleological” in form as 
opposed to “empirical.” A teleological conception of human nature is formed by drawing 
distinctions between proper and improper ends, needs, or desires. As such, it offers an 
account of ends, needs, or desires that constitute a fulfillment or realization of our nature 
and distinguishes these from those that do not. By purging assumptions about which 
ends, needs, or desires contribute to the proper development and or fulfillment of human 
life, an empirical conception of nature in general eliminates the perspective necessary for 
supporting judgments about flourishing. 
This argument is significant because (as we saw in the discussion of Louise 
Antony) this is not commonly recognized. Antony (along with many others) assumes that 
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the kind of claim about nature that would be relevant to “grounding” ethical claims would 
be based on a view of nature in general that is “empirical” (like Hume’s). I have argued 
that this view is mistaken, because if we insist on the “empirical” view of nature in 
general, we’ll get the conclusion that Antony arrives at, which is that a theory of human 
nature is of little relevance for an ethic of flourishing. 
As I previously acknowledged, the effect of embracing a teleological conception 
of human nature is that the appeal to human nature cannot plausibly be construed as an 
appeal to an uncontroversial fact or set of facts about which persons are likely to be 
agreed. While teleological conceptions of human nature articulate reasons in support of 
the theory of flourishing—as has been shown in detail in this chapter through the 
extended examination of the ethics of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx—they do not give 
uncontroversial reasons. But they are reasons that make sense of the account of 
flourishing and articulate what makes living like this good for us.  
As I acknowledged in chapter one, it would, in principle, be possible to develop 
an ethic of flourishing that jettisons (or greatly diminishes) its dependence on a theory of 
human nature. While this is a possibility that deserves to be taken seriously—which I do 
in chapter five—I believe an articulate conception of human nature is a significant 
normative resource in a flourishing-based ethical framework. While I am not confident 
that giving a theoretical conception of human nature a central role in an ethics of 
flourishing will play a significant role in settling moral disagreements, I believe that 
articulating the conception of human nature that a theory of flourishing depends upon can 
make it clear where (at least some of) our deepest ethical disagreements reside. 
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Distinguishing between the possible ends of human life and arguing that some are 
fulfillments of our nature while others are distortions, stuntings, or maladaptations to 
nonideal environments is indispensable to a perspective that would maintain that we have 
natures which are well realized in some ways and not in others. It is this kind of claim 
that feminists need to be able to substantiate if they are to offer moral criticism in light of 
a standard of flourishing.
144
 There is a pressing need to distinguish those developments, 
practices, rules, and norms that are a response to legitimate human needs and 
appropriately supportive of human capabilities and potentials from those practices, rules, 
and norms that do not serve legitimate human needs or which stifle or stunt potentials 
that are important for leading an unfrustrated and fulfilling life. Louise Antony hits on 
this aspect of the significance of an account of human nature for feminist moral 
philosophy when she asserts that  
[some] conception of human flourishing, grounded in assumptions about a 
shared set of capacities, in fact lies behind feminism’s protest against the 
treatment of women. . . . I take it to be feminism’s position that women 
under patriarchy are systematically dehumanized—treated in way that 
prevent or impede the full development of their human capacities. Without 
a nonarbitrary background notion of human flourishing, the notion of 
damage makes no sense.
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Our legitimate needs can be explained by pointing to those realizations of human 
life that are genuine fulfillments and forms of flourishing and distinguishing those from 
forms of life which are pseudo-satisfactions, or that distort or stunt our potential for a 
fully human form of flourishing.  
Some feminists have characterized the central thrust of feminist criticism in a 
different light. Rather than characterizing feminist objections to patriarchy as a system 
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that stunts or distorts the capacity of women to flourish, they see feminism as bringing 
attention to the covert exercise of power in human life, particularly the exercise of power 
through the gender system.
146
 Understood in this way, feminist ethics makes central 
relations of power and questions authority in the use of that power. Illegitimate power 
often rests on the use of coercive force, but the claim that a given phenomenon in human 
life is (despite appearances) merely a product of force implicitly assumes a contrast with 
what would come about absent the use of force, that is, “naturally.” Thus, distinguishing 
between natural and forced behavior may be an important, even indispensable, critical 
tool for feminist ethics whether feminism is understood as a defense of women’s full and 
equal claim to human flourishing or as a movement to reveal the illicit exercises of power 
in human life that operate via the gender system. 
Being clear about the evaluative status of the conception of human nature that is 
needed for an ethic of flourishing may also go some way toward assuaging feminist 
concerns about moral theories that invoke a robust account of human nature. Flourishing-
based ethics need a teleological theory of human nature. An empirical conception of 
human nature will not be able to play the role that a flourishing-based ethic requires. 
Being transparent about the status of the appeal to human nature means we eliminate one 
perpetual source of skepticism that comes from smuggling in evaluative premises under 
the guise of uncontroversial description. Recognizing that such evaluative distinctions are 
in play is a step toward making responsible use of theoretical representations of human 
nature in ethical argument. 
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In the following two chapters, I explore the strengths and weaknesses of two 
contemporary ethics of flourishing in light of the argument given here that a flourishing-
based ethic needs a teleological (as opposed to empirical) conception of human nature. 
First, I consider the flourishing-based virtue ethics of Rosalind Hursthouse, followed by 
the human capabilities approach advanced by Martha Nussbaum. I argue that in 
appealing to a teleological conception of human nature, Hursthouse gives human nature 
the right methodological role in the ethic of flourishing she articulates. However, for 
feminist purposes, the substantive conception of human nature she endorses is not 
sufficiently robust to draw necessary evaluative distinctions between feminist and 
patriarchal understandings of the virtues. In contrast, through the capabilities list, 
Nussbaum articulates a substantive conception of human nature robust enough to support 
and make sense of the liberal, feminist vision of human flourishing she advances. 
However, Nussbaum wavers between an empirical and teleological concept of nature in 
general. At times, Nussbaum claims an epistemological status for the capabilities list that 
implies that it is an uncontroversial, quasi-empirical finding regarding what people 
universally agree to be valuable for human life. At other times, Nussbaum acknowledges 
that the capabilities list expresses an evaluative judgment about what full human 
development requires. As I have argued in this chapter, an ethic of flourishing needs a 
teleological rather than empirical concept of nature in general, in order to be adequately 
normative. In this way, I argue that both of these ethics of flourishing need to be 
modified—though in different respects—if they are to serve as the basis of a feminist 
ethic of flourishing.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE’S EUDAIMONIST VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE 
PROBLEM OF THE BENEVOLENT PATRIARCH 
 
 
Everyone who is taking the ethical naturalist line takes it as obvious that 
they are not pretending to derive ethical evaluations of human beings from 
an ethically neutral human biology, but are already thinking about human 
beings in an ethically structured way.
1
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter argued that in respect to its conception of nature in general, 
any conception of human nature with normative significance for a flourishing-based 
ethical theory will need to be teleological in form. The ends marked out by a teleological 
conception of nature in general—whatever the substantive content of that conception may 
be—serve to distinguish in at least a minimal way between legitimate and illegitimate 
interests, desires, and needs. As I argued in the case of both Hume and the later Marx, in 
the absence of such a distinction, their conception of human nature is incapable of 
accounting for the distinction they need to be able to draw between legitimate and 
illegitimate interests, desires, or needs of individuals.  
In this chapter, I turn to a contemporary flourishing-based ethic I believe satisfies 
this basic requirement that a flourishing-based ethic must employ a teleological 
conception of nature in general. Rosalind Hursthouse has developed a flourishing-based 
virtue ethic that aims to account for the virtues as states of character that reliably promote 
human flourishing. The framework of natural normativity she appeals to presupposes a 
form of biological teleology as operative in all living organisms, and the conception of 
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flourishing she employs is grounded “naturalistically” by appeal to that which is 
necessary for human beings to successfully pursue and realize the ends characteristic of 
our species-specific form of life. While Hursthouse has maintained that the ends 
associated with this account are epistemologically well-supported by the biological 
sciences, the full picture of the end internal to human nature that is required by this 
account is, I believe, more complex. The full picture entails an interpretation of human 
life that goes beyond what the natural sciences can license. In this chapter, I argue that 
Hursthouse requires the conceptual resources of a more “liberal” account of human 
nature, by which I mean an account that is not restricted by what the biological sciences 
can strictly license. I argue that feminists interested in the resources of Hursthouse’s 
general approach will require something yet more “liberal” if they hope to give a 
coherent feminist account of flourishing and the virtues constitutive of such flourishing. 
While I believe that the methodological role Hursthouse assigns to a theoretical 
conception of human nature in the context of a flourishing-based ethic is correct, 
Hursthouse’s substantive conception of human nature is not sufficiently robust to account 
for core feminist commitments as my discussion of Marilyn Friedman’s “Benevolent 
Patriarch” brings out.  
I begin section two with a brief discussion of a challenge to any form of feminist 
eudaimonism posed by Marilyn Friedman. Showing the degree to which Hursthouse’s 
moral philosophy can provide resources to meet this challenge will, I believe, vividly 
illuminate the strengths and limitations of Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian eudaimonism. 
After laying out Friedman’s challenge, section three is devoted to exposition of the 
details of Hursthouse’s project and is organized by the three theses she calls “Plato’s 
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Requirements on the Virtues,” but I give special attention in section three to the 
conceptual background for this project in the work of Philippa Foot, whose ideas about 
the grammar of the word ‘good’ led her to the notion of natural normativity. In section 
four, I develop an analysis of the concept of human nature found in Hursthouse in terms 
of its role and function in the theory, making explicit what the theoretical place of the 
appeal to human nature is in this kind of theory and reviewing some of the points 
Hursthouse has made often enough about what the appeal to human nature is not intended 
to do. The theoretical role of human nature in the context of this unique form of 
eudaimonism is shown to be quite different than it is often assumed to be. This theoretical 
account of human nature is an ethically informed account, the upshot of which is that this 
account of human nature cannot be justified strictly on the basis of the biological 
sciences, and Hursthouse ultimately needs (and does, in fact, rely on) a conception of 
human nature that is more robust than it first appears. In section five, I argue that a 
minimally feminist eudaimonism would likewise require the resources of a more robust 
(and hence more controversial) conception of human nature to account for core feminist 
convictions about the virtues such as, for example, that patriarchal benevolence (the 
putative virtue of Friedman’s Benevolent Patriarch) is not a genuine virtue. As it stands, a 
feminist eudaimonist equipped with the theoretical framework Hursthouse provides 
would be incapable of defending such a conclusion, but the kind of modifications 
necessary to defend this conclusion are, I believe, fairly clear and the exercise 
demonstrates how a theoretical conception of human nature can serve as a resource for a 
feminist flourishing-based ethic. 
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2. Marilyn Friedman’s Benevolent Patriarch and the Challenge for Feminist 
Eudaimonism 
 
Marilyn Friedman argues that eudaimonist moral theory cannot advance the goals 
of feminism because the feminist eudaimonist will be committed to an untenable and 
implausible conjunction of premises.
2
 The eudaimonist unites reflection on the good life 
to philosophical argument that moral virtue is necessarily a defining feature of any truly 
good life. According to Philippa Foot, the eudaimonist “suggestion is, then, that 
humanity’s good can be thought of as happiness, and yet in such a way that combining it 
with wickedness is a priori ruled out.”3 For feminists interested in utilizing a eudaimonist 
perspective, the challenge is to show how visions of success and happiness that passively 
accept or actively entail oppression and domination are misguided or false conceptions of 
happiness, because true happiness requires moral goodness. 
However, Friedman maintains that the feminist eudaimonist will (by virtue of her 
feminism) be committed, first, to the supposition that the domination and oppression of 
women by men is morally vicious and, second (by virtue of her eudaimonism), to the 
thesis that “men who dominate or oppress women cannot flourish or be happy.”4 
However, as a counter-example to this thesis, Friedman presents us with the case of the 
Benevolent Patriarch. The Benevolent Patriarch is a  
devoted family patriarch, a man who believes that men should be the 
heads of families because they are superior to women in such capacities as 
leadership and decision-making, and perhaps also because male leadership 
is required by religious norms. The benevolent patriarch does not love the 
women in his life as social equals to himself. However, he may harbor no 
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hostility toward them and may sincerely love them in the same way that 
any adult might love a young child who is dependent on his or her 
protection and guidance. For the patriarch, women are like children who 
will never fully grow up and who therefore require lifelong protection and 
guidance.
5
  
 
Friedman does not say so, but we can even imagine the benevolent patriarch 
having a robust conception of women’s dignity as women, that leads him to condemn 
practices and attitudes that he identifies as degrading or disrespectful to women. What he 
does not possess is a conception of women’s dignity as a function of their equality. 
Women, for him, possess a form of dignity strongly colored by norms of gender and only 
fully realized in and through forms of gender-based subordination. 
Friedman further argues there is no reason to believe the eudaimonist feminist’s 
claim that, because he possesses a significant vice, the Benevolent Patriarch cannot be 
happy.  
I believe the benevolent patriarch can plausibly flourish and be happy 
about his life overall despite his mistaken and derogatory beliefs about 
women. He can still flourish in today’s world because he will probably not 
have much trouble finding a woman who is willing to be a full-time wife 
for him and who may do an excellent job as the full-time mother of their 
children. This man will probably be relieved of the burden of a two-career 
household, in which case he will be able to devote himself to success at 
work, thereby gaining sufficient income to ensure for his family a safe 
neighborhood to live in, good schools to attend, and all the other familiar 
middle-class privileges that will give his children (his sons, at any rate) an 
advantageous start in life. He may also have time to participate in the 
public life of his community, perhaps by running for office on the local 
school board.
6
  
 
Friedman argues that the Benevolent Patriarch is quite likely to be personally 
successful and lead a happy life as gauged by common indicators of material success and 
personal satisfaction. All of this seems plausible enough. Friedman presents this 
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argument not against any eudaimonist in particular, but rather against what she thinks any 
eudaimonist—by virtue of her commitment to the necessity of virtue thesis and her moral 
opposition to patriarchy in any form—must say in order to sustain her position.7 This 
raises an interesting question: can a feminist eudaimonist equipped with the conceptual 
framework articulated by Hursthouse rebut this charge? Alternatively, is Friedman right 
to think the eudaimonist cannot reject the possibility that the Benevolent Patriarch is 
primed to lead a happy, successful life? After a discussion of Hursthouse’s unique form 
of eudaimonist moral philosophy, I return to this question in section five. 
 
3. Contemporary Eudaimonism: Rosalind Hursthouse’s Neo-Aristotelian Ethical 
Naturalism 
 
In On Virtue Ethics, Rosalind Hursthouse defends a Neo-Aristotelian, flourishing-
based virtue ethic.
8
 As I said in the introductory chapter, it is not clear that all 
“flourishing-based” ethics can or should be identified as “eudaimonistic,” but 
Hursthouse’s arguably can for she commits herself to one of the central tenets of the 
ancient eudaimonists: the virtues benefit their possessor.
9
 Hursthouse argues that the 
virtues are character traits a human being needs for eudaimonia. To say this means that: 
1) The virtues benefit their possessor. (They enable her to flourish, to be, and live 
a life that is, eudaimon.) 
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2) The virtues make their possessor a good human being. (Human beings need the 
virtues in order to live well, to flourish as human beings, to live a 
characteristically good, eudaimon, human life.) 
 
3) The above two features of the virtues are interrelated.
10
 
 
Hursthouse develops these three theses, which she dubs “Plato’s requirements on 
the virtues,” to provide a framework within which a rational vindication of the virtues is 
possible: those character traits are genuine virtues that benefit their possessor and make 
her good qua human being. Hursthouse’s defense of the general claim that “the virtues 
are character traits that a human being needs for eudaimonia” is built up out of the 
argument for each of these sub-theses. Hence, it is worth pausing to review the arguments 
given in support of each of these claims. 
 
3.1 “The Virtues Benefit Their Possessor” 
Hursthouse offers a quite general, intuitive argument for the claim that the virtues 
benefit their possessor. Philosophers have often enough rejected as untenable the claim 
that developing the virtues is in each person’s best interest. A common argument against 
the thesis involves a thought experiment in which one tries to imagine successfully 
convincing whatever character one imagines to have a full range of vices—the gangster, 
drug baron, autocratic strongman, or Cruella de Vil-type
11—that, lacking the virtues, they 
cannot live truly happy lives. The consensus is that such an attempt would fail to 
convince the moral skeptic or truly wicked person that they are not truly happy, but since 
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these people generally believe themselves to be happy, and they evidently lack the 
virtues, the thesis is taken to be false. 
In contrast to this approach, and following R.M. Hare, Hursthouse recommends 
looking at the debate from a different angle. Admitting we are unlikely to be able to 
convince the moral skeptic or thoroughly wicked character that the virtues are in their 
interest, she argues that, nevertheless, it is striking and significant that those we call 
“good parents”—those who really want the best for their children—give their children a 
moral education that encourages and attempts to nurture the virtues rather than their 
opposites. Though they may not be able to guarantee that the virtues will bring true 
happiness and success in life, if we look at what they do in the course of raising their 
children, few parents seem to believe that the virtues are irrelevant or that cultivating the 
vices will be just as good a bet if they want their children to live good and successful 
lives.
12
 Prima facie, the way good parents typically try to raise their children suggests a 
widespread conviction that the virtues (on the whole) benefit their possessor, making 
their possessor fit to succeed and capable of dealing with the most predictable of life’s 
challenges. This suggests that people generally believe the virtues are necessary for a 
truly good life. 
Despite this, Hursthouse maintains that the virtues are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for eudaimonia. Rather, she regards the virtues as our ‘best bet’ when it comes 
to dealing with the realities of human life and the vicissitudes of human fortune. In line 
with the ancient eudaimonists, Hursthouse maintains that “A virtue is a character trait a 
human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well,” but she interprets this claim 
as parallel to one’s doctor’s advice that if you want to preserve your health, you should 
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quit smoking and drink only in moderation.
13
 There is no guarantee that following the 
doctor’s orders will bring one glowingly into old age. The doctor’s advice is no foolproof 
assurance, but this is the only reliable bet. “The claim is that they are the only reliable 
bet—even though, it is agreed, I might be unlucky and, precisely because of my virtues, 
wind up dying early or with my life marred or ruined.”14 While such tragedy can befall 
the virtuous, Hursthouse also thinks that it is quite possible that, on the other side, the 
vicious will just get lucky and, even without virtue, “flourish like the green bay tree.” 
Thus, Hursthouse interprets the claim that “the virtues benefit their possessor” as the 
claim that the virtues are our most reliable bet for leading a successful and happy life. In 
any case, they are certainly more reliable than the life of vice, which “clearly carries its 
own risks.”15  
Hursthouse’s argument that the virtues benefit their possessor by being the most 
reliable bet for one who wants to live a good and successful—eudaimon—life is an 
intuitive one. I call this an “intuitive” argument because the key concept on which the 
argument turns is left unspecified. The argument works with a common sense, intuitive 
conception of ‘benefit’ and the idea that flourishing is a benefit to the agent. The 
argument at this stage does not depend on any clarifications regarding the nature of “true 
benefit” or dislodging any misguided ideas a person might have about what will benefit 
and what will harm. This argument operates within the realm of common sense, even 
while it undermines a common line of philosophical argument by asking us to bring the 
assumptions we accept in the practical sphere of child-rearing into line with the 
assumptions we accept upon philosophical reflection.  
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3.2 “The Virtues Make Their Possessor a Good Human Being” 
 The argument for the second thesis is more complex. It depends on a clarified 
conception of benefit arrived at through philosophical reflection. The claim that “a virtue 
is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia, to flourish or live well” is taken 
to imply not only that the virtues benefit their possessor (as explained above), but that 
“the virtues make their possessor a good human being.” At this stage in the argument, we 
begin to get a clarification and specification about the nature of the benefit that the 
virtues (most reliably) bring: the benefits of the virtues are benefits to us qua biological 
members of the human species. The argument for the second thesis introduces the unique 
form of naturalism to which Hursthouse is committed. 
Following Philippa Foot, Hursthouse argues there is an important analogy 
between ethical evaluations of flourishing and biological evaluations of flourishing. In 
order to grasp the analogy, it helps to see how the evaluation of character traits—as 
virtues or vices—mirrors the evaluation of the biological aspects of ourselves. Character 
traits—understood as robust dispositions involving both reason and emotion—come to be 
understood as those aspects of ourselves that are appropriately subject to moral 
evaluation. 
In order to argue for the second thesis, Hursthouse takes up a line of philosophical 
argument initially set out by Philippa Foot that aims to ground objective attributions of 
human moral goodness “naturalistically.” Ethical naturalism, broadly conceived, is the 
view that the claims of ethics about what one should do and be are ultimately justified by 
facts about human nature and the circumstances of human life. The variety of ethical 
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naturalism defended by Foot and Hursthouse conceives of human beings as part of a 
“natural, biological order of living things.”16 Ethical evaluation is made in light of what it 
is to be a good human being, i.e., a “flourishing” member of the human species, and 
ethical evaluations are understood in a way that makes them structurally identical to 
evaluations of other natural living things. This kind of ethical naturalism maintains that 
ethical evaluations are analogous to the evaluations of health and good function in plants 
and non-human animals. 
Ethical naturalism of this sort has been developed most prominently by Elizabeth 
Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Michael Thompson, and Rosalind Hursthouse. The 
philosophical thesis common to these figures is that the conceptual use of species 
categories to identify living organisms implies a set of normative judgments that establish 
not only the bounds of species membership, but also standards for measuring well-being 
for particular members of the species. Thus, there is a kind of normativity within the 
natural world that is expressed in the norms of the form of life for the species, or in what 
is necessary for members of a given species to progress through the lifecycle in a species-
typical fashion. Philippa Foot has called this “natural normativity.” Anscombe refers to 
these norms as “Aristotelian necessities,” while Thompson calls them “Aristotelian 
categoricals.”17 
In his essay “The Representation of Life,” Michael Thompson articulates the 
conceptual and logical background of this perspective. He argues that our very ability to 
identify an individual as an organism of a certain species or as engaged in certain life 
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activities presupposes a set of normative judgments about the form of life (i.e., the 
‘species’) of the organism.18 Thompson argues, “If a thing is alive, if it is an organism, 
then some particular vital operations and processes must go on in it from time to time—
eating, budding out, breathing, walking, growing, thinking, photosynthesizing.”19 Yet our 
very ability to identify the life activities of the organism requires a prior identification of 
that which is characteristic of its form of life—the way(s) this kind of thing progresses 
through the life cycle—and this necessarily implicates a set of normative judgments with 
respect to the species, since what it is to be engaged in any one of those activities for any 
particular organism can only be identified in the wider context of its form of life.  
John Hacker-Wright offers the very useful example of cellular division as a case 
in point. In a single-celled organism or bacteria, cell division is a form of reproduction, 
but in a multicellular organism, cell division is a form of organismic growth and 
maintenance. Cellular division is a different kind of activity in these different forms of 
life. What follows from this recognition is that “identifying an organism also involves 
taking a normative stance on what is going on in the organism. In situating the organism 
within the wider context of a form of life, we are situating the individual organism 
against a view of how creatures of that sort normally function.”20 Hence, to look at any 
individual as a member of a species is to look at that individual from a normative 
perspective, according to the norms set by the form of life of which it is a member.
21
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Facts about the organism’s form of life constitute the basis of natural normativity. 
Whether one is a good (or conversely, defective) member of the species is determined by 
the way that members of the species characteristically pass through the various life 
stages. As such, the species norm sets standards for things such as development and 
behavior in the individual.  
Foot argues that an analogous principle applies to the ethical evaluation of 
members of the human species. “To determine what is goodness and what defect of 
character, disposition and choice, we must consider what human good is, and how human 
beings live: in other words, what kind of a living thing a human being is.”22 Of course, 
ethical evaluations do not pertain to physical growth and development, which are matters 
of health, but rather pertain to states and actions subject to choice and freedom, matters of 
human will. The analogy suggests that ethical evaluations have to do with those aspects 
of ourselves that are ethically relevant, which, from a virtue-theoretic standpoint, are the 
dispositions of character. Foot argues that we can evaluate good dispositions of character 
                                                                                                                                                 
species or a rather typical member of the dwarf sub-species. See Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 203. Our 
judgments in these regards must be left subject to revision, and it is implausible to maintain that the 
distinction between species “announces itself to us” or is in some way self-evident. However, this neo-
Aristotelian framework does, I think, depend on at least a moderate form of realism (the view that our best 
concepts map the intelligibility of the world, rather than construct it). If it could be shown that species/kind 
categories were nothing more than a function of human perspective or human interests, that would be a 
serious blow to this perspective. Hursthouse does not address the realist/anti-realist philosophical debate, 
but I think her answer to this question would be something akin to, “The biological sciences are our best 
attempt to understand the natural world of living organisms in a thorough and precise way, and the 
biological sciences employ species distinctions to do so. To the degree that the biological sciences give us 
an ‘objective’ account of the world, we have good reasons to consider species distinctions objective.” 
However, she complicates this (hypothetical) response by conceding the following point: Hursthouse 
admits, “there is no unique way of dividing up the biological world and . . . different modes of 
classification are in part determined by different interests of ours.” On Virtue Ethics, 202 ftnt 15. It seems 
to me that our interests (e.g., our interest in understanding) can be part of what determines our modes of 
classification, but if our interests are all that guide the classification of living organisms by species, then 
Hursthouse cannot make the claim that “the truth of our evaluations of living things [which are ultimately 
based on species norms] does not depend in any way on my wants, interests, or values, nor indeed on 
‘ours’. They are, in the most straightforward sense of the term, ‘objective’; indeed, given that botany, 
zoology, ethology, etc. are sciences, they are scientific.” On Virtue Ethics, 202. (Emphasis mine.) 
22 Foot, Natural Goodness, 51. 
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in the same way we evaluate good roots and good instincts in plants and animals: by 
whether and how they conduce to the characteristic flourishing of a member of that 
species. Whether a character trait is or is not a virtue, then, turns on its connection to the 
characteristic way human beings live and flourish. 
Hursthouse adopts Foot’s basic concept of natural normativity and with it the 
teleological perspective on living organisms. She also agrees with Foot that a good 
human being is one who exhibits those character traits necessary for flourishing as a 
human being. Furthermore, Hursthouse develops Foot’s thesis by elaborating it in the 
terms of a systematic framework within which she aims to make the justification of 
individual virtues possible.
23
 According to Hursthouse, a person counts as an ethically 
good human being insofar as the ethically relevant “aspects” of her constitution conduce 
to the characteristic ends of the human species and thereby enable her to flourish as a 
human being.  
According to Hursthouse, we can identify in the natural world differing levels of 
complexity in living things, from plants to non-human animals to human beings. 
Amongst the most complex are social animals where Hursthouse argues that we find a 
confluence of four characteristic “aspects”—their (i) parts, (ii) operations, (iii) actions, 
and (iv) emotions and/or desires—conducing to four characteristic “ends”: (1) individual 
survival, (2) continuance of the species, (3) characteristic enjoyments and freedom from 
pain, and (4) the good functioning of the social group.
24
 The evaluation of any individual 
as a good member of its species turns on how well each of its species-characteristic 
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aspects conduces to the achievement of its species-characteristic ends. In each case, 
Hursthouse emphasizes that how these ends are realized is as important as the 
achievement of the ends themselves. For example, not only must the actions of the 
individual conduce to the good functioning of the social group, but they must do so in a 
species-characteristic way. I will call this conceptual framework the “framework of 
natural normativity.” 
She goes on to argue that something analogous is true for human beings as well, 
though when we arrive at the task of evaluating ourselves, Hursthouse maintains that we 
need to add a fifth “aspect” for evaluation, since we are not only social animals but also 
rational. Hence, human beings are subject to evaluation in light of a fifth aspect—(v) 
rationality—over and above the four we share with other social animals. The good 
functioning of human beings is categorically distinct from the good functioning of other 
highly intelligent social animals because our actions must contribute to the ends of our 
species in a “characteristically rational” way. Even though Hursthouse maintains that the 
ends characteristic of human flourishing are identical to those of other social animals, the 
way we pursue these ends is distinctive. A ‘characteristically rational’ way, Hursthouse 
specifies, is “any way which we can rightly see as good, as something we have reason to 
do.”25 This means that the ultimate criterion for any character trait counting as a virtue is 
whether or not it contributes to the achievement of the specified ends of our species and 
does so in a way that we can see as a good way of achieving this end. Thus, the 
conception of practical rationality Hursthouse’s account requires is clearly substantive, as 
opposed to instrumental. What counts as “rational” (and, therefore, as potentially 
virtuous) will be more restricted than what is merely an effective way to realize the ends 
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of our nature. Thus, the all-important question becomes ‘What ways can we legitimately 
see as good ways of pursuing these ends?’ I will return to this point in assessing the 
response to Friedman that seems available to Hursthouse. 
 In order to use the framework of natural normativity as a framework for 
understanding ethical evaluations, we need to separate out those aspects of ourselves—
the parts, operations, actions, and reactions—which are merely physical (e.g., the 
dexterity of our hands and the regulation of our breathing and heart rate, our metabolic 
capacity and our reflexive reactions, and so forth). While these can certainly be crucial 
for human flourishing, evaluation of these things is a matter of health, not ethics. Moral 
evaluation—and the praise and blame that characteristically accompany it—presupposes 
the capacity for free choice made possible by our rationality.
26
 Although this form of 
ethical naturalism attempts to connect our understanding of ethical evaluations to 
evaluations of good biological function by attending to the characteristic elements of 
human flourishing, it is important to emphasize that ethical evaluation remains distinct 
insofar as it is restricted to those aspects of ourselves that are in some meaningful sense 
“up to us.”27 Ethical naturalists like Hursthouse are not attempting to reduce ethical 
evaluations to evaluations of good biological functioning as measured by physicians and 
veterinarians. What we are left with when we separate out those aspects of ourselves that 
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 John McDowell, “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” in Mind, Value and Reality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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 There are, of course, some who deny that anything we do is “up to us” in the sense necessary to warrant 
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Ted Honderich, How Free Are You?: The Determinism Problem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); 
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are merely physical is notable. We have actions taken from reason; we have our emotions 
and desires (the ones that are not merely reactions to physical stimuli); and the 
(occasional) action taken because of those desires or emotions (the ones that are not 
merely physical).
28
 These are all aspects of ourselves that enter into the exercise of the 
virtues as traditionally understood. 
Character traits, as understood in the Aristotelian tradition, involve “a complex 
unity of one’s values, choices, desires, emotions, perceptions, interests, expectations, 
attitudes, sensibilities and actions” in a way that is deeply engrained and not subject to 
moment-by-moment voluntaristic changes.
29
 A character trait typically involves a certain 
set of attitudes and emotions concerning a specific sphere of human concern.
30
 However, 
in contrast to other kinds of personal traits or qualities, which can be fairly local in scope, 
a character trait is global in scope and shapes the agent’s actions and reactions in 
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accordance with trait-characteristic reasons wherever the subject matter specific to the 
character trait comes into play.
31
 
Furthermore, when we attribute a character trait as a virtue, we also attribute to 
the person the capacity to reason well about matters connected to that virtue, since each 
of “the virtues involves getting things right, for each involves phronesis, or practical 
wisdom, which is the ability to reason correctly about practical matters.”32 When we 
understand virtues as robust character traits, Hursthouse argues, the “concept of a virtue 
emerges as tailor-made to encapsulate a favourable evaluation of just those aspects 
which, according to the naturalism here outlined, are the ethically relevant ones.”33 
Thus, character traits emerge as the candidate “aspects” of ourselves that we 
properly look to when making ethical evaluations. Understood in light of the framework 
of natural normativity, if a character trait is a virtue (a good character trait), then it ought 
to conduce in a fairly regular sort of way to the ends of the human species, 
naturalistically understood: individual survival, continuance of the species, characteristic 
pleasures and freedom from pain, and the good functioning of the social group. When we 
look at the character traits we typically think of as virtues, does this seem to be the case? 
Hursthouse observes that “it has long been a commonplace that justice and fidelity to 
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promises enable us to function as a social, cooperating group”34 and that charity “directed 
to the young and helpless particularly serves the continuance of the species; directed 
more widely it serves the good functioning of the social group by fostering the individual 
survival, freedom from pain, and enjoyment of its members, and also by fostering its 
cohesion.”35 Furthermore, without “honesty, generosity and loyalty we would miss out on 
one our greatest sources of characteristic enjoyment, namely loving relationships.”36 
Similar accounts can be given for courage and temperance. 
Encouraged by the fact that we seem to be able to make sense of many of the 
virtues on the standard list by examining them in this light, Hursthouse concludes that we 
have good reason to think that the second of “Plato’s requirements on the virtues” is true: 
the virtues do make their possessor an ethically good human being, naturalistically 
understood, because they contribute to the species-characteristic ends of human life. 
Human beings seem to need the virtues in order to live well and to flourish as human 
beings, and to live characteristically good, eudaimon, human lives. The rational support 
for that claim is the argument provided by the framework of natural normativity that the 
virtues are character traits encapsulating just those aspects of ourselves—i.e., the ones 
that are rationally informed and subject to decision and choice—that are susceptible to 
distinctively moral evaluation. These aspects are “virtues” when they conduce in a 
characteristically rational way to the ends of a flourishing human being conceived in 
terms of individual survival, continuance of the species, characteristic pleasure and 
freedom from pain, and the good functioning of the social group. 
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As I noted at the outset of this section, this argument constitutes a clarification of 
the kind of benefit that the virtuous can expect to receive: the virtues benefit their 
possessor—the first thesis—but they benefit their possessor qua human being. The 
virtues bring about our flourishing as human beings—i.e., as members of a species with a 
species-specific form of life—and thereby make their possessors good human beings. 
This is how the first two features are inter-related, which is the third of “Plato’s 
requirements on the virtues.” The virtues benefit their possessor, but the benefit they 
bring makes their possessor a flourishing member of the human species. 
 
3.3 “The First Two Theses Are Inter-Related” (Because Human Nature Is Harmonious) 
 
That the first two theses are inter-related Hursthouse takes to imply not only what 
was explained above—that the benefit the virtues bring about is our flourishing as 
members of the human species—but also that the virtues can benefit us in this way 
because our nature is such that human flourishing is possible. While connecting the first 
two theses is important and clarifying the conception of benefit and relating human 
nature to a positive conception of flourishing is significant, it is Hursthouse’s conviction 
that we must presuppose a conception of human nature as harmonious that is most 
philosophically interesting and methodologically significant for revealing the role and 
function of human nature within this moral framework. 
The third of “Plato’s requirements on the virtues” (which says that the first two 
theses are interrelated) is an essentially hermeneutic thesis. It requires that we interpret 
our nature—its aspects and ends—as (at least potentially) harmonious rather than as just 
“a mess,” the “ill-assorted bricolage of powers and instincts” that Bernard Williams 
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suggests may be our lot.
37
 Looking at both the very general features of the human 
condition and the historical, evolutionary account of how human beings have come to be 
as they are, Williams has wondered whether anything like the kind of fulfillment 
imagined in the Aristotelian tradition is a plausible aim for human beings. The 
Aristotelian project presupposes that the essential requirements imposed by each of the 
fundamental human ends is compossible with the requirements imposed by each of the 
others, at least to the extent that making trade-offs to accommodate each of them is a 
reasonable and not a futile strategy. Consider, for example, one possible conflict between 
the ends of human flourishing as articulated by Hursthouse: the pleasure of the individual 
and the good functioning of the social group. One can imagine the case in which, given 
the circumstances of human life, one must be sacrificed to preserve the other. But if our 
flourishing depends in a deep way on both, then sacrificing either will represent not 
simply a trade-off, but rather a kind of mutilation—a sacrifice of something without 
which a good life cannot be lived. 
Imagine, for example, that social conservatives are right when they argue that a 
functioning, stable society depends on the majority of that society’s children being raised 
in stable two-parent families. In the absence of affordable and widely available birth 
control, this means society needs strong marriage relationships, low divorce rates, and 
low rates of reproduction outside of that context. But that, in turn, means placing heavy 
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strictures on the ways people in that society express themselves sexually and pursue 
sexual pleasure. If the needs of a well-functioning and stable social group are compatible 
with the characteristic human pursuit of sexual pleasure, then the trade-off in terms of 
limiting the boundaries and the context under which such pleasure can legitimately be 
pursued may be reasonable. But if the strictures and taboos required to achieve this are 
not mere limitation, but rather are a repression of something essential, then the limits 
represent no mere trade-off but a cutting off—a mutilation—of a part of us that is 
essential for human flourishing. If the demands of these two ends are not compatible (and 
by hypothesis, they are not), then we might alternatively allow the free exercise of human 
sexuality and the pursuit of such a characteristic and (by hypothesis, essential) pleasure, 
but in this case, we will necessarily be cut off from a form of social functioning equally 
essential for human flourishing. This will represent a mutilation of a different sort, but a 
mutilation no less real and serious. The prospect that what is necessary for a minimally 
adequate form of flourishing could be impossible to realize because the ends of human 
nature are fundamentally incompatible presents the real possibility that, given what 
human nature is, human flourishing is an unrealistic, and hence unreasonable, aim. 
Still, Hursthouse argues—I think plausibly—that the belief that flourishing is 
possible is an essential feature of the ethical outlook of even the most minimally virtuous, 
since taking flourishing as one’s goal—either for oneself or for others—requires one to 
believe flourishing is possible. Moreover, as Hursthouse perceptively points out, the 
thesis that human nature is harmonious is not an extra assumption that eudaimonism 
requires but which Kantianism and utilitarianism can do without. “[E]ven Kant and 
utilitarianism will be affected by this . . . since we cannot be required to adopt the 
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happiness of others as an end, or its maximization, if happiness comes only through 
astonishing luck.”38 Both Kantians and utilitarians enjoin us to act in ways that promote 
the well-being and the happiness of others, but if our nature is such a mess that no course 
of action can reliably be expected to bring this about, then the possibility opens up that it 
does not really matter what I do, or what I intend. Rejecting the thesis that human nature 
is (potentially) harmonious has significant practical consequences. 
If we really are, by nature, just a mess, then we are beings for whom no 
form of life is likely to prove satisfactory at all. Any individuals who 
flourish individually and socially are an extraordinary accident and so 
(please note) are those who flourish individually and anti-socially. Neither 
is likely, for given that we are just a mess, what is to be expected, what 
happens unless we are, individually, astonishingly lucky, is that we don’t 
flourish at all, notwithstanding our rationality and our desire to do so. [. . .] 
The belief that harmony is possible for human beings, that we have the 
virtues neither by nor contrary to nature, but are fitted by (our) nature to 
receive them, is, I think, an essential part of the ethical outlook even of the 
minimally virtuous—any of us who think that being right about ethics 
matters.
39
 
 
The thesis that human nature is harmonious underwrites the hope that taking 
flourishing as the aim of practical reason is reasonable and meaningful because 
flourishing is possible for creatures like us, and harmonizing these ends in ways that lead 
us to make trade-offs is the counsel of wisdom, not futility. 
Whether we adopt an ethical outlook (i.e., take a general view of the world that 
holds that it is meaningful to strive for good lives and that such lives are systematically 
connected to morality in some way) or we accept a nihilistic or immoralist outlook (i.e., 
take the view that it is either pointless to strive to lead good lives—nihilism—or that 
immorality is just as, or even more likely to lead to the best kind of life possible for 
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human beings) seems to depend on a certain understanding of our nature: that our nature 
is (or can be made) harmonious. 
However, neither the view that human nature is ultimately ‘a mess,’ nor the view 
that human nature is harmonious seem (to me at least) to be necessitated by the empirical 
evidence or the anthropological record. There seems here to be a choice to make about 
how we will interpret the various impulses our nature gives rise to and what significance 
we will accord the various kinds of trade-offs necessitated by our finitude and the 
external circumstances of human life.
40
 Sustaining an ethical outlook (as opposed to a 
nihilistic or immoralist outlook) depends on a certain understanding of our nature. But 
this is an interpretation of our nature and the interpretation is made necessary by our 
ethical outlook.
41
 So the argument is one that works from the perspective of asking about 
the presuppositions required to sustain an ethical outlook (as opposed to falling into 
nihilism or immoralism), and arguing that a certain interpretation of our nature is justified 
because it is necessary for sustaining an ethical outlook. 
The conclusion we come to, then, is that human nature is relevant to our moral 
theorizing because the question of how we interpret our nature is directly related to our 
ability to give a reasonable account of our ethical outlook, whatever that may be. Insofar 
as any ethical outlook is defined by a persistent drive to live well ourselves and find a 
way of life that will enable others to do so, and our practical commitments embody the 
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hope that this is possible, this presupposes that flourishing is possible for creatures like 
us.
42
  
 
4. Analysis: The Concept of Human Nature and Its Function 
What role can we see human nature playing in Hursthouse’s unique form of 
ethical naturalism? Hursthouse gives extensive attention to this question in the sense of 
trying to make clear what the appeal to nature is not intended to do. The appeal to human 
nature, Hursthouse insists, is not intended to provide a value-neutral, extra-ethical 
foundation for ethics, and the conception of human nature to which she appeals is neither 
value-neutral nor extra-ethical, as the third thesis clearly reveals. Regarding what the 
appeal to human nature is intended to do, Hursthouse’s position is more ambiguous, but 
there are a few things we can establish that are worth noting. 
As previously discussed, one function played by the concept of human nature 
(qua concept of the human species) is to specify and clarify the concept of benefit which 
the theory invokes when it claims that the virtues benefit their possessor and enable her to 
flourish. Though Hursthouse’s initial arguments employed a vague, intuitive conception 
of benefit, the theory ultimately draws on an account of what is involved in successfully 
progressing through the life cycle of our species in order to specify more precisely the 
kind of flourishing the virtues (by hypothesis) bring. An account of the ends of human 
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life qua members of the human species is crucial for this theory insofar as the theory 
takes its conception of flourishing from the idea of living successfully as members of a 
certain natural kind. 
Another theoretical role played by the concept of human nature is that it serves to 
link the concepts of flourishing and virtue. It is the concept of human nature—the way 
the theory conceives of our species-specific form of life with certain ‘aspects’ being 
central and human life as a whole defined by the pursuit of individual survival, the 
continuance of the species, pleasure and the avoidance of pain, and the good functioning 
of our social group—that allows Hursthouse to defend the claim that the virtues are 
necessary for flourishing (because they are our “best bet”). As Simon Hope observes, 
human nature plays a very particular justificatory role in neo-Aristotelian ethical 
naturalisms. It does not justify specific moral practices or particular judgments, rather the 
conception of human nature answers the question, “Why think these thick moral concepts 
[i.e., the virtue terms we appeal to when making particular moral judgments] are the right 
ones?”43 In this way, a conception of human nature as oriented toward certain abstract 
ends serves as one element of a complete theory that attempts to fit “our concepts of 
virtue and good human being and excellence and defect in living things (and a number of 
other concepts) together” in a way that yields “the best abstract understanding” of virtue 
and what it is to be a good human being.
44
 
Borrowing a phrase from Bernard Williams, Hursthouse has described neo-
Aristotelian ethical naturalism with its intense reflection on human nature as a form of 
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“coherentism with a hermeneutical agenda.”45 This expression succinctly captures two 
very important aspects of the role of human nature in Hursthouse’s theory. First, I will 
explain how it is a form of “coherentism,” then I will discuss its “hermeneutical agenda.” 
When it comes to reflection on human nature, this means making a certain interpretation 
of our nature coherent with other ethical concepts and commitments. 
Speaking again of Foot’s project, Hursthouse describes Foot’s broad endeavor as 
a coherentist project, the driving force of which was the demand for a consistent account 
of the word ‘good’ across ethical and non-ethical contexts. Foot’s project can be seen as a 
kind of coherentism insofar as she strove to give a consistent analysis of the word ‘good,’ 
and initially, “hardly anyone but her thought that they should work on getting their 
ethical and meta-ethical beliefs to cohere with a whole lot of other beliefs they had about 
good roots, good eyes, good cacti and so on, because they assumed those were 
irrelevant.”46 When it came to language use, it was not clearly the case that the grammar 
of the word underwent a radical change depending on the context, but that was what the 
subjectivist, expressivist, and prescriptivist theories claimed. 
The structure of Hursthouse’s account is coherentist in another sense as well. 
Rather than taking one concept—e.g., virtue or human nature—as basic or foundational 
and deriving other concepts from that as many modern moral theories do,
47
 Hursthouse’s 
eudaimonism might be thought of as taking a number of distinct concepts as primary, but 
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not basic.
48
 A cluster of primary terms—i.e., virtue, flourishing, good human being—are 
appealed to in order to explain and elucidate the others, but it is not claimed that any can 
be reduced to or derived from any of the others. (Thus, it would be mistaken to read 
Hursthouse as positing the ends of human nature as fundamental values from which we 
can derive the virtues, which is what Brad Hooker takes her to be doing.
49
) In both these 
ways, Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian eudaimonism can be seen as a kind of coherentism. 
Why describe it as having a certain “hermeneutical agenda”? Hursthouse suggests 
that the view of ourselves employed by neo-Aristotelian naturalism is useful for 
dislodging certain entrenched Enlightenment views of ourselves as special sorts of 
beings—persons—which are quite set apart from the rest of the natural world. “[We] go 
for the [biological or animal] analogy [to moral evaluation] in part to curtail our hubristic 
tendency to think of ourselves in that inflated way. The analogy puts us firmly in our 
place as something distinctly less than that special.”50 Thus, one of the intended effects of 
taking this perspective on ourselves—as members of the biological order of living things 
with ends continuous with those of other living organisms—is to lead us to think of 
ourselves and interpret our lives in a less hubristic way. So part of the hermeneutical 
agenda is to bring us to interpret our lives in a way to which we are not generally 
accustomed. (This links up with the coherentism because it is this interpretation of our 
lives that we are trying to make coherent with other important views we have, for 
instance, about the virtues, the word ‘good,’ and what it means to ‘flourish.’) 
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I believe Hursthouse’s eudaimonism can be described as advancing a 
hermeneutical agenda in a different sense as well. Her eudaimonistic reflections on the 
presuppositions necessary for sustaining the practical engagement characteristic of any 
ethical outlook suggest a positive reason for modifying our views on human nature. Prior 
to thinking about the aspects and ends of human life and considering the way in which 
the virtues relate to these and these ends and aspects relate to one another, we may have 
seen no reason to regard our nature as either harmonious or disharmonious. But upon 
reflection, seeing the implications of these views for our practical engagement with the 
world—ethical, nihilistic, or immoralist—the consequence of not abandoning our ethical 
outlook seems to be that, on grounds of consistency, we need to adopt a view of our 
nature as harmonious. 
To what extent is our conception of our nature a matter for hermeneutic 
considerations? That is, to what extent should we take the truth of our conception of 
human nature to be open to interpretation? Christopher Gill, writing on Cicero’s 
eudaimonism, describes how 
it is a premise of the whole account that a person’s understanding what 
‘nature’ means develops hand-in-hand with (and as part of) his moral 
development. [. . .] In this respect, Cicero’s account of moral 
development, like Aristotle’s account of the human function, appeals to 
the ‘inside’ view of the ethical agent for its intelligibility and plausibility, 
although it invites the agent to enlarge and develop his understanding of 
the world, or ‘nature’, from that ethical viewpoint.51 
 
As Gill understands it, eudaimonist reflection in the ancient tradition invites the 
agent to enlarge and develop his or her understanding of ‘nature’ (and human nature in 
particular) from an ethical viewpoint. This is, methodologically, quite similar to the role 
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we see human nature being given by Hursthouse. I think this is an equally apt description 
of the line of thought we currently see Hursthouse developing. According to Hursthouse, 
“Everyone who is taking the Aristotelian naturalist line takes it as obvious that they are 
not pretending to derive ethical evaluations of human beings from an ethically neutral 
human biology, but are already thinking about human beings in an ethically structured 
way.”52 Thus, Hursthouse clearly denies that neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism is trying 
to derive ethical evaluations from biological facts; however, her account of what neo-
Aristotelian ethical naturalists are doing if they are not doing this is rather 
underdeveloped. I suggest we understand it along the line of reasoning described by Gill 
as characteristic of the ancient eudaimonists: in bringing nature to bear on our ethical 
thinking, we are at the same time invited to enlarge and develop our understanding of the 
world, including ‘nature’ and ‘human nature,’ from that ethical viewpoint. When we do 
so, the person’s understanding of human nature will properly change and develop in 
response to her moral development and as a function of her ethical outlook. 
The implications of this way of thinking about appeals to human nature in moral 
reasoning are quite radical. If our concept of human nature is something that develops 
with our ethical understanding, then it makes just as much sense to speak of a mature 
understanding of human nature as it does to speak of a mature moral perspective. In this 
case, human nature is not going to enter into ethical theory as the “facts of the matter,” 
which can be specified independently of an ethical outlook, the truth of which will be 
clearly accessible to anyone, no matter their stage of moral development. Our 
interpretation of human nature will be shaped by an ethical outlook, and properly so. 
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To summarize, I have argued (following Hursthouse) that the shaping of one’s 
conception of human nature by one’s ethical outlook is reasonable on the basis of a very 
general commitment, which is likely to be common to any ethical outlook. Any ethical 
perspective which holds that it is meaningful to strive for good lives and that such lives 
are systematically connected to morality implicitly requires a conception of human nature 
as harmonious. But if this is correct—and Gill’s description of the relationship between 
one’s conception of human nature and one’s ethical outlook is correct—then it is not only 
the very general outlines of an ethical outlook, but also the substantive commitments of 
an ethical outlook that will have implications for a person’s conception of human nature 
(and vice versa). 
Finally, allow me to put a point on the differences between Hursthouse’s 
coherentist proposal and more common foundationalist assumptions about how human 
nature will inform ethical theory. The assumption of the foundationalist is that a 
conception of human nature, formed independent of ethical or evaluative considerations, 
will provide an objective, value-neutral basis upon which we can justify specific ethical 
judgments. (For example, Louise Antony, as I explained in chapter 2, argues against the 
appeal to human nature in ethics assuming that this is the role human nature would play if 
the appeal to human nature were successful.) Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian ethical 
naturalism, by contrast, suggests that the conception of human nature does indeed 
“justify” certain ethical judgments (i.e., that it is worth our while to strive to live well and 
better), but the conception of our nature is not formed independently of our ethical 
reflection. Reflection on the ethical life as an attempt to lead the best kind of life possible 
given the human condition (which includes conditions beyond ‘human nature’) leads us 
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to adopt a certain understanding of our nature as the only one consistent with such an 
ethical endeavor, as discussed above. 
This, however, raises the possibility that when it comes to giving a rational 
justification for individual virtues, the picture is more complicated than Hursthouse 
represents it. The conception of human nature relevant to justifying the virtues as 
constitutive elements of an ethical outlook will itself be shaped in some significant ways 
by that ethical outlook itself. While the thesis that human nature is harmonious is likely to 
be required by a number of ethical outlooks because it bears on a quite general 
commitment common to major ethical perspectives—whether Kantian, utilitarian or 
eudaimonist—even beyond this, substantive differences in ethical outlooks will have 
consequences for one’s view of human nature. In particular, in the same way one’s view 
of human nature (as just “a mess” or as “harmonious”) has implications for the ability to 
maintain an ethical outlook as opposed to an immoralist or nihilistic outlook, how one 
substantively characterizes the virtues may have implications for the substance of one’s 
conception of human nature and the ends characteristic of human flourishing.
53
 
Furthermore, every particular ethical outlook is, in part, a product shaped by the 
history and culture of a specific place and time. “Different local forms of life will 
understand ‘kindness’ or ‘loyalty’ or ‘justice’ in substantively different ways, with 
substantively different interconnections between these and other thick concepts, in the 
service of substantively different ends.”54 Because of this, a very general or schematic 
account of human nature is not likely to be able to adjudicate disputes between the 
competing conceptions of the virtues associated with different ethical outlooks. It is 
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unclear whether the very general characterization of the ends of human nature to which 
Hursthouse appeals—based as they are on what can be justified by the biological and 
health sciences—could possibly judge between these culturally specific conceptions of 
the virtues. Human nature, in this framework, is supposed to help answer the question: 
Why think these virtues are the right ones? A more specific version of this question asks, 
“Why think this description of the virtue is the right one?” Assuming a Hursthousian 
framework, the theory’s capacity to answer this question will be directly related to the 
conception of human nature on which it can draw. I return to develop this point in detail 
in the following section, where I offer an analysis of the extent to which Hursthouse’s 
framework enables a feminist eudaimonist to respond to Marilyn Friedman’s case of the 
Benevolent Patriarch. 
 
5. Responding to Friedman: The Prospects for a Feminist Eudaimonism 
In light of this discussion of Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian eudaimonism, and in 
light of the previous analysis of the role of human nature in a theory of this sort, can this 
framework serve as the basis of a feminist eudaimonism? Marilyn Friedman has argued 
that eudaimonism is a non-starter for feminists, since as eudaimonists they will be 
committed to the claim that the virtues are necessary for flourishing, while as feminists 
they will be committed to the claim that a person like the Benevolent Patriarch possesses 
at least one serious vice, and yet, all appearances suggest that the Benevolent Patriarch is 
capable of flourishing and leading a good life. In this section, I develop the line of 
response made available by Hursthouse’s eudaimonist ethical naturalism. I will argue that 
Friedman’s general objection to feminist eudaimonism turns out to be misdirected when 
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raised against Hursthouse because Friedman simply assumes an intuitive conception of 
flourishing and this is not the kind of flourishing that Hursthouse claims the virtues bring 
about. However, Friedman’s objection remains relevant. In order to really forestall the 
possibility that patriarchal benevolence is a morally legitimate form of benevolence, 
feminists operating out of Hursthouse’s framework will need either a more robust 
account of practical rationality—in order to argue that this is not a “way which we can 
see as good”—or a more robust conception of the ends constitutive of human flourishing. 
The first thing that must be established is that the beliefs, tendencies, emotional 
reactions, and attitudes of the Benevolent Patriarch constitute a character trait, and not 
some other kind of personal quality. As previously explained, character traits, as 
understood in the tradition of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, entail “a complex unity of 
one’s values, choices, desires, emotions, perceptions, interests, expectations, attitudes, 
sensibilities and actions.”55 I think it is plausible to imagine the Benevolent Patriarch 
possessing a robust character trait—call it ‘patriarchal benevolence’—with the complex 
intertwining of all these facets. Patriarchal benevolence would be a standing disposition 
to act benevolently—that is, a disposition with the intention to do good to others—in a 
way that is strongly shaped by beliefs and expectations related to gender. What Friedman 
describes can easily be imagined to be a form of benevolence conditioned by certain 
beliefs about women’s systematic inferiority to men in regards to strength, intelligence, 
worldly competence, business acumen, and so on. (Of course, one could have all of these 
beliefs and just be a chauvinist, but that is not the case we are imagining here. What we 
are imagining in this case is a form of benevolence, not outright domination or 
exploitation in pursuit of self-interest.) To be a form of benevolence, the beliefs, 
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emotions, attitudes, and actions directed toward women must be consistent with an 
intention to benefit and not harm, but as patriarchal, this kind of benevolence would 
understand women’s interests as conditioned by their need for special protection and 
tutelage in a range of areas. These beliefs are taken as reasons for men to be protective of 
women (e.g., because women are weak or childlike in their vulnerabilities), to assume 
positions of leadership and direction in decision-making (e.g., because women are not as 
competent to do so), but when doing so, to take the good of all into account. 
This peculiar form of benevolence can also be plausibly imagined to involve a 
whole range of emotional reactions and attitudes to what it sees as improper reversals of 
appropriate gender hierarchy: anger at actions that take advantage of women’s weakness 
or vulnerability, chaffing under the authority of women in the workplace, etc. On the 
presumption that benevolence is a character trait, I take it that a modified form of 
benevolence, conditioned by norms of gender hierarchy, can quite plausibly be construed 
as a character trait. 
Granted that ‘patriarchal benevolence’ is a character trait, we are now in a 
position to examine this character trait using the framework of natural normativity. What 
we want to know is this: is patriarchal benevolence a virtue or a vice? The framework of 
natural normativity provides us with a set of criteria by which to evaluate character traits 
over which we have some question. A virtue, according to Hursthouse, is a character trait 
that (1) benefits its possessor and (2) makes its possessor a good human being. And, as 
discussed above, a good, flourishing human being in the sense employed in (2) is one 
who successfully pursues and attains the four naturalistically-defined ends of individual 
survival; the reproduction of the species; characteristic pleasures and the avoidance of 
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pain; and the good function of the social group. Additionally, a good human being will do 
so in a characteristically human way, which is to say a way that is rational and that its 
possessor can rightly see as good. 
Before considering the possible ways in which a feminist equipped with 
Hursthouse’s eudaimonist framework might reason about patriarchal benevolence, we 
should observe that, as it stands, Friedman’s argument is not an argument against 
Hursthouse’s form of eudaimonism because so-directed it trades on a homonymous use 
of the word ‘flourishing.’ At the intuitive level, there is no reason to think patriarchal 
benevolence (on the whole) will not benefit its possessor by enabling him to flourish in 
the ways Friedman suggested: the Benevolent Patriarch will be freer to devote himself to 
his career, and if he is successful, then he and his family will be able to live in a relatively 
safe neighborhood, experience the material and psychological benefits that follow, etc. 
However, as I explained above, Hursthouse does not ultimately endorse such an intuitive 
conception of benefit. Hence, when Friedman argues that the Benevolent Patriarch is 
entirely capable of leading a good life and “flourishing,” this is no objection to 
Hursthouse’s argument that human beings need the virtues in order to flourish or a 
counter-example to the assertion that patriarchal benevolence is a vice. For this is not the 
kind of flourishing that it is claimed the virtues produce or the vices inhibit.  
Because the conception of benefit comes from the idea of what it is to 
successfully live the form of life specific to our species, the claim that ‘the virtues benefit 
their possessor’ and enable her to flourish cannot be debunked by pointing to instances in 
which the virtuous person (say, as a result of her virtue) is taken advantage of or (because 
she refuses to engage in bribery) loses out in a business deal that would have paid 
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handsome returns. Nor can it be debunked by pointing to a case like the Benevolent 
Patriarch, who accrues culturally significant symbols of success and “flourishes.” In both 
cases, the vicious (or the one who is at least not so virtuous) clearly “benefit” in a certain 
sense. But this is irrelevant, since this is not the kind of the benefit the eudaimonist 
claims the virtues characteristically bring. Taking Friedman’s argument as an argument 
against the (neo-Aristotelian) eudaimonist trades on a homonymous use of the word 
‘flourishing’—it uses the same word but employs a different meaning. According to the 
neo-Aristotelian eudaimonist, the virtues benefit their possessor in the sense that they 
enable their possessor to flourish as a good human being by conducing to the 
achievement of the four naturalistically defined ends of the human species. But this is not 
the sense given to ‘flourishing’ by Friedman’s argument. 
Even if Friedman’s argument is not an objection to a Hursthousian eudaimonism 
as it stands, her argument still raises a potentially significant objection to feminist 
appropriations of Hursthouse’s eudaimonism if the framework as it stands would have to 
admit that patriarchal benevolence was a morally legitimate form of benevolence and, 
therefore, a virtue. Can feminists appeal to the framework of natural normativity to show 
that patriarchal benevolence is not a virtue? In order to argue this, the Hursthousian might 
argue in one of three ways: First, she might argue that patriarchal benevolence fails to 
meet Plato’s requirements on the virtues, either (a) because it does not benefit its 
possessor or (b) because it does not enable its possessor to flourish by conducing to (one 
or more of) the four ends of the species, naturalistically defined. Second, she might argue 
that, as gender-specific, it does not constitute a human virtue. Third, she might argue that, 
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despite being conducive to the four ends, it fails to conduce to the four ends of the human 
species in a characteristically rational way. 
With regard to the first line of argument: does patriarchal benevolence satisfy 
Plato’s requirements on the virtues? In particular, does it benefit and enable its possessor 
to flourish by achieving the ends of the species? The anthropological records of human 
society will not decisively support the claim that patriarchal benevolence is incompatible 
with the four naturalistic ends. History bears witness to the much worse quality of 
outright patriarchal domination as quite pervasive in many human societies. These same 
societies nevertheless managed to function well enough for their individual members to 
survive and reproduce the species and create contexts in which characteristically human 
pleasures were available to many members in many realms of life (even if the pleasures 
of full autonomy and other forms of human excellence were denied to most women and 
many men). In light of this, it is implausible to think we can argue against patriarchal 
benevolence on the grounds that it undermines the achievement of the first three ends of 
human life essential for human flourishing, naturalistically understood.  
It might be said that patriarchal benevolence undermines the fourth end (the good 
functioning of the social group), since it entails the suppression of the functioning of part 
of the group. However, as articulated by Hursthouse, “the good functioning of the social 
group” is measured by the degree to which the cooperative activity of the group sustains 
the other three ends. A group functions well, according to Hursthouse, when it enables 
“its members to live well (in the way characteristic of their species); that is, to foster their 
characteristic individual survival, their characteristic contribution to the continuance of 
the species and their characteristic freedom from pain and enjoyment of such things as it 
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is characteristic of their species to enjoy.”56 As Hursthouse has developed the idea of the 
“good functioning of the social group,” there is no basis for claiming that members 
cannot be assigned significantly different functions in the collective pursuit of these four 
ends. 
Might a feminist eudaimonist argue that a more egalitarian form of benevolence 
supports the good function of the social group in a way that is more efficient since all 
members are allowed to contribute on terms of equality? One can imagine endless 
debates between feminists and the partisans of patriarchy over which form of the virtue is 
“more efficient,” but there is no question that both are capable of maintaining relatively 
stable and long-lived forms of human society. Besides this, the claim that only those traits 
that bring about these four ends in a maximally efficient way are genuine virtues would 
make the theory far more determinant than Hursthouse seems to want. The benefit of 
making character traits the locus of moral assessment is that they leave space for different 
cultural expressions of the virtues. However, if, like charity, patriarchal benevolence can 
be seen as a virtue because “directed to the young and helpless [it] particularly serves the 
continuance of the species; directed more widely it serves the good functioning of the 
social group by fostering the individual survival, freedom from pain, and enjoyment of its 
members, and also by fostering its cohesion,” then the framework of natural normativity 
will be problematic when looked at from an ethically-informed feminist standpoint. It is 
problematic, not because it is too determinate, but because in allowing different cultural 
expressions of the virtues it fails to rule out enough. 
Still, two other lines of argument remain open. Rather than argue about whether it 
is or is not a virtuous character trait, the feminist eudaimonist might argue that, whatever 
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it is, it is not a human character trait. It is a character trait the exercise of which is, by 
definition, restricted to half the human population. It is a character trait that women 
cannot possess, and by that measure alone it is not a candidate for human virtue. Human 
virtues are character traits that are, in principle, available to the whole of the human 
population, and patriarchal benevolence is, in principle, a character trait restricted to men. 
But this reply is unconvincing, for it simply begs the question of whether the human 
virtues (benevolence, for example) can take on specific modifications in respect of the 
different forms in which human beings come. Is there a form of benevolence appropriate 
for males and a form of benevolence appropriate to females of the species? These 
questions (authentic enough) show this reply to be a merely verbal solution. There is a 
substantive question at stake and the reply does not address that question. 
That leaves us with one line of argument: patriarchal benevolence can contribute 
to the achievement of the four naturalistic ends, but it does not do so in a rational way—a 
way we can see as good. The virtues are not merely instrumentally effective means of 
achieving the naturalistically-defined ends of human life. To be a virtue, a character trait 
must conduce to those ends in a characteristically human way. Not only must the ends be 
characteristic and appropriate to our species, so must the means: a character trait that is a 
virtue will conduce to these ends in a rational way. Maybe patriarchal benevolence is 
akin to piety. If we look at the way piety tends to contribute to and reinforce other virtues 
and thereby support the ends characteristic of human flourishing, we might think that 
piety is, indeed, a virtue. If, however, we ask whether this is a rational way of achieving 
these ends, our answer about piety will depend on whether we think it is rational to 
engage in the sorts of activities pious people typically engage in—praying, going to 
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church (or the mosque or temple), spending time thinking about God, trying to honor and 
understand the will of God more fully. Whether it is rational seems to turn most vividly 
on whether one thinks God exists or not. If God does not, then doing these sorts of 
things—spending one’s time and energy in these ways—cannot be regarded as rational. 
On the other hand, if one thinks God does exist, then piety might indeed be rational. 
However, the framework of natural normativity has no resources to settle this dispute. It 
can only indicate the source of the dispute. Whether piety is a virtue or not turns on a 
metaphysical aspect of one’s ethical outlook: whether one thinks God exists or not. 
In the same way that the framework of natural normativity cannot settle the 
dispute about piety, it may not be able to settle the dispute over patriarchal benevolence. 
The views about women held by the Benevolent Patriarch are part of an overall ethical 
outlook, and Hursthouse maintains that this kind of argument is only effective from 
within a shared ethical outlook. Hursthouse denies that the framework is intended to 
convince the moral skeptic (see Section 2.1), and Hursthouse may hold that the 
framework of natural normativity should not be expected. However, this gives the 
framework of natural normativity such severely limited argumentative and persuasive 
scope that one wonders if it isn’t too limited for feminist purposes. It does not appear to 
provide the necessary resources for ethical argument with those with whom one disagrees 
at the more basic level of ethical outlook. At most, it seems to provide us with resources 
for persuading one those who are already (fairly) virtuous and functioning with—what is 
from a feminist perspective—a well-formed and rationally well-founded ethical outlook. 
At this point, Hursthouse’s naturalistic framework runs out of resources to 
adjudicate our deep ethical disagreements. There would seem to be two options available: 
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one is to argue from a fuller conception of human good, the other is to argue from a more 
developed account of rationality, as Hursthouse does in the case of piety, where what is 
rational turns on fundamental metaphysical truths.  
Take the first alternative. Without getting into the specifics, feminists who believe 
patriarchal benevolence cannot be a legitimate form of benevolence need a conception of 
flourishing that can account for the fact that human relationships characterized by 
equality and mutual respect are better forms of human sociality—that the quality of 
human life shaped by such attitudes and actions is superior to one not so shaped. 
Independent of its instrumental efficacy toward extrinsic goods like individual survival, 
the reproduction of the species, characteristic pleasures and pains, and the good function 
of the social group, a life that achieves these things by inculcating character traits (such 
as patriarchal benevolence) that enshrine systemic forms of social hierarchy is less 
desirable than one that achieves them through character traits expressing the value of 
equality. It is not clear how a naturalistic conception of the ends of human flourishing, 
based strictly on what can be licensed by the biological and health sciences, could 
support such a conception of the human good. 
The alternative strategy would pick up with Hursthouse’s suggestive remark that a 
“rational” way is “any way that we can rightly see as good,”57 and develop a conception 
of practical rationality substantive enough to provide grounds for the claim that 
patriarchal benevolence is not a way we can rightly see as good in our pursuit of human 
flourishing. It may be one way these ends can be achieved, but it is not a rational way. 
Here we require a substantive conception of practical reason. As discussed above, it will 
not do to appeal to a conception of rationality as instrumental means-ends reasoning 
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because both hierarchical and egalitarian gender relations have proven themselves 
capable of sustaining these ends. Hursthouse’s own schematic proposal that a “rational 
way” is a way that we “rightly see as good” clearly goes beyond a merely instrumental 
conception of practical reason (and is certainly a necessary condition). However, given 
all of the ethical disputes we can imagine will ultimately rest on a judgment about 
whether this form of the virtue or that form contributes to human flourishing in a way 
that we can rightly see as good, it is too thin an account of practical reason. 
Both of these alternative responses strain the framework’s exclusive reliance on 
naturalistic, quasi-scientific considerations. Feminists will need either a more expansive 
conception of flourishing or a more expansive conception of rationality in order to 
distinguish one kind of flourishing life from another. A thin account of rationality that 
merely assesses the instrumental efficacy of these means toward the naturalistically pre-
defined end of flourishing is not enough to discriminate between patriarchal and 
egalitarian forms of benevolence—or probably to do quite a lot of other work that 
feminists want done by a moral theory. 
While Hursthouse’s thin account of the ends of human nature—based on what the 
biological and health sciences can license, and supplemented by consideration of the 
presuppositions of an ethical outlook—can take us some way toward an explanation and 
justification of the place of the virtues in human life, it cannot adjudicate more fine-
grained disputes about the virtues insofar as these differ between ethical outlooks. Even 
still, the framework Hursthouse provides shows the way these disputes could be 
rationally argued, but the resources to do so are tied to a more developed account of 
human nature—an account that is going to be much more controversial than the rather 
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thin account licensed by the biological sciences and the very general presupposition 
common to any ethical outlook that human nature is harmonious.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HUMAN NATURE, AND THE CAPABILITIES 
APPROACH 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter brings together several of the major themes of this dissertation. The 
capabilities approach provides a prominent example of a feminist moral philosopher 
appropriating the ethics of flourishing to provide a theory of social justice that can 
address the obstacles to flourishing that women face. The capabilities approach, as 
advanced by Martha Nussbaum, seeks to articulate and defend a list of human 
capabilities, the minimal functioning of which each and every person must be able to 
choose in order to flourish as a human being. While I agree with her critics that the 
capabilities list is not as uncontroversial as she has sometimes claimed, I believe the 
virtue of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach lies in the fact that it articulates and offers 
arguments for an account of human nature that can support and make sense of a liberal 
vision of human flourishing. Nussbaum’s conception of human nature supports what is, 
in many ways, a deeply compelling and powerful vision of human flourishing.  
By engaging with the criticisms of Brooke Ackerly, Susan Moller Okin, and 
Alison Jaggar, I will advance the argument of this dissertation that a feminist ethic of 
flourishing (such as the capabilities approach) needs a robustly normative conception of 
human nature which is, to use the language of chapter two, teleological. When Nussbaum 
distinguishes between human capabilities—defining some as essential for human 
flourishing and fulfillment and others as impediments to flourishing—she is invoking a 
teleological conception of human nature. I believe the criticisms of Ackerly, Okin, and 
175 
 
Jaggar can be understood as raising objections which are versions of the Problem of 
Representation (discussed in chapter one). Ackerly and Jaggar suggest that the solution to 
the problems plaguing Nussbaum’s list of capabilities lies in the direction of a 
proceduralist moral epistemology. Against these critics, and with Nussbaum, I believe we 
cannot do without substantive moral reflection on our account of human nature, and I 
strongly suspect that no methodological proceduralism will allow us to avoid this. 
However, such a strong claim is beyond my ability to argue and beyond the scope of this 
chapter. In order to defend a more modest claim, I examine the resources available in Iris 
Marion Young’s deliberation-based proceduralism, and I argue that underlying this 
proceduralism is an unacknowledged (and un-argued) commitment to a conception of 
human nature very similar to Nussbaum’s. Showing how these commitments covertly 
enter into Young’s proceduralism strongly suggests that Nussbaum is correct to think we 
cannot avoid substantive commitments about the nature of the human condition and the 
conditions of human fulfillment, and that, as difficult as it is, substantive argument on the 
nature of the human condition is unavoidably necessary. 
While I defend Nussbaum’s attempt to forge paths for substantive reasoning about 
human nature (and in my exposition I offer a novel, integrationist interpretation of her 
“substantive-good approach” to moral reasoning), I believe her critics are right to raise 
questions about the status of the capabilities list as a whole. Nussbaum is ambiguous at 
times about the status of the capabilities list and has sometimes claimed an 
epistemological status for the capabilities list that implies it is an uncontroversial, quasi-
empirical finding about what people universally agree to be valuable about human life. 
Even if we grant such a questionable claim, if the capabilities list is the product of an 
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empirical investigation into what people generally believe to be valuable about human 
life, it is still not clear why we should preserve, protect, and promote these capabilities in 
the way the theory directs us to. Here, the distinction drawn in chapter two between 
teleological and empirical concepts of nature in general becomes relevant. The “thick 
vague theory of the good” expressed in the capabilities list clearly invokes a distinction 
between capabilities that contribute to the fulfillment of our nature (a life with “human 
dignity,” as Nussbaum says) and capabilities that do not (because they are either 
insignificant or incompatible with human flourishing). This puts the capabilities list as a 
description of human nature squarely within the ambit of teleological conceptions of 
human nature. However, once this is acknowledged, the contestable nature of this 
account comes to the fore. 
This chapter will proceed as follows: In section two, I provide an original 
interpretation of the argumentative method Nussbaum has developed to argue for the 
capabilities list. In section three, I assess the criticisms of Brooke Ackerly, Susan Moller 
Okin, and Allison Jaggar, and argue that these can be understood as raising the Problem 
of Representation. Ackerly and Jaggar have proposed that the capabilities list could be 
more convincingly argued for on the basis of a deliberative procedure, so in section four I 
look at how Iris Marion Young’s proceduralist, discourse-based method of political 
justification might be put to use to provide an account of fundamental capabilities. In 
section five, I raise a further aspect of the Problem of Representation and argue that 
coming to terms with this means explicitly acknowledging that the capabilities approach 
depends upon a teleological conception of human nature. 
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2. The Capabilities Approach to Quality of Life and Fundamental Entitlements 
Martha Nussbaum has advanced and defended a theory of basic human 
capabilities as a standard for gauging quality of life and establishing a universal set of 
norms with respect to civil, political, social, and economic entitlements.
1
 As such, “the 
capabilities approach” is an approach to both human development and fundamental 
entitlements (or rights) based in claims of justice.
2
 She argues that all people—simply by 
virtue of being human—are entitled to the things they need in order to live a “truly 
human life,” by which she means a life with basic human dignity. Nussbaum appeals to 
an intuitive concept of dignity in order to distinguish between those capabilities that have 
a legitimate claim to support and those that do not.
3
 In order to live a life with dignity, 
                                                 
1
 Martha Nussbaum, “Nature, Function and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution,” in Oxford 
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. Julia Annas and Robert H. Grimm (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1988); “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in Liberalism and the Good, ed. Bruce Douglass, Gerald Mara, 
and Henry Richardson (New York: Routledge, 1990); “Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense 
of Aristotelian Essentialism,” Political Theory 20, no. 2 (1992); “Aristotle on Human Nature and the 
Foundations of Ethics,” in World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, 
ed. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); “Human 
Capabilities, Female Human Beings,” in Women, Culture and Development, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and 
Jonathan Glover (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Sex and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999); Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006); Creating Capabilities: The Human 
Development Approach (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). A similar 
theoretical approach has also been developed by Amartya Sen, and Nussbaum often credits Sen as a co-
creator and advocate of the view, though their approaches have important differences. See, for example, 
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999). 
2
 As a theory of entitlements, this makes the capabilities approach distinct from, for example, Rawls’s 
theory of justice, which operates on the basis of a procedure by which entitlements are to be determined. 
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971). 
Similarly, it differs from Robert Nozick’s theory, which makes entitlements not about being or doing, but 
about having. For Nozick, entitlements are fundamentally entitlements to the possession of things (i.e., 
external goods) and first and foremost to the possession of oneself. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). As a theory of quality of life, the capabilities approach is distinct 
in placing the emphasis on capabilities to do and to be, as opposed to GDP or self-reported subjective well-
being. 
3
 Nussbaum calls this intuitive conception of dignity a “free-standing” moral idea. Nussbaum, Women and 
Human Development, 83. By this, she means it is not tied to “any particular set of metaphysical or 
epistemological foundations.” “Political Objectivity,” New Literary History 32 (2001): 887. The hope is 
that by employing a widely-accepted value-concept (such as dignity), but without endorsing any particular 
conception of that notion, persons committed to many different metaphysical understandings of that notion 
will be able to endorse the general claim and supply their own metaphysical background as the reason for 
178 
 
certain capabilities fundamental to human life must be respected. The capabilities 
Nussbaum advances as worthy of our respect include: 
 Life 
 Bodily Health 
 Bodily Integrity 
 Use of the Senses, Imagination, and Thought 
 Emotions 
 Practical Reason 
 Affiliation 
 Relationships to Other Species 
 Play 
 Political and Material Control Over One’s Own Environment4 
 
The ten items on the capabilities list are advanced at a high level of generality 
with the intention that this generality leaves room for multiple specifications and diverse 
cultural interpretations of each item. While Nussbaum wants to affirm that there is room 
for a reasonable degree of pluralism with regards to interpretations of the items on the 
list, she is equally adamant that the list be understood as fully universal: “The capabilities 
in question are held to be important for each and every citizen, in each and every nation, 
and each person is to be treated as an end.”5 Obviously, this is not an exhaustive list of 
human capabilities. It is a selective list that aims to capture those capabilities that are 
essential for flourishing in a fully human way, and is, for that reason, frequently 
                                                                                                                                                 
their endorsement. In this way the “overlapping consensus” Nussbaum believes we need as a matter of 
political justification will be more accessible. 
4
 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 76-78. 
5
 Ibid., 78. 
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portrayed by Nussbaum as an evaluative and normative list based on an evaluative 
conception of human nature as capable of realizing a species-specific kind of dignity. The 
capabilities list is intended to articulate the necessary conditions of a good human life, 
and for this reason, Nussbaum has at times referred to the list as “the thick, vague theory 
of the good.”6 
Nussbaum argues that the capabilities list, given suitable contextual specificity, 
can serve as a practical measure of social justice in any society by establishing a 
minimum standard above which every human being has the right to function should they 
so choose.
7
 She maintains that “the ‘basic capabilities’ of human beings are sources of 
moral claims wherever we find them: they exert a moral claim that they should be 
developed and given a life that is flourishing rather than stunted.”8 Conversely, “it is 
wrong when the flourishing of a creature is blocked by the harmful agency of another.”9 
On these grounds, Nussbaum argues that wherever the threshold level for capability to 
function is not met, the claims of justice have not been met. This surprisingly bold 
assertion that the capabilities make a legitimate moral claim upon us lies at the heart of 
                                                 
6
 Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” 205; “Human Functioning,” 214; Sex and Social Justice, 
318. 
7
 To make the capabilities approach consistent with liberal principles of respect for the individual and their 
right to lead their life in their own way and in accordance with their own judgments about the good, 
Nussbaum argues that the actual functionings associated with each capability need not be present—only the 
possibility to choose functioning. If an individual chooses to forgo functioning in a certain respect (as she 
suggests the Amish do with respect to political participation and many religious ascetics do with respect to 
nourishment), that does not mean their life is any less worthy or dignified. Intentionally forgoing 
functioning in a given area is held to be entirely consistent with the capabilities approach when this is 
chosen by the individual in their pursuit of the good as they understand it, since the capability to exercise 
thought and judge the nature of the good for oneself is one of the central capabilities (practical reason).  
8
 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 278. We find Nussbaum advancing this claim across her written work: 
“The basic intuition from which the capability approach starts, in the political arena, is that human 
capabilities exert a moral claim that they should be developed.” “Human Capabilities, Female Human 
Beings,” 88. Again elsewhere, “We believe that certain basic and central human endowments have a claim 
to be assisted in developing, and exert that claim on others, and especially, as Aristotle saw, on 
government.” Sex and Social Justice, 43. 
9
 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 349. 
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Nussbaum’s insistence that failures of capabilities are failures of justice. The potential of 
each individual for a dignified existence, grounded in their standing as a member of the 
human species—with powerful and wonderful potentials that deserve to be protected and 
fostered—stands at the center of the capabilities approach, which seeks to articulate the 
baseline requirements of human dignity and flourishing wherever human life is found. 
As a moral theory, the capabilities approach can usefully be understood as a two-
stage theory. Nussbaum does not herself present the theory in this way—as having two 
distinct “stages”—but I think it is helpful to see it this way to keep the different parts of 
the theory separate.
10
 In the first stage, the capabilities approach generates a list of 
capabilities. For each item on the list, an argument must be given showing that a fully 
human form of life requires a minimum capability for functioning in that area, and that a 
life without a minimum level of capability in that area is a life unfit for a human being. 
To this end, Nussbaum has appealed to at least five different sorts of arguments to justify 
particular items’ status on the list. The first four are (a) Aristotelian internalist-essentialist 
arguments, (b) literary arguments, (c) evidence from personal life narratives, and (d) 
evidence that preferences formed under appropriate conditions commonly concur with 
the internalist-essentialist and literary arguments. Each of the various kinds of arguments, 
or “approaches” as she has sometimes called them, aims to get at this idea of what a 
“truly human life”—a life with dignity—requires. Nussbaum also argues that it is 
important to bring the conclusions of these first four arguments together in (e) reflective 
                                                 
10
 That they should be kept separate is clear from the fact that Nussbaum thinks a person can take issue with 
the list itself in terms of the contents (i.e., accepting that, in principle, a list of fundamental capabilities is 
the right approach, but thinking this is not the right list). Or one can take issue with the uses to which the 
list is being put (i.e., accepting the capabilities as an adequate account of fundamental entitlements, but 
rejecting them as metric for quality of life). Nussbaum comes close to breaking the theory down this way. 
Women and Human Development, 71. 
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equilibrium, and that demonstrating that these various arguments can be brought together 
to form a consistent list of capabilities is a significant form of justification for the 
capabilities list as a whole.
11
 According to Nussbaum, the primary weight of 
epistemological justification rests on bringing these particular arguments—that a certain 
capability is a necessary constituent of a fully human form of life—together in reflective 
equilibrium. However, Nussbaum also believes that achieving an overlapping consensus 
(in the Rawlsian sense) on the list would provide a secondary form of epistemological 
justification.
12
 A brief word about each of these kinds of arguments is in order. 
 
2.1 Aristotelian Internalist-Essentialist Arguments 
The Aristotelian internalist-essentialist approach appeals to a few intuitively 
powerful ideas related to kind membership and the concept of a “truly human life” to 
articulate the moral significance of certain human capabilities. The first idea is that 
without certain key capabilities, a life would not qualify as a human life at all. Nussbaum 
contends that “certain functions are particularly central in human life, in the sense that 
their presence or absence is typically understood to be a mark of the presence or absence 
of a human life.”13 It is important to note and recognize the boundaries around what 
counts as a minimally human form of existence because if we are concerned, for instance, 
to establish metrics for a good human life, a life that is not even minimally human could 
                                                 
11
 Nussbaum makes it clearer that this is her intended methodology and that the coherence of the various 
arguments about what is necessary for a fully human form of life is the ultimate standard of justification 
when she responds to the criticisms of Susan Moller Okin. “On Hearing Women's Voices: A Reply to 
Susan Okin,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (2004): 196; Susan Moller Okin, “Poverty, Well-Being and 
Gender: What Counts, Who's Heard?” Philosophy and Public Affairs 31, no. 3 (2003). 
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 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 76. As a matter of political justification, Nussbaum 
maintains that an overlapping consensus on the contents of the list is itself sufficient and that concurrence 
based on the specific arguments in each case is unnecessary. For a fuller discussion of what it means to 
achieve overlapping consensus that is political, not metaphysical, see “Political Objectivity, 887 ff.” 
13
 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 71-72. 
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not, perforce, be a good human life. The idea is that without certain key capabilities, a life 
can fail to qualify as a human life at all: “Some functions can fail to be present without 
threatening our sense that we have a human being on our hands; the absence of others 
seems to signal the end of a human life.”14 Nussbaum cites as examples the most severe 
forms of mental disability and senile dementia.
15
 But we can also think of voluntarily 
adopted forms of life that, on their face, appear to offer a viable path for human life, but 
are not actually coherent options for a fully human form of life. For example, it seems 
like one could pursue a life of simple pleasure without any rational reflection and still 
count this as a human life. However, following the line of reason Plato employs in the 
dialogue Philebus, Nussbaum argues that while it has the appearance of plausibility, 
ultimately the pursuit of pleasure without the rational capacity is incoherent. It would not 
really create for a life we would recognize as human, since by omitting reason one would 
also be omitting things such as the belief that one is enjoying oneself, the memory of 
pleasure, and the ability to calculate for future pleasure (21b6-c6).
16
 As Socrates says, 
what we would seem to have in this case is “not the life of a human being, but one 
belonging to some jellyfish” (21e6-8).17 
A second way to get a handle on this idea is to attend to concepts of kind 
membership. The intuition at the heart of the capabilities approach is the idea that “there 
is something that it is to do these functions in a truly human way, not a merely animal 
way.”18 This “truly human way” expresses the dignity and worth of a human form of 
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 Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice, 39; Frontiers of Justice, 181. 
15
 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 73 
16
 Nussbaum, “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of Ethics,” 99. 
17
 Ibid., 99 
18
 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 72. For essentially the same description of the capabilities 
approach, compare Frontiers of Justice, 74. 
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life.
19
 There is an intuitive divide between reduced (that is, “merely animal” or 
“dehumanized”) forms of existence on the one hand and expanded (that is, “super-
human”) forms of existence on the other. Both of these contrast with “truly human” 
forms of life, and Nussbaum argues that there are stories and myths from many cultures 
and times that attempt to articulate the significance of these ideas. In so doing, they 
articulate the moral significance of kind membership. We’ve inherited stories of 
anthropomorphic creatures and divine beings that are humanoid, but not quite human for 
one reason or another. The reasons the beings in question–-however close to us they may 
be in appearance—do not qualify as “human” reveal something important about the 
boundary between human and non-human forms of life and about what it is to live a 
“truly human” life with its unique capabilities and limitations. Internalist-essentialist 
arguments operate on the basis of these two central ideas: the idea that there are certain 
functions or capabilities, the absence of which signals a life which is no longer human in 
any meaningful sense, and the idea that a “truly human life” requires certain capabilities 
and is incompatible with others (such as divine immortality). While Nussbaum must 
believe that internalist-essentialist arguments could be made for each of the items on the 
capabilities list, she herself has only pursued the kind of lengthy and detailed arguments 
required to demonstrate this for two of them: practical reason and affiliation.
20
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 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 73. 
20
 Nussbaum, “Nature, Function and Capability,” 179 ff; “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” 226 ff; “Human 
Functioning,” 214, 222 ff. For a provocative critique of the internalist essentialist method, see Simon 
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2.2 Literary Arguments 
A common sense of the tragic in human life forms the basis for another set of 
arguments for the central capabilities. Appealing to literary and dramatic depictions of 
tragedy, Nussbaum argues we can see in many different cultures and many different 
times a shared sense of tragedy at a human life cut short or a life with powerful potentials 
unrealized. Tragedy hinges on the idea that personal failings within or the forces of fate 
without can threaten the goods necessary for human flourishing and fulfilment. Because 
of this, tragedy can also express a vision of what counts as depravation or as a mutilation 
of one’s humanity. Insofar as we are able to resonate emotionally with the tragic tales of 
cultures far removed from our own, this reaction suggests a common sense of the 
significance of certain features of human life. The same powers of the person that moved 
the original authors of these stories are moving us as well: “Insofar as we are able to 
respond to tragic tales from other cultures, we show that this idea of human worth and 
agency crosses cultural boundaries.”21 Tragedy reveals a common sense of the “human 
being as having worth as an end, a kind of awe-inspiring something that makes it horrible 
to see this person beaten down by the currents of chance—and wonderful, at the same 
time, to witness the way in which chance has not completely eclipsed the humanity of the 
person.”22 
If we resonate with the moral phenomenology Nussbaum describes as 
characteristic of the experience of tragedy in life and art, we are also likely to find strong 
reasons grounded in humanity itself “for protecting that in persons that fills us with 
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 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 73. 
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awe.”23 As a way of distinguishing it from the so-called “narrative method,” which I 
discuss next, we might call these arguments invoking the experience of tragedy the 
“literary approach” to identifying the capabilities. If they draw on ancient folklore, 
literature and texts from the world’s wisdom traditions, both the internalist-essentialist 
and literary arguments offer methods by which to query a wide swath of human intuition 
about what is particularly important and central for human life. 
 
2.3 Real-Life Narrative Arguments 
In Women and Human Development, Nussbaum structures much of her discussion 
of the capabilities approach around the narrative of two women’s lives. This real-life 
narrative offers in-depth descriptions of the lives, struggles, challenges, and aspirations of 
two economically poor Indian women—Vasanti and Jayamma—she met during a period 
of field study in India. In the course of telling the story of these women’s lives, 
Nussbaum discusses the capabilities in terms of their concrete significance for the lives of 
these two women. Summing up the ways in which the various capabilities (or the lack 
thereof) have conditioned their lives, Nussbaum concludes that the application of the 
“capabilities framework, when used to evaluate these lives, does not appear to be an alien 
importation: it seems to square pretty well with the things these women are already 
thinking about . . . and want when they think about them.”24 Though Nussbaum also 
admits that in some ways the “list goes beyond what the two women are currently 
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 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 73. 
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thinking” since, for example, neither desire or value education for themselves in the way 
the list does.
25
 
Looking to the lived reality of two economically poor women—members of the 
demographic the list is centrally intended to serve—and what they say they want in terms 
of capabilities yields mixed results in terms of confirmation of the capabilities list. This 
brings us to a final method considered by Nussbaum for establishing the capabilities list: 
the empirical evidence that people actually desire certain capabilities. This method would 
ground the capabilities in actual expressed preferences or some suitably refined set of 
preferences (for instance, rational or informed preferences). 
 
2.4 Evidence of Preferences 
A good deal of Women and Human Development is devoted to the challenging 
question of what role the actual desires or preferences of people ought to have in 
determining which capabilities to place on the list. Nussbaum’s position on the 
significance of desire for the purpose of formulating the capabilities list has occasioned 
significant criticism, so I think it is worth saying a little more in detail on this point. 
Preference-based or “subjective welfarist” theories of value begin from the 
premise that the satisfaction of preference is the ultimate source of value.
26
 If preferences 
are the ultimate source of value, then the value of human capabilities would repose on 
their being so preferred. This initial statement of this theory, as I have given it here, is too 
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 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development, 109. 
26
 There are differences between desires and preferences, and preference-satisfaction theories and desire-
satisfaction theories, but I will disregard these differences, since as far as I can see, this discussion is not 
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crude because, as many advocates of the preference-based account of value openly 
recognize, the satisfaction of some preferences may constitute a disvalue to the subject—
for example, the satisfaction of preferences that exist on the basis of misinformation. 
Subjects are frequently mistaken about information relevant to their preferences but 
assuming the subject has “informed” preferences, the source of value lies in the 
satisfaction of preferences, according to these theorists. Theorists who accept this line of 
reasoning take an informed-preference approach to value so it is not all preferences 
whose satisfaction is of value, but only the informed ones.
27
 
Procedural constraints on the formation of preferences are thought to be necessary 
by many advocates of subjective welfarism to address the problem of uninformed or 
irrational preferences (i.e., preferences for satisfactions that seem clearly to conflict with 
the agent’s own best interest). Nussbaum cites as representative Christopher Bliss, John 
Harsanyi, Richard Brandt, and Richard Posner.
28
 While the satisfaction of preferences is 
still held to be the basic form of value, these defenders of the theory argue that the only 
preferences deserving of satisfaction are preferences formed under the proper conditions, 
for instance, those formed with full and accurate information,
29
 or those formed freely 
and absent forces of intimidation, authority, or hierarchy.
30
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In addition to misinformed preferences and coerced preferences, another serious 
challenge is the problem of adaptive preferences—those that have been shaped or created 
by oppressive social norms. Though preference-satisfaction continues to be influential as 
an account of value in economics and social choice theory, many of its advocates have 
recognized the complex problems of adaptive preferences and the need for a more 
sophisticated account of the kind of preferences that legitimately justify social policy. As 
such, these theorists recommend that legitimate preferences—preferences deserving 
satisfaction—be restricted to the class of preferences that have been formed in the right 
way and under the proper conditions (which each theorist specifies as he or she deems 
most defensible).  
In light of these problems, Nussbaum argues that while these procedural 
modifications to subjective welfare accounts of value offer substantial improvements 
from a normative perspective, they remain problematic. In order to respond to these 
problems, the theorists invoke various kinds of procedural constraints, but the procedures 
themselves invoke substantive moral norms that are unjustifiable in terms of their own 
account of value. For example, Richard Brandt argues that we need to distinguish 
between people’s expressed preferences and their true or rational preferences. He 
maintains rational preferences are those that would survive or be produced by a sustained 
process of “cognitive psychotherapy,” defined as “value-free reflection” that “relies 
simply upon reflection on available information, without influence by prestige of 
someone, use of evaluative language, extrinsic reward or punishment, or use of 
artificially induced feeling-states like relaxation.”31 But, as Nussbaum points out, “the 
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absence of authority, intimidation, and hierarchy in the method . . . expresses values—
independence, liberty, self-driven choice—that Brandt actually thinks very important.”32 
We can think of this problem as posing an “accounting challenge.” The 
procedural constraints each theorist places on the formation of preferences encode 
normative values such as reasonableness, independence, equality, and freedom, but these 
substantive procedural norms cannot themselves be justified simply on the basis of 
expressed preferences. A preference-based theory of value cannot “account” for the value 
of the norms that they propose are necessary for sifting legitimate preferences (those 
formed in a valid way, deserving satisfaction) from illegitimate preferences (those not so-
formed). The upshot of what I have here called the accounting challenge is that the most 
sophisticated versions of procedurally-constrained, preference-based accounts of value 
require normative resources they cannot account for on the basis of their own theory of 
value. 
If this analysis is correct, then procedurally constrained preference-based accounts 
of value require—although without recognizing it—some other source(s) of value. In 
light of this, Nussbaum argues the capabilities list cannot ultimately be grounded in 
preferences because preferences alone might be for capabilities that are harmful or 
unreasonable, entail the domination of others, or enable one’s own oppression (just to 
give a few clearly objectionable examples). Neither can the value of the capabilities list 
be grounded in a procedurally constrained form of subjective welfarism because these 
theories beg important questions about the value of the norms they require to differentiate 
between preferences. Therefore, we need an account of the value of the capabilities that is 
based on grounds independent of preferences. This seems correct to me. 
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While Nussbaum is unwilling to allow preferences to settle questions of value, her 
stance on the epistemic value of preferences is complex. Nussbaum is clearly opposed to 
two extremes. On the one hand, she thinks it is wrong to give the facts of desire—even 
the facts of “informed desire” (desire that has been laundered in light of some set of 
normative criteria)—the last word. She argues that because desire is malleable and 
especially susceptible to social pressures and norms about, for example, what one can 
legitimately expect in life (or what a person of one’s social position can legitimately 
expect), actual desires are an unreliable guide to settling normative questions. On the 
other hand, she thinks it is wrong to entirely dismiss desire as untrustworthy. When she 
calls the substantive-good approach “non-Platonist,” this is what she is referring to: 
unlike Plato, she believes desire needs to be taken into consideration and given some 
weight, not just dismissed as untrustworthy and irrelevant to questions of normative 
justification, as the Platonist confidently does.
33
 Desire is potentially misleading, but it 
also represents an authentic way of “reaching out for the apparent good,” and this should 
be taken seriously.
34
 Her solution is to grant desire a heuristic role in the process of 
formulating the capabilities list, and to grant that procedurally-constrained forms of 
subjective welfarism offer valuable insight into the nature of the good, even if they do not 
offer an adequate account of the value of the norms their procedures require. Nussbaum 
appears to think that if we can give an independent account of the value of the norms that 
subjective welfarists require as constraints on the formation of preference, then the results 
of a procedurally constrained approach to preference-satisfaction can offer a valuable 
check on the conclusions that the capabilities theorist has argued for on other grounds 
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(i.e., what contributes to a “truly human” form of life). Nussbaum even calls a suitably 
norm-laden proceduralist approach to preferences an “essential complement” to the 
substantive-good approach, since through “a dialogue between the two, we gain 
confidence that we are on the right track.”35 Though she rejects the idea that an appeal to 
people’s preferences can serve as a foundational form of justification for the capabilities 
list, when suitably refined by a norm-laden procedure, preferences have an ancillary role 
to play in questions of justification. Importantly, they should enter in as one data point in 
identifying the necessary constituents of a truly human form of life. 
Because Nussbaum takes such a view of the place of preferences in justifying the 
capabilities list, the fact that Vasanti and Jayamma do not seem to value education (for 
themselves) does not count decisively against a list that includes education. In more 
recent writings and in response to the criticism that she did not take the evidence of 
Vasanti and Jayamma’s preferences seriously enough, Nussbaum appears to downgrade 
the status of these narratives, suggesting they are only heuristic devices meant to 
illuminate for the reader the real-life challenges facing the world’s poorest, and they are 
not intended to justify the list in any way.
 36
 But this concedes too much to the critic, and 
it is not clearly consistent with the role their stories should have, given what she says 
about the importance of attending to the evidence of desire in light of the best 
procedurally-constrained theories of preference-satisfaction. The real question at stake is 
whether Vasanti and Jayamma would desire education had their preferences been formed 
under the right circumstances. 
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2.5 Reflective Equilibrium 
Finally, as a “framing method,”37 Nussbaum has argued that each of these 
approaches to identifying the capabilities necessary for a truly human form of life should 
be brought together in “reflective equilibrium.” Following Rawls, Nussbaum endorses a 
coherentist approach to justification:  
Justification rests upon the entire conception and how it fits in with and 
organizes our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. . . . 
[J]ustification is a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of 
everything fitting together in one coherent view.
38
 
 
The capabilities approach endorses a holistic, coherentist approach to 
justification, which is put to work at the level of formulating the capabilities list as the 
theorist attempts to work out the basic principles of the theory. Do the powers and 
capacities that evoke an emotional response in tragedy cohere with those that seem 
centrally important when we reflect on the idea of a “truly human life”? Is this account 
consistent with what we generally find people striving after? If they’re striving for other 
sorts of capacities, can we account for this in a way that preserves the integrity of the 
basic idea? These and other sorts of questions bring the various kinds of arguments 
together in support of an account of the capabilities that are minimally necessary for a 
dignified form of human life.  
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Thus, when formulating the capabilities list, intuitive arguments are offered in 
support of each item in order to support the claim that every individual has a justified 
claim to a minimum level of functioning in that area. As a matter of political justification, 
these intuitive arguments need only establish the list as the basis of an overlapping 
consensus.
39
 With this overlapping consensus, we expect that there may be different 
reasons—stemming from differing religious and metaphysical outlooks—in support of 
the individual capabilities, or even different understandings of human dignity these 
capabilities are taken to express. By accepting many different conceptions of human 
dignity, Nussbaum is optimistic that people from many different perspective will be able 
to agree that no person should be forcibly kept from functioning in these areas (even 
though someone might think that all persons ought to choose not to function in some 
specific area), and that supporting each of these capabilities is centrally important for 
human flourishing and a life with dignity.
40
 
This integrative interpretation of Nussbaum’s method for justifying the 
capabilities approach is distinctive in the literature in seeing the various kinds of 
arguments—internalist essentialist, literary, narrative, and preference-based—as parts to 
be integrated through reflective equilibrium into a larger coherentist argument about the 
nature of the human good, which Nussbaum characterizes in terms of what is necessary 
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for a truly human life with distinctively human dignity. These various kinds of arguments 
support Nussbaum’s claims about the nature of a “truly human” form of life and what 
human dignity requires, but the individual conclusions from each argument need to be 
checked for consistency with one another. They do not stand alone. This means, for 
example, that none of the internalist-essentialist arguments offer conclusive evidence that 
a given item belongs to the “thick vague conception of the good” articulated by the 
capabilities list. Our all-things-considered judgment that a given item on the list properly 
belongs depends on a whole series of considerations about how it fits in light of the 
totality of evidence available.  
This means my interpretation differs significantly from that of Alison Jaggar, who 
interprets the various arguments as independent methods of justification Nussbaum has 
pursued and abandoned over the long course of revising and developing the view. Jaggar 
interprets the different methods as supplanting one another, with the development of new 
methods implying a rejection of earlier methods.
41
 It is definitely true that Nussbaum’s 
method for justifying the capabilities list has developed over time, with the appeal to 
narratives based on actual women’s lives, arguments from informed-desire, and the 
attempt to draw these arguments together in reflective equilibrium (alongside other 
considerations of life quality and social justice) coming much later than the internalist-
essentialist and literary arguments about the concept of a truly human life. However, an 
integrated interpretation is more generous and fits better with Nussbaum’s habitual 
practice of referencing older arguments in the course of advancing newer arguments.
42
 
Her most recent theoretical work on the capabilities approach, Frontiers of Justice, brings 
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the capabilities approach into conversation with contractarian approaches to social 
justice, and it relies heavily on older work, especially Women and Human Development.
43
 
But WHD (especially chapter one) is the most systematic exposition and synthesis of 
Nussbaum’s earlier work on the capabilities approach. In it, Nussbaum asks her reader to 
attend to some of the very earliest arguments advancing the capabilities approach, 
particularly those provided in “Aristotle on Human Nature and the Foundations of 
Ethics,” “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” and “Human Functioning and Social Justice,” 
which are cited repeatedly.
44
 These are the most significant essays developing the 
internalist-essentialist approach to moral reasoning, and WHD provides a lens on those 
arguments as reasoning about substantive goods of human life. In WHD, all of this is 
supplemented with an articulated position on the role of desire in justification, on which 
no detailed stance had previously been taken. 
Jaggar finds Nussbaum’s new appeal in WHD to a “substantive-good approach” 
to moral reasoning particularly obscure. She criticizes the substantive-good approach as a 
method because it is not clearly distinguishable from the capabilities approach as a 
whole, and she thinks Nussbaum’s claim to be using a substantive-good approach to 
moral reasoning simply obscures any attempt to get clear on the nature of the moral 
epistemology behind the capabilities approach: “This conflation obscures the distinction 
between substantive-good approaches in general and the capabilities approach in 
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particular, making it difficult to examine Nussbaum’s moral epistemology separately 
from her substantive claims about the capabilities.”45 One plausible reason the 
substantive-good approach is not clearly distinguished from the capabilities approach is 
that Nussbaum does not intend the substantive-good approach as yet another method, 
different from what she has previously articulated, but rather as a characterization of the 
theoretical approach as a whole. Just as identifying Nussbaum’s method of justification 
as “coherentist” offers a helpful characterization of the epistemology without introducing 
a new method as such, identifying the capabilities approach as a version of a substantive-
good approach offers a useful characterization as a contrast with other broad forms of 
moral reasoning. For instance, although the capabilities approach is like utilitarianism in 
making claims about the nature of the good foundational, it is unlike most forms of 
utilitarianism insofar as it attempts to reason from a “thick,” or substantive, 
characterization of the human good (as opposed to a “thin” account of the good 
conceived of as pleasure, or desire- or preference-satisfaction). A substantive-good 
approach can also be contrasted with proceduralist approaches to moral reasoning that 
focus on the formal conditions for decision procedures that can be understood as fair or 
reasonable. In contrast, the capabilities approach focuses argument directly on the 
substantive requirements of a dignified or truly human life. In describing the capabilities 
approach as a “substantive-good approach,” it is best to understand Nussbaum as 
focusing attention on these broad differences between the capabilities approach and other 
theoretical alternatives. As a substantive-good approach, the capabilities approach argues 
from a thick characterization of the human good, and it argues immediately about how 
the human good is to be characterized rather than about the procedures by which a 
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minimally, or thinly, specified good might reliably be produced. While Jaggar is right 
then to see that the substantive-good approach Nussbaum claims to be employing has not 
been clearly distinguished from the capabilities approach, I do not see that this is, in 
itself, grounds for complaint. 
Confirmation for my reading and the claim that there is a relationship of mutual 
support between older and newer approaches to arguing for the capabilities can be seen 
clearly in a more recent summary by Nussbaum of her preferred method for justifying the 
capabilities list. In this summary statement of her method, she explicitly links some of the 
oldest (internalist-essentialist) and newest (informed-desire) arguments in support of the 
approach. Nussbaum reiterates the method for generating the list—a set of questions that 
lead us to consider what is necessary for a “truly human” life, a life “worthy of the 
dignity of a human being”—and emphasizes that in compiling the final list, we need 
independent arguments for each item on the list and not simply a vague appeal to our 
personal intuitions about human dignity.
46
 These arguments, together with the supporting 
evidence of what people tend to prefer under circumstances conducive to the formation of 
free and authentic preference, are brought together in support of the basic list of 
capabilities, and these are presented as the universal requirements of social justice. 
We think about human dignity and what it requires. My approach does this 
in an Aristotelian/Marxian way, thinking about the prerequisites for living 
a life that is fully human rather than subhuman, a life worthy of the dignity 
of the human being. [. . . ] 
We now argue, moving through the various areas of human life in 
which political planning makes choices that influence people’s lives at a 
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basic level, that this fully human life requires many things from the world: 
adequate nutrition, education of the faculties, protection of bodily 
integrity, liberty for speech and religious self-expression—and so forth. In 
each case, an intuitive argument must be made that life without a 
sufficient level of each of these entitlements is a life so reduced that it is 
not compatible with human dignity. 
These arguments are based in a kind of freestanding reflective 
intuition, not on existing preferences. . . . Nonetheless. . . it is a good sign 
if these arguments converge with the deliverances of the best informed-
desire approaches, those that build in informational and ethical 
constraints.
47
 
 
I began this exposition by describing the capabilities approach as having a two-
stage character. In stage one, a list of fundamental capabilities must be generated. I’ve 
now described how that is done and the justification Nussbaum has provided in support 
of the list as a whole. My reading is integrative: it sees the various arguments given as 
mutually supporting parts of a whole. At stage two, the capabilities theorist applies the 
list of capabilities endorsed in stage one either to concrete questions of quality of life or 
to normative questions of social justice to articulate what is owed to each and every 
person as a matter of justice. 
With this general characterization of the capabilities approach in place, I turn in 
the next section to some criticisms that have been raised against it. Specifically, I focus 
on criticisms of the arguments to which Nussbaum has appealed in the course of 
compiling the capabilities list. While it has been important for Nussbaum that the list be 
expressed in a fully universal way, critics have argued that the list does not represent 
universally what is important and central for flourishing for all people. Rather, it 
represents what is important for people like Nussbaum who are liberally minded and 
intellectually and artistically inclined. In what follows, I will argue that these theorists are 
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articulating a version of the Problem of Representation in their criticisms and showing 
how this problem affects the capabilities approach. 
 
3. The Problem of Representation, Part One 
Nussbaum’s arguments in support of the capabilities list are intuitionist and 
coherentist, as I explained above. A number of Nussbaum’s critics have argued that the 
intuitionistic method of justification employed by the capabilities approach is flawed and 
inadequate from a feminist perspective.
48
 Alison Jaggar argues that, for the purpose of 
formulating a list of capabilities meant to define the threshold of a dignified human life, 
an adequate methodology must have some reasonable set of procedures in place to 
protect against the biases of the theorist herself about what constitutes a dignified form of 
human existence.
49
 However, rather than protecting against the theorist’s bias, the 
capabilities approach employs a method that may in fact legitimize the biases of the 
theorist by encouraging her to endorse her “deepest beliefs,” i.e., her own deep-seated 
biases about the world. The implication of this criticism is that Nussbaum’s intuitionism 
suffers from what I called in chapter one the “Problem of Representation.” Jaggar 
gestures at discourse ethics as a possible procedural resource for providing a more 
adequate methodology for formulating a list of capabilities. Following up on Jaggar’s 
suggestion, Chad Kleist recently argued that “discourse ethics as a method best grounds 
the capabilities approach as a genuinely universal moral theory.”50 Similarly, Brooke 
Ackerly argues that a central list of capabilities should be formulated on the basis of a 
                                                 
48
 Brooke Ackerly, Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); Jaggar, “Reasoning About Well-Being;” Okin, “Poverty, Well-Being and Gender.” 
49
 Jaggar, “Reasoning About Well-Being.” 
50
 Chad Kleist, “A Discourse Ethics Defense of Nussbaum's Capabilities Theory,” Journal of Human 
Development and Capabilities 14, no. 2 (2013): 279. 
200 
 
discourse with certain normative features.
51
 There are clear resources available in the 
tradition of feminist thought that Jaggar and Ackerly point to, since feminists working in 
the areas of discourse ethics and deliberative democracy have thought quite seriously and 
carefully about the normative constraints and procedures needed for deliberation to 
generate morally legitimate outcomes.
52
 However, with Nussbaum, I think proceduralism 
is an inadequate method for generating an account of foundational normative values (as 
the capabilities list is intended to do), because the procedure itself must presuppose 
substantive moral values if it is to be remotely plausible that the procedure will generate 
legitimate outcomes. 
 
3.1 Brooke Ackerly 
In Political Theory and Feminist Social Criticism, Brooke Ackerly advances what 
she calls “a Third World feminist theory of social criticism,” wherein she endorses a list 
of capabilities as a standard for social criticism. Ackerly regards the theoretical 
justification for a concrete capabilities list as compelling, arguing that “social criticism 
requires, among other things, universal standards by which to assess given local 
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practices.”53 She argues that having such a list is important and that “Nussbaum offers a 
draft of such criteria.”54 
However, Ackerly questions both the content of Nussbaum’s capabilities list and 
the methodology behind it. Ackerly regards Nussbaum’s methodology of social 
criticism—appealing to the list as an independent and universal standard of minimum 
entitlements—as inadequate because Nussbaum does not incorporate a methodological 
check to guarantee that the proposals of the social critic represents the views of everyone. 
“The problem with [Nussbaum’s] method is that nothing requires that ‘we’—those who 
are doing the inquiry—consider how all people live or find something that others can live 
with.”55 Nothing requires Nussbaum “to seek out all unfamiliar views or to take them 
seriously. Consequently, the inquiry is biased toward what is familiar to those doing the 
inquiry, be they the entire society or philosophers within it.”56 She notes that the 
capabilities approach encourages the theorist “to find out what we deeply believe to be 
most important and indispensable.”57 However, without any rigorous mechanism for 
validating the intersubjective validity of these judgments, Nussbaum’s methodology is 
liable to make misguided and inappropriate policy recommendations rooted in her own 
personal opinions rather than in what is universally regarded as indispensable for a 
dignified human life.
58
 “The problem with the capability ethic,” says Ackerly, “is not that 
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Nussbaum’s list embodies liberal values, but rather that Aristotle’s method allows her 
to.”59 For Ackerly, the root problem is not that the capabilities list Nussbaum endorses 
embodies liberal values. Capabilities consistent with liberal values might very well figure 
in a list that Ackerly would accept as valid. The root problem she finds in Nussbaum’s 
approach is that the method by which the list is produced does not put an adequate check 
on the influence of the theorist’s own biases, nor does it guarantee the results of the 
inquiry are universally valid. 
In this criticism, we see Ackerly raising a version of the Problem of 
Representation. Ackerly’s concern is that in proffering a list of capabilities that purports 
to articulate the basic aspects of human nature—the actualization of which constitutes 
human flourishing—Nussbaum has not represented a vision of human flourishing, but 
rather a vision of flourishing uniquely attractive and suited to the kind of person 
Nussbaum herself is. This is a version of the Problem of Representation insofar as the 
accusation is essentially that the theorist has represented herself—and other persons like 
her—as the paradigm of humanity. Those who do not fit this mold will be aberrant. 
In Ackerly’s estimation, an intuitionism that seeks rational coherence amongst the 
totality of the theorist’s beliefs is not adequate to protect against the fundamental and 
deeply held biases of the theorist. The capabilities approach is as likely to reinforce this 
bias as it is to challenge it. To correct for this, Ackerly argues that the social critic must 
promote and engage in dialogue that is maximally informed and fully inclusive. 
There are two problems with Ackerly’s proposed solution. She argues that a 
normative deliberative process must be fully inclusive. Full inclusivity, she supposes, will 
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generate a more informed deliberation. A fully inclusive deliberation will be maximally 
informed since it will include the perspectives of all those affected by the outcome of the 
deliberation. Hence, she sees a fully inclusive deliberation as an epistemically superior 
method for generating the capabilities list. However, it seems that inclusion is neither 
necessary nor sufficient as a constraint on the deliberative process. It is not sufficient 
because (as Ackerly herself admits) some information can be misleading, and in such a 
case, more information would not necessarily lead to better deliberative outcomes. If this 
is the case, then “full” information is not sufficient to guarantee epistemically reliable 
deliberative outcomes, because the process would also need a constraint designed to filter 
out actively misleading information. Full inclusion is also not a necessary condition of 
normatively significant deliberation. Women-only consciousness-raising groups have 
often argued for the need for exclusion as a condition of epistemic reliability. Some 
deliberative processes might be more trustworthy if they are exclusive. Ackerly’s concern 
is legitimate, but her solution is problematic. I will put forward what I think is a more 
adequate response to the Problem of Representation in the final section. 
 
3.2 Susan Moller Okin 
As discussed above, in Women and Human Development, Nussbaum provides a 
narrative description of the lives of a number of economically impoverished women in 
the process of discussing the implications of the capabilities approach and demonstrating 
its real-world applicability. Susan Moller Okin objects to Nussbaum’s use of these 
narratives, arguing that Nussbaum’s use of the actual experience of economically 
impoverished women does not exemplify the “dialogue” with real women that Nussbaum 
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herself calls for.
60
 Okin highlights the fact that in the entire study, Nussbaum only quotes 
each of these women directly once. The rest of what we know of them is filtered through 
Nussbaum’s own language, understanding, and interpretation.61 Okin argues that—as a 
result of failing to enter into the requisite kind of dialogue with persons of different 
backgrounds—the capabilities approach is insufficiently attentive to what Brooke 
Ackerly calls “the silent voices”: the voices of actual women whose lives are shaped and 
whose perspectives are marginalized by circumstances of serious poverty, gender-based 
hierarchies, and oppression. As a result, Okin argues that although the capabilities 
approach purports to employ a list of basic capabilities reflecting a broad, cross-cultural 
consensus on the most significant capabilities for human life, the capabilities list in fact 
represents little more than the opinions and experience of the theorist behind it. Okin 
asks, “From where . . . does Nussbaum’s list, her comprehensive account of the human 
capacities and functionings, come? . . . [It] seem[s] to draw more from the life of a highly 
educated, artistically inclined, self-consciously and voluntarily religious Western woman 
than from the lives of the women to whom she spoke in India.”62 Okin argues, 
furthermore, that a list of basic capabilities that is appropriately sensitive to the silent 
voices to which Ackerly draws attention would be much more basic, with items much 
less “fanciful.”63  
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Okin’s critique raises two different issues. The first is an issue of method. 
Nussbaum has responded in part to Okin’s criticism of her method by clarifying that she 
does not intend her use of narratives drawn from real life in WHD as an independent 
method of justification. She offers a sketch of the method of justification she endorses 
along the lines of what I described above in section two, and her response positions these 
narratives as one among several methods of reasoning that should be brought into 
reflective equilibrium. She says she intended the narratives to illuminate and make 
poignant the significance of the various capabilities on the list. However, in her reply to 
Okin, Nussbaum also re-casts the significance of Vasanti and Jayamma’s stories as 
offering the kind of ancillary support she had earlier claimed procedurally constrained 
informed-desire approaches provide. She argues that both Vasanti and Jayamma are 
involved politically in groups whose deliberative structure fosters the formation and 
expression of normatively significant preferences. 
Given that Vasanti, at least, is a participant in a group that deliberates in 
accordance with procedures that I describe in chapter 2 [of WHD] as 
characteristic of the best informed-desire approaches, and given that 
Jayamma is an active participant in the political culture of Kerala, which 
has related features, I am inclined to think that these examples, along with 
others taken from such groups, can also play . . . the modest partial role in 
justification that I assign to informed-desire approaches.
64
  
 
Even if we grant that these narratives offer concrete examples of people with 
desires that are trustworthy because, formed under appropriate conditions (i.e., in a 
political context devoted to collective deliberation and activism in which members’ 
contributions are relatively equal and members receive information about the many kinds 
of life possibilities open to them), the weight Nussbaum’s method actually assigns to 
such examples is minimal. Thus, Nussbaum’s response avoids what appears to be the root 
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issue: that Okin believes any list of basic capabilities should be grounded in what actual 
women say about their lives and what they say is significant to them. Giving Vasanti and 
Jayamma’s stories the status of a “heuristic device” or that of an example of normatively 
significant informed-desires does not do that. Okin charges Nussbaum with mere lip 
service to the ideal of attending to what people with diverse perspectives actually believe 
is important. Instead, Okin accuses Nussbaum of relying on a form of intuitionism that 
functions to justify her own (idiosyncratic and possibly elitist) ideas about the nature of 
the human condition, human dignity, and the conditions of full human flourishing. 
The second issue Okin raises concerns the content of the list. (As a matter of 
record, Okin is critical on a wide array of fronts. These two are simply the most relevant 
for our purposes here.) Okin believes that the capabilities list contains items that are far 
too “intellectualized” and “fanciful” to belong on a list of “basic capabilities.” This is 
related to the first criticism insofar as Okin believes that, had Nussbaum given sufficient 
attention to what actual women in conditions of dire poverty and subject to serious 
gender-based oppression say that they want, the content of the list would have been much 
more basic—probably focused on bodily needs such as “being able to eat adequately and 
not to be beaten.”65 It is Okin’s position that if we are going to promote a set of basic 
capabilities as the basis for a set of fundamental entitlements, then our list ought to be 
much more basic, more akin to the kinds of capabilities advanced by Amartya Sen or 
Brooke Ackerly, since these are more likely to reflect what women in dire poverty 
actually say they want.
66
 Again, I think we can see in Okin’s criticism concerns about 
representation and an accusation that Nussbaum has represented herself—and other 
                                                 
65
 Okin, “Poverty, Well-Being and Gender,” 296. 
66
 Ibid., 302. 
207 
 
persons like her—as the paradigm of humanity. Thus, Nussbaum has not articulated a 
universal ideal of human life, but an ideal that fits the lives of persons like herself. 
The justification for respecting and prioritizing the actual expressed preferences 
of people is complex.
67
 In her criticism of Nussbaum, Okin does nothing to contribute to 
the quite necessary discussion of the problems that beset the assertion that respect for 
persons demands respect for preferences as opposed, say, to respect for a constrained set 
of preferences or respect for individual rights, both of which are live alternatives for 
political liberals. Nussbaum, by contrast, has dealt with this problem at length in WHD, 
confronting head-on the problems of uninformed and adaptive preferences.
68
 I will return 
to the methodological issue of the need for a method that incorporates genuine dialogue 
in the next section, since Okin’s criticism on this point is reiterated by Alison Jaggar. 
 
3.3 Alison Jaggar  
Finally, Alison Jaggar has endorsed both Ackerly’s and Okin’s criticisms, adding 
that Nussbaum’s flawed method of justification means the weight of justification must 
ultimately rest on an appeal to her own moral authority. Not having provided a method 
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that gives readers good reason to believe the capabilities list genuinely reflects the 
deepest and most secure beliefs of everyone regarding the most important capabilities for 
human flourishing, the capabilities approach offers us no reasons to accept the list as 
having wider validity than as a coherent expression of Nussbaum’s own philosophical 
intuitions on the matter. Using the language of Jürgen Habermas, Jaggar calls the method 
“monological”—it can only be expected to reflect the reasoning of the theorist him- or 
herself. If the list is accepted, she concludes, it must be on the basis of the authority of its 
author. Jaggar maintains that in the end, “the non-Platonist substantive-good approach is 
simply a claim to privileged moral authority.”69 According to Jaggar, 
The methodology of the non-platonist substantive-good approach is problematic 
in several overlapping respects. It runs the risk of exclusiveness because it fails to 
mandate that everyone should participate in developing the list of capabilities; 
instead, an unidentified “we” draw on the ideas of other vaguely identified 
“people.” In addition, it is explicitly non-egalitarian: some people, the same 
unidentified “we,” assume authority to decide whether or not those people’s 
desires are “informed” or “corrupt” or “mistaken.” . . . If other people agree with 
“us,” “we” use their preferences as data supporting “our” list but, if they disagree, 
“we” reject their ideas as flawed data. They are “witnesses;” “we” are the judge. 
Justification still rest ultimately on “our” intuitions—not on those of everyone.70  
 
Because she believes the final judgment on the central capabilities rests with the 
theorist building the list, Jaggar argues that the method ultimately relies on the authority 
of the theorist to make the list. Thus, Jaggar argues that the methodology behind the 
capabilities approach is shaped by two morally problematic features: it is exclusive 
insofar as it does not require the resources of everyone’s intuitions about the central 
capabilities, and it is non-egalitarian in encouraging the theorist to privilege his or her 
own moral judgment when it comes to determining which intuitions (of those others we 
have opted to consider) should be rejected and which endorsed. The result, Jaggar thinks, 
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is a method of moral reasoning that privileges the perspective of the theorist and is 
thereby susceptible to the theorist representing her own partial and limited perspective as 
universally valid. The problem is not one of malicious intent. Even if the theorist should 
be well-intentioned and trying to form her judgments on the basis of the evidence, the 
method itself provides no protections against the excessive influence of the theorist’s 
personal bias. 
I submit that in these criticisms, Okin, Ackerly, and Jaggar are each 
independently identifying in Nussbaum’s methodology the problem that was discussed in 
chapter one as the Problem of Representation. While Nussbaum purports to be 
representing universal features of the human condition in the form of capabilities that 
ought to be supported for each and every individual, her critics have argued that the list 
does not universally represent what is important for all lives. Rather, it represents (and 
the methodology allows it to represent) what is important for Nussbaum herself (or 
possibly for politically liberal-minded persons more generally). Though Nussbaum 
aspires to have formulated a genuinely cross-cultural and universally valid list (at least 
for the modern world), the contents of the list actually represent what is most significant 
for persons whose social situation reflects Nussbaum’s own as a well-educated, wealthy, 
Western woman with plenty of inclination and leisure to pursue intellectualist pleasures.  
What Jaggar and Ackerly both point to as a solution to this problem is a method 
with more fine-grained procedures for guaranteeing that the contributions of all are heard 
and given equal weight. Ackerly’s own Third World theory of social criticism appeals to 
the resources of deliberative democratic theory, and in Jaggar’s estimation, what is 
needed is some form of “morally-constrained proceduralism” designed to correct for the 
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sorts of flaws to which Nussbaum’s method is susceptible.71 Jaggar gestures at the 
deliberation-based proceduralism developed in discourse ethics. Instituting a 
deliberation-based procedure for winnowing a list of basic capabilities would also seem 
to go some way toward satisfying Okin’s demand that Nussbaum exhibit the dialogue 
with differently situated and especially poor women that she herself calls for in her 
method. 
Nussbaum has already engaged with one kind of proceduralist theory of value as 
an alternative to the intuition-based theory of value that she defends. In WHD, Nussbaum 
engages with procedurally constrained, preference-based accounts of value and argues 
that the intuitionistic epistemology behind her favored theory of value is necessary to 
avoid the question-begging appeal to values other than preference-satisfaction that even 
the best procedurally constrained, preference-based accounts of value entail.
72
  
If Nussbaum’s objective is that the beliefs of all should be represented in the 
formulation of the capabilities list such that it has an authentic claim to universality, then 
a discourse-based proceduralism will be stronger than the preference-based 
proceduralisms with which Nussbaum has engaged. For instance, a sufficiently inclusive 
discourse would have a verifiable claim to represent universally the capabilities that are 
believed important for a flourishing, fully human life. If, as Jürgen Habermas has argued, 
there are transcendental norms of discourse to which persons must be committed in order 
to engage in discourse at all, then there may be values (such as universal moral respect 
and egalitarian reciprocity) that come from the discourse itself and can be accounted for 
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pragmatically.
73
 In this way, there may be values that place moral constraints on 
preferences and have a valid justification, thereby avoiding the accounting challenge. 
Thus, discourse-based forms of proceduralism have some clear strengths over preference-
based proceduralisms, and thereby present a stronger challenge to Nussbaum’s arguments 
that adequate theories of quality of life and distributive justice depend upon the resources 
of an intuitionistic, substantive-good approach to moral reasoning. In the next section, I 
follow up on this alternative proposed by Ackerly and Jaggar and explore what a 
deliberations-based proceduralism has to offer the capabilities approach. For reasons of 
space and time, I focus on the thought of just one figure: Iris Marion Young. Her work on 
the requirements of normative deliberation is well-developed and has been influential in 
feminist political theory and beyond. Furthermore, she is vividly aware of and attentive to 
the real-world problems of moral and political justification for agents living in non-ideal 
conditions shaped by oppression and domination. Nussbaum’s current position is, 
likewise, a response to such problems. She contends that feminists need a list of universal 
values by which to judge preferences precisely because she believes oppression has the 
power to shape consciousness and preferences in ways that reinforce oppression. Young 
is acutely concerned with the possible distorting effects of oppression and domination on 
the process of deliberation, and this leads her to defend strong substantive constraints on 
discourse as necessary conditions of normative legitimacy. This mutually shared starting 
point will make the comparison all the more fruitful. Nevertheless, I will argue that 
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Young’s deliberation-based theory of democratic process does not avoid the problem that 
leads Nussbaum to argue that we need substantive modes of reasoning about the nature of 
the human good, and that the best procedures implicitly rely on such an account of the 
good. We will find this to be just as true for Young’s deliberation-based proceduralism as 
it was for the preference-based proceduralisms Nussbaum criticized in WHD. I will argue 
that Young’s deliberative procedure suffers from the central problem Nussbaum 
identifies with preference-based proceduralisms, a problem which I call “the accounting 
challenge.” Specifically, Young’s deliberative procedures implicitly rely upon an account 
of central human capabilities reminiscent of the capabilities list Nussbaum advances. It is 
precisely because oppression and domination undermine these valuable capabilities that 
they constitute a harm.  
 
4. Iris Marion Young on the Conditions of Normative Deliberation 
Under what conditions can a decision arrived at collectively be considered 
normatively valid and binding? Different theories of democracy answer this question 
different ways. 
For instance, aggregative theories of democracy (otherwise known as “pluralist” 
or “interest group pluralist”) hold that decisions that express majoritarian opinion are 
valid because they express either the strongest or most widely held preferences of the 
group.
74
 Deliberative theories of democracy, on the other hand, maintain that collective 
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decision making under appropriate conditions can be construed as a collective form of 
practical reason, the outcome of which has a claim to reasonableness and, under the right 
conditions, can also claim strong normative validity. These are central questions for 
democratic theory, but answering such questions has a more general applicability for 
theories of procedural normativity.  
A theory of practical reason based on a normatively valid process of collective 
deliberation might be able to provide an alternative method for formulating a list of 
central capabilities. Such a method would not be susceptible to the charge of 
“monologism,” and if it were sufficiently inclusive and representative, it would have a 
clear claim to represent what all people actually believe to be the most central and 
significant capabilities for human life. Such an account would provide a basis from which 
to build a genuinely universal list of capabilities that could serve as a neutral starting 
point for cross-cultural moral reasoning. This would be valuable since it is precisely what 
the capabilities approach seeks.  
Building on the normative tradition of discourse ethics pioneered by Jürgen 
Habermas and Karl Otto-Apel, Iris Marion Young has argued that an agreed-upon 
outcome of a social process of deliberation can reasonably be regarded as just if the 
process is characterized by inclusivity, equality, reasonableness, and publicity.
75
 
According to Young, justice “is nothing other than what the members of an inclusive 
public of equal and reasonable citizens would agree to under these ideal 
circumstances.”76 A brief word on each of these requirements is in order. Young 
interprets the norm of inclusion as requiring that all those affected by a given decision be 
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included in the process of discussion and decision-making. As Young sees it, “inclusion 
allows for maximum expression of interests, opinions, and perspectives relevant to the 
problems or issues for which a public seeks solutions.”77 Equality requires not only that 
all have a free and equal opportunity to speak, but that none of the participants “is in a 
position to coerce or threaten others into accepting certain proposals or outcomes.”78 This 
is important, since only if the discourse is free from domination can participants “be 
confident that the results arise from good reasons rather than from fear or force or false 
consensus.”79 Securing the participants’ confidence in the outcome as a product of good 
reasons suggests the need for a third norm: reasonableness. For Young, the norm of 
reasonableness is not so much about the content of the claims entered into the discourse 
as it is about the dispositions of the people engaged in the discourse:  
To be reasonable is to be willing to change our opinions or preferences 
because others persuade us that our initial opinions or preferences, as they 
are relevant to the collective problems under discussion, are incorrect or 
inappropriate. Being open thus also refers to a disposition to listen to 
others, treat them with respect, make an effort to understand them by 
asking questions, and not judge them too quickly.
80
 
 
 Finally, in regards to the publicity requirement, Young maintains that for an 
outcome to be regarded as just, the decision must be arrived at under conditions in which 
all speakers enter claims with the knowledge that they are speaking to a public to which 
they are answerable. Therefore, every claim must be entered in a way that “aims in its 
form and content to be understandable and acceptable” to all.81  
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I believe it is especially the requirement and specification of the publicity 
criterion that make Young’s normative procedure dependent on an account of human 
nature—an account that is specifically characterized by a set of fundamental capabilities 
justice requires us to respect. We can uncover this conception of human nature and the 
fundamental capabilities that justice requires us to respect by unpacking the concept of 
publicity. 
Publicity entails entering claims acceptable to all. According to Young, one of the 
conditions for acceptable claims is a compatibility with the fundamental claims of others 
based on justice:  
Knowing that they are answerable to others, and that they are mutually 
committed to reaching agreement, means that each understand that his or 
her best interests will be served by aiming for a just result. Each is thus 
motivated to express her interests or preferences in terms that aim to 
persuade others that they are compatible with justice in this case, which is 
to say that they do not seek to ignore or cancel the legitimate interests of 
others.
82
 
 
This stipulation raises an important question: what constitutes the legitimate 
interests of public persons (i.e., persons entering public claims)? According to Young, 
legitimate interests are “generalizable” interests, which is to say interests that “others can 
recognize . . . as legitimate without denying their own legitimate claims to self-
determination and self-development.”83 
By self-determination Young means “being able to participate in determining 
one’s action and the condition of one’s action.”84 A person is therefore self-determining 
when they are free, particularly when they are free of conditions of domination. Young 
maintains that this freedom for self-determination cannot be understood simply as 
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“negative freedom”—freedom from the interference of particular others—but must 
include freedom from institutional relations of domination, meaning relations “that award 
differential power to some agents to constrain the choices and actions of others.”85 This 
implies that individuals must be able to participate in making “the collective regulations 
designed to prevent domination.”86 The capability for self-determination is one of the 
fundamental capabilities, then, that must be respected if the publicity norm is to be met 
and the outcomes of the discourse are to be regarded as morally legitimate and binding.  
The other capability Young appeals to is the capability for self-development. Self-
development requires that people are able to meet their “basic needs” for food, shelter, 
health care, and so on,
87
 but Young is not willing to limit our legitimate interest in self-
development to provisioning for basic needs. Young agrees with Amartya Sen that the 
value of self-development is to be thought of primarily in terms of capabilities—what 
people are able to do and to be:  
As doers and actors, we seek to promote many values of social justice in 
addition to fairness in the distribution of goods: learning and using 
satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings; 
participating in forming and running institutions, and receiving 
recognition for such participation; playing and communicating with 
others, and expressing our experience, feelings and perspective on social 
life in contexts where others can listen.
88
 
 
In this list, Young names some of the central capabilities of persons institutional 
oppression tends to undermine: the capability to learn; to use our skills in socially 
recognized settings and in a way that is satisfying; to play and communicate with others; 
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and to express our experiences, feelings, and perspective on social life in a way that leads 
to others hearing us. Violating these capabilities would render the discourse illegitimate. 
For Young, the legitimate interests of persons for self-determination and self-
development define the basic requirements of social justice. Social justice has to do with 
“the institutional conditions for promoting self-development and self-determination of a 
society’s members.”89 Institutional constraints on self-development constitute forms of 
oppression whereas institutional constraints on self-determination are understood as 
forms of domination.
90
 These twin entitlements of persons to the institutional conditions 
necessary to satisfy their legitimate interests in self-development and self-determination 
establish the basic requirements of social justice, which all persons are entitled to as 
members of a just society. By incorporating these entitlements into the conditions of 
publicity—one of the conditions of normative deliberation—Young places a substantive 
constraint not only on the “form” of the claims entered into discourse (which is how she 
describes publicity), but the content of the claims entered. This has the effect of ruling 
out of bounds some actions or policies people might, as a matter of fact, believe they 
have an interest in—namely actions or policies that violate the rights of others to self-
determination and self-development—in short, those which harm others unjustly.91 But 
this means Young has not defined justice in a strictly proceduralist way. 
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Young’s claims that all people are entitled to an equal opportunity to develop and 
exercise important capacities (self-development) and that all people should be free from 
systemic forms of domination (self-determination) function as the fundamental 
entitlements of persons. These are absolute prohibitions on injustice in Young’s theory of 
social justice. For her, only interests which are compatible with the fundamental right of 
all to self-development and self-determination are legitimate. Otherwise put, only those 
interests that are compatible with these two basic requirements of justice may be entered 
into normatively legitimate deliberations.
92
 
Officially, according to Young, an agent (whether a person or a collective) “has 
an interest in whatever is necessary or desirable in order to realize the ends the agent has 
set.”93 However, as this discussion shows, the criterion of publicity—which says that we 
must see ourselves as answerable to others and therefore only enter claims others can, in 
principle, accept—rules out a subset of claims individuals might want to make on the 
basis of interests they perceive themselves as having. Interests that are incompatible with 
the legitimate claims of others to self-development and self-determination are illegitimate 
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grounds upon which to make claims. Young is specific about the requirements of self-
development and self-determination, and the way she spells them out reveals a 
conception of human nature characterized by a set of fundamental capabilities that must 
be respected: the capabilities to be self-determining; to participate in the process of 
collective self-regulation designed to prevent domination; to learn; to use our skills in 
socially recognized settings and in ways that are satisfying; to play and communicate 
with others; to express our experiences, feelings, and perspectives on social life; and to 
do so in a way that leads to others hearing us. As we can see, Young endorses a 
conception of human nature and its fulfillment that draws on a list of capabilities, and in 
her discussions of self-development and self-determination, the reader catches glimpses 
of the positive capabilities she takes to be significant. 
Returning to the initial question that inspired this discussion of Young’s 
deliberative theory of justice: Can the procedure she defends plausibly ground a 
normative conception of the human capabilities? If we adapted Young’s theory of 
deliberation for this purpose, a legitimate list would be the product of collective 
deliberation characterized by inclusion, equality, reasonableness, and publicity. Because 
publicity entails respect for the rights of others to self-determination and self-
development, and implicit within these ideals is a conception of central capabilities that 
must be respected, Young’s account of normative deliberation could not justify a list of 
capabilities without being circular by virtue of presupposing a list of capabilities from the 
outset. 
To summarize: my argument here has been that a deliberation-based 
proceduralism such as Young provides cannot substitute for substantive argument over 
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the capabilities list because the constraints she places on the procedure, which give its 
outcomes normative validity, are dependent on a prior account of the person as entitled to 
self-determination and self-development. Young understands self-determination and self-
development in terms of essential capabilities. As was discussed above, self-
determination entails the capability to participate in making “the collective regulations 
designed to prevent domination,”94 while self-development entails such capabilities as 
“learning and using satisfying and expansive skills in socially recognized settings; 
participating in forming and running institutions and receiving recognition for such a 
participation; playing and communicating with others, and expressing our experience, 
feelings and perspective on social life.”95 When this list is made explicit, there is clearly 
some common ground between Young and Nussbaum, who defends capabilities such as 
control over one’s political environment, being granted the social bases of self-respect 
(which is akin to the social recognition that Young thinks important), play, and use of 
one’s senses, imagination, and thought (under which Nussbaum includes things like 
communication of one’s own perspective and self-expression). Additionally, the five 
faces of oppression Young identifies—exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, 
cultural imperialism, and violence—correspond in fairly obvious ways to central and 
significant capabilities, such as: being able to appropriate the benefits of the exercise of 
one’s own capabilities (which exploitation undermines);96 “having a right to seek 
employment on an equal basis with others”97 and exercise one’s capacities in a way that 
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brings recognition and self-respect (both of which marginalization undermines);
98
 and 
“being able to be secure against assault”99 and the threat of assault (both of which 
violence undermines).
100
  
When Young incorporates publicity as a constraint on the discourse and requires 
that agents observe even this minimal standard of justice in entering claims, she invokes a 
conception of the person as a being with legitimate interests in their own well-being 
(which she articulates as freedom for self-development and self-determination). But 
because of this, we cannot use such a procedurally constrained form of discourse as a 
method for formulating a list of fundamental capabilities. The validity of the procedure 
itself depends on presupposing some such list, so to use such a process would be circular.  
In this section, I raised and argued against the possibility of substituting a 
deliberation-based, proceduralist method of reasoning for Nussbaum’s own intuitionist 
method of reasoning about the capabilities. It is worth repeating, I think, that the issue at 
stake is one of methodology in moral epistemology, not in political legitimacy. An 
advocate of the capabilities approach could argue (and I am quite sympathetic to this) that 
a deliberation-based proceduralism is inadequate for formulating the capabilities list, 
while still leaving open that deliberation-based procedures may be the most just and wise 
processes to employ when it comes to implementation of the capabilities, given that the 
capabilities need to be interpreted and implemented in context-sensitive ways. The reason 
for this difference is that deliberation-based procedures only result in valid or just 
outcomes if the procedures constraining the deliberation are themselves just, and for this 
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we need a prior account of human nature and the human good that cannot itself be 
provided by a value-neutral process of deliberation. This is another version of “the 
accounting challenge” we discussed above as affecting preference-based proceduralisms. 
Just as the preference-based forms of proceduralism Nussbaum interacts with in WHD 
face an “accounting challenge,” Young’s deliberation-based proceduralism would face 
the same challenge. The normative constraints on the procedure require an account of the 
human good which the procedure must respect, but for this reason it cannot be used to 
generate an account of the human good without begging the question in a fundamental 
way.  
Now, this obviously does not show that there is no deliberation-based 
proceduralism that can avoid the accounting challenge. The source of the challenge for 
Young’s deliberative proceduralism is, arguably, that it is not rigorously proceduralist 
enough. It introduces an independent, albeit thin, conception of justice into the 
constraints placed on the procedure, and is therefore reliant on a set of independent 
intuitions about the requirements of justice rather than letting the procedure alone define 
what is just independent of intuition. Nevertheless, I believe considerations of this nature 
are an argument in favor of a form of moral reasoning that draws on evaluative intuitions 
about the human condition and the human good. In the context of the capabilities 
approach, this means substantive moral reasoning about the capabilities is still necessary. 
Granting that some kind of substantive moral reasoning is needed, should 
feminists endorse the methods Nussbaum has advanced, or should these methods be set 
aside in light of the criticisms enumerated above? Her critics charge that the methods she 
employs do not do enough to reduce the influence of personal bias on the conclusions of 
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the list (see Ackerly and Okin), and that, because the moral epistemology behind the 
substantive good method is not clearly laid out, its validity cannot be assessed 
independent of the moral authority of the author (see Jaggar). In this chapter, I’ve 
provided an interpretation of Nussbaum’s substantive-good intuitionism that aims to 
defend the approach against the charge that there are no clear lines of reasoning by which 
we can assess the list independent of its author’s moral authority. There are independent 
arguments and I’ve argued that they are to be taken in conjunction and made coherent 
through a process of reflective equilibrium. As such, Nussbaum’s intuitionism has a 
claim to transparency about where these intuitions of “ours” are coming from. This 
makes rational dispute over each of the items possible insofar as reasons for each item on 
the list are open to view and can be endorsed by reasonable people on the basis of their 
own judgment that they are good and sufficient reasons. This is sufficient to rebuff the 
charge that the items on the capability list finally depend on nothing more than the moral 
authority of the author of the list. The moral epistemology of the capabilities approach as 
articulated by Nussbaum cannot be dismissed as an appeal to her own moral authority. 
Furthermore, I believe that the capabilities approach, grounded as it is in an 
account of core capabilities essential to human fulfillment has something valuable to 
offer. Nussbaum’s capabilities list expresses an account of human fulfillment that is 
clearly at home in a liberal conception of value, the predominant features of which are a 
commitment to the individuality of the person and respect for autonomous choice. 
Nussbaum has articulated in a robust way what one kind of liberal position clearly 
presupposes to be of value in human life. Many political liberals, who share much in 
common with Nussbaum when it comes to the substance of their conclusions, have 
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preferred to reason toward these conclusions through procedural rather than substantive 
methods. Our discussion here has shown that a number of well-known proceduralist 
alternatives do not avoid presupposing the value of certain specific capabilities. However, 
rather than argue for them, these proceduralist alternatives simply presuppose the value 
of these capabilities. The capabilities approach as such, then, is no more contentious for 
its explicit stance on the value of a definite list that it advances as worthy of protection. 
Moreover, it has the virtue of being explicit about this and of offering arguments on this 
front. This is important for feminist moral theory, which has often failed to fully develop 
and make articulate the normative foundations required to defend practical moral and 
political positions.
101
 If feminists are going to employ a flourishing-based moral 
framework like the capabilities approach to articulate moral and political social criticism, 
the normative basis of this approach needs articulation and argument. As I’ve argued, a 
theory of human nature is an indispensable normative resource within such a moral 
theory. The feminist ethics of flourishing may need better arguments than those provided 
by Nussbaum’s substantive-good approach, but it is unwise to reject a well-developed 
method of reasoning on such a difficult question as human nature without a better 
alternative to offer. 
While I find much that is of value in Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and I have 
defended her arguments for the capabilities, which are made in the context of an 
intuitionist moral epistemology, I have not gone so far as to argue for or endorse 
intuitionism as such. Feminist moral philosophers attentive to issues of moral 
epistemology have raised a number of objections to intuitionism. Some of these concerns 
almost undoubtedly motivate the criticisms discussed above. Especially concerning are 
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forms of intuitionism that rely heavily on an appeal to the “self-evidence” of the 
philosopher’s favored intuitions,102 and some objections against intuitionistic moral 
epistemologies are well-founded.
103
 However, Nussbaum does not invoke self-evidence; 
she relies on a coherentist form of intuitionism which seeks to achieve “reflective 
equilibrium” between intuitions, considered judgments, and principles, and she offers 
arguments for the intuitions she appeals to, rendering them more akin to considered 
judgments. One of the inherent limitations to any coherentist approach to justification is 
that coherence is no guarantee of truth. At the limit, it is entirely conceivable that one 
could have a coherent set of false beliefs. Less dramatically, one might have a coherent 
set of true beliefs that was partial in some important respect, excluding certain true 
beliefs and so producing only a partial picture of the full reality in question. In advancing 
a list of central capabilities that deserve special protection, either one of these failings 
would be serious, since it would unjustifiably enshrine a partial and particular form of life 
as universally valid, possibly foreclosing other legitimate alternatives that cannot be 
squared within the account. Nevertheless, seeking coherence across a set of beliefs or 
intuitions one has other reasons for thinking true (or if that is too strong in some cases, 
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then at least one has no good reason to think them false) is an epistemic virtue. It can 
serve to demonstrate consistency and fit, and, in that regard, can be the basis for greater 
epistemic confidence. Whatever its limitations (and there are serious limitations), a 
coherentist pursuit of reflective equilibrium is considerably less problematic than other 
forms of intuitionism feminists have rightly criticized.
104
 
 
5. The Problem of Representation, Part Two 
While I am unwilling to dismiss the argumentative strategies Nussbaum has put 
forward, I think her critics are right to scrutinize the capabilities list and the status she has 
at various times claimed for it. Recall that the Problem of Representation has two sides. 
First, in advancing philosophical accounts of various phenomena in human life, moral 
philosophers have often passed off their normative ideals under the guise of descriptive 
analysis. Margaret Walker describes how this works: 
The accounts they [i.e., some moral philosophers] produce of certain 
positions, postures, and lives often are given and taken as disinterested, 
indeed rationally critical, examinations of what moral agency, autonomy, 
or responsibility simply “are,” and what people and lives look like when 
they exhibit these. These accounts, however, are not just descriptions. 
They are idealizations and defenses (one might say, idealized defenses) of 
certain conceptions: They affirm these as terms which should govern our 
moral assessment of ourselves and others.
105
 
 
Articulations of “what it is to be human” are susceptible to the same ambiguity. 
Second, (and it is this side of the critique that Ackerly and Jaggar have pressed) feminists 
have found a predictable relationship between the ideals embedded in these descriptions 
and the faces behind those ideals. The ideals very typically reflect the life and social 
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position of the philosopher. Ackerly and Jaggar have accused Nussbaum of advancing an 
account of human capabilities that does not really describe what is necessary for all 
people to flourish; rather, it describes the capabilities that are important for a woman of 
her own inclinations and social position to flourish. Jaggar argues that Nussbaum has 
given us little reason to accept this conception of human flourishing. To the contrary, I 
have argued that Nussbaum’s argumentative strategy is valuable and that there are 
reasons given in defense of the capabilities on the list that can be assessed independently 
of the authority of their author. But insofar as the Problem of Representation 
encompasses the problem of passing off normative ideals under the guise of descriptive 
analysis, I think Nussbaum’s critics would be right to be suspicious. 
Part of what the Problem of Representation identifies is value judgments parading 
as neutral facts. If a flourishing-based ethic cannot do without a normative conception of 
human nature, then an important part of addressing feminist concerns about the Problem 
of Representation is being transparent about the nature of the claims being made. 
Nussbaum has vacillated between the idea that the answers to questions about what it is 
to be human capture our best self-understanding in a quasi-scientific sense, and the idea 
that the answers to these questions are fundamentally evaluative matters invoking 
judgments of significance about what makes for a good human life. For instance, 
Nussbaum has described the method behind the capabilities list as an “attempt to 
summarize empirical findings of a broad and ongoing cross-cultural inquiry.”106 
However, in the same discussion, she also asserts that “because the account is evaluative 
from the start . . . it is called a conception of the good.”107 
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In a similar way, in some of her earlier writing on the internalist-essentialist 
method, Nussbaum vacillates between the idea that the internalist-essentialist arguments 
capture our best self-understanding in a quasi-empirical sense, and the idea that the 
answers to internalist-essentialist questions are fundamentally evaluative matters 
invoking judgments of significance about what makes for a human life properly so-
called, that is, a truly human life.
108
  
In more recent work,
109
 she has taken to identifying the kind of life made possible 
by the freedom to exercise human capabilities as a life with “dignity,” an idea which 
expresses with much less ambiguity the fact that the capabilities list expresses an 
evaluative vision of what is necessary for a good human life.
110
 It is presumably the 
connection to flourishing (expressed in terms of a life with dignity) that makes the “moral 
claim” of capabilities to their own fulfillment worthy of our respect.111 Self-destructive 
and harmful capabilities (e.g., for killing, brute-force domination, manipulation, and 
revenge) can also be described as capable of an existence that is “flourishing” as opposed 
to “stunted.” But in this case, Nussbaum thinks our legitimate refusal to respect these 
potentials rests on a judgment that they are inconsistent with human flourishing. 
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The capabilities view refuses to extract norms directly from some facts 
about human nature. . . . [W]e must begin by evaluating the innate powers 
of human beings, asking which ones are the good ones, and the ones that 
are central to the notion of a decently flourishing human life, a life with 
human dignity. Thus not only evaluation but also ethical evaluation are put 
into the approach from the start. Many things that are found in human life 
are not on the capabilities list. The political conception does not have the 
job of fostering greed or making sure that crime and brutality get a chance 
to flourish, although these activities are surely based in human powers. 
The conception of flourishing is thoroughly evaluative and ethical; it holds 
that the frustration of certain tendencies is not only compatible with 
flourishing, but actually required by it.
112
 
 
Here we see Nussbaum clearly taking the position that human flourishing consists 
not in the realization of all human potentials, but in the fulfillment of those that contribute 
to the end of human dignity. This stance entails a conception of human nature defined by 
a distinction between appropriate and valuable developments of our nature and harmful 
and destructive developments of our nature. I have tried to bring articulacy to convictions 
of this sort. This conviction that our nature must be understood as well-realized by some 
developments and not by others is one of the principle markers of a teleological 
conception of nature in general (see chapter two). 
It is worth noting that when Nussbaum has been tempted to describe the contents 
of the capabilities list as an empirical finding, she has not been claiming that the 
capabilities list is a product of an inquiry into human nature as made through the natural 
or social sciences. She has, rather, claimed that the list is a product of empirical 
investigation into what people, in different times and different places, have believed is 
valuable about human life. However, even if we have an empirical finding about wide-
spread evaluative judgments, such a discovery cannot put the capabilities list on the 
footing it requires. If this is all the capabilities list is, then it will not be able to play the 
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normative role the capabilities approach requires it to play. In terms of its normative 
significance, this argument for the capabilities list would put the capabilities list on par 
with Hume’s appeal to sympathy. Just as Hume has a difficult time using the fact that we 
can (and often do) sympathize with others to explain why we should,
113
 Nussbaum’s 
account will have difficulty explaining why the fact that many people around the world 
take these capabilities to be valuable implies that we should value and protect them. On 
the other hand, if the capabilities list is, rather, based on a set of judgments about which 
capabilities—amongst the many human beings possess—are a constitutive element of 
human fulfillment and flourishing, then we escape Hume’s problem, and it is clear what 
normative ground Nussbaum has for privileging the capabilities on the list. The challenge 
with such a position is that the capabilities list can no longer be represented—as 
Nussbaum represents it at points—as an uncontroversial ground upon which most (if not 
all) persons are agreed. 
If the account of human nature employed by the capabilities approach is now 
understood as thoroughly ethically informed (that is, as an evaluative account that 
distinguishes between human potentials on grounds of worth), then does Nussbaum still 
think the capabilities list—more than other universal moral ideals—can serve as a shared 
basis for cross-cultural moral reasoning? If so, is this because ethical ideals about human 
nature are somehow less contentious than ethical ideals about other subjects? If not, then 
what is the unique value of reasoning from an account of human nature and its potentials 
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for flourishing? I am persuaded that Nussbaum is right to acknowledge that the theory of 
the human nature employed in the capabilities approach is (and must be) an ethically 
informed account. Being transparent about this is an essential part of dealing with 
concerns about theoretical problems of representation. But, if this is the way we go, then 
it seems one must also articulate a different account of the benefits and reasons for 
advancing such a theory of human nature. Formerly, Nussbaum’s reasoning was that such 
a theory of human nature could provide a neutral ground for moral reasoning upon which 
many people are agreed. If the capabilities list is articulating a theory of human nature 
that is thoroughly ethically informed, then it is implausible that the capabilities list should 
still be thought to provide such a neutral ground for moral reasoning.  
One might be concerned at this point that the conception of human nature 
articulated by the capabilities approach does no more than give concrete and quite 
articulated expression to Nussbaum’s own bias for liberal values. While the capabilities 
list is an evaluative list thoroughly informed by one kind of liberal humanism, it does 
more than simply re-express liberal values in a new sphere. Articulating the vision of 
human nature that makes liberal values plausible and appropriate for the human condition 
offers rational resource for a moral theory, and it makes the capabilities approach more 
articulate about the sources of its fundamental commitments. This is an epistemic 
advantage over other kinds of liberal political theories that presuppose the value of many 
of the same capabilities
114
 but lack articulacy about their significance in terms of the 
pursuit of flourishing.  
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6. Conclusion 
 I have argued that what Nussbaum calls the “substantive-good approach” 
incorporates various methods (such as the internalist-essential, literary, narrative, and 
procedurally-constrained, informed-desire approach) in order to argue in a substantive 
way about the nature of human fulfillment. On the basis of this integrationist 
interpretation of Nussbaum’s arguments for the capabilities list, I believe the form of 
intuitionism she offers makes the arguments in favor of these intuitions open to view and, 
hence, rationally disputable in a way for which her critics do not give the approach credit. 
Addressing the Problem of Representation that still plagues the capabilities approach 
requires clarifying the underlying conception of nature in general to which the 
capabilities approach is committed. Nussbaum has clarified that not all human 
capabilities deserve our support and respect—only those that contribute to realizing an 
end which she calls a “life with dignity.” This makes it clearer that she must be 
committed to a teleological conception of human nature. I have argued that being 
transparent about this is important for addressing the Problem of Representation. This 
ethically informed and evaluative conception of human nature will need to be understood 
as one aspect of the theory of flourishing to which it belongs. Nevertheless, the strength 
of Nussbaum’s capabilities list is that it brings articulacy to the foundational, normative 
commitments of her politically liberal vision of flourishing. 
 To this point, I have argued that a teleological conception of human nature is a 
necessary resource for a flourishing-based ethical theory, and that it serves as a resource 
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in a quite different capacity than what is commonly assumed. It is commonly assumed 
that nature claims enter into a theory to ground the objective validity of normative claims 
in non-normative facts. However, I have argued that some nature claims are already 
normative and that these kinds of nature claims make clear a particularly important set of 
reasons we have to comply with the normative claims of the theory. This is how 
Nussbaum’s capabilities list needs to be understood. In articulating the capabilities as the 
constitutive elements of a fully human, or “dignified,” life, Nussbaum makes clear the 
reasons we have to protect and nourish these capacities. Her theory of human nature, 
articulated through the capabilities list, makes clear the reasons it is good for agents to 
live according to the liberal, feminist vision of flourishing she articulates. 
In sum, I have argued (see chapter two) that flourishing-based ethics require a 
concept of nature in general that is teleological in form. It is an important methodological 
element in an adequately normative ethic of flourishing. On the basis of a normatively 
flat, “empirical” conception of human nature, flourishing-based ethical theories suffer 
from a serious kind of normative failure, failing to give agents adequate reasons to do or 
live as the theory prescribes. In this and the previous chapter, I looked at two quite 
different flourishing-based moral frameworks that I believe satisfy this basic requirement. 
In the case of Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian eudaimonism, I argued that while 
her appeal to human nature is properly situated within the theory, and Hursthouse 
recognizes that our conception of human nature is normatively-saturated from the start 
and shaped by an ethical perspective, the substantive conception of human nature 
employed by Hursthouse is ultimately too “thin” to satisfy the needs of a feminist 
eudaimonism. In the case of Martha Nussbaum’s flourishing-based capabilities approach, 
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while the conception of human nature is adequately robust to sustain her politically 
liberal vision of flourishing, Nussbaum fails to recognize the deep way in which the 
conception of human nature to which she appeals is evaluative and shaped by the 
politically liberal values to which she is committed. Because of this, Nussbaum at times 
misconstrues the methodological role of human nature within a flourishing-based 
framework and represents her account of human nature as though it were an empirically 
discoverable matter of fact and something upon which we can expect broad agreement 
independent of other disagreements over values and the proper ends of human life. This 
ambiguity opens the capabilities approach to feminist criticism informed by an awareness 
of theoretical problems of representation. I believe that addressing the Problem of 
Representation as I’ve articulated it here depends upon an unambiguous 
acknowledgement of the evaluative nature of the capabilities list, thereby making 
transparent the nature and function of the appeal to nature within the flourishing-based 
framework of the capabilities approach. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
LISA TESSMAN’S BURDENED VIRTUES: HUMAN NATURE AS A CRITICAL 
RESOURCE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The relationship of this chapter to the argument as a whole is quite different than 
the preceding. Lisa Tessman’s work in Burdened Virtues presents an implicit challenge to 
the thesis defended here that a teleological conception of human nature is 1) necessary 
and 2) can be a critical resource for naming and criticizing oppression within a 
flourishing-based moral framework. While there are a number of feminist moral 
philosophers appropriating the insights of Aristotelian eudaimonism for feminist use and 
making inroads towards a distinctively feminist appropriation of a flourishing-based 
moral framework, there are few engagements as sustained and novel Tessman’s. She 
implies that one of the revisions feminists ought to make to Aristotle’s eudaimonism is to 
avoid appealing to a theory of human nature to provide an account of flourishing. What 
she substitutes instead is an account of flourishing implicit in the goals of liberatory 
political communities. From this perspective, she argues, oppression inflicts a uniquely 
moral harm on its victims by making necessary a set of “burdened virtues.” Substituting 
the account of flourishing implicit in the goals of liberatory movements is an interesting 
and provocative proposal, for it suggests a feminist flourishing-based framework might 
avoid altogether contentious claims about human nature. However, as I will argue, it is 
only given a specific conception of human nature that Tessman can defend her thesis that 
the eudaimonist moral framework reveals a distinctively moral harm of oppression. 
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Without the conception of human nature I identify as implicit in her perspective, Tessman 
cannot defend the claim that oppression puts agents in the double-bind she claims to 
name with the “burdened virtues.”  
As I will demonstrate, Tessman’s claims about the burdened virtues are “cross-
pressured,” susceptible to critique from two different directions. As such, her claims 
about the burdened virtues sit in an unstable space, open to rejection on the grounds that 
they are not truly “virtues” as well as on the grounds that they are not truly 
“burdensome.” The conception of human nature I claim to find underlying the concept 
makes it apparent why the burdened virtues are both “burdensome” and “virtues.” This is 
important since if either claim falls, then so does Tessman’s argument that a eudaimonist 
moral framework sheds light on the uniquely moral harms of oppression. Oppression 
would still, of course, interfere with many external conditions of flourishing, but it would 
not follow that oppression constitutes a unique harm to the moral, psychological 
conditions of flourishing. In addition to defending her claims about the moral harms of 
oppression, another benefit of embracing this conception of human nature is it would 
enable Tessman to defend against the charge that her eudaimonism collapses into a form 
of consequentialism. In this way, this chapter adds support to the argument of the 
dissertation as a whole by showing what benefit a feminist eudaimonist gains from 
endorsing a teleological conception of human nature. 
 My argument proceeds as follows: In section two, I lay out Tessman’s claim that 
there are virtues unique to contexts of oppression. She calls these the “burdened virtues.” 
Tessman has proposed revising Aristotle’s starting assumptions in order to make the 
eudaimonism he articulates useful for feminist analysis, and I give these points special 
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attention. In particular, I will show how she proposes to avoid reliance on controversial 
claims about human nature to defend her conception of flourishing. In section three, I 
explore the visions of flourishing articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, 
taking them as public spokespersons of the liberatory movement to which Tessman 
appeals in order to have a working conception of flourishing. However, I argue there is 
not sufficient unanimity about the concept of flourishing within this movement to 
substantiate her claim that the character traits she calls “virtues” are genuine virtues. I 
argue that the visions of flourishing articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm 
X diverge in ways significant enough that Tessman must actually argue out the points 
over which they differ in order to defend her claims about the burdened virtues. 
Independent of the undefended assumptions about flourishing upon which she relies, the 
character traits Tessman identifies as “burdened virtues” are either not “burdened” 
because not psychologically damaging (Malcolm X’s position) or not “virtuous” because 
not the ideal response (Martin Luther King’s position). In section four, I draw out the 
significance of this argument, and show how embracing the conception of human nature 
needed to sustain her claims about the burdened virtues strengthens Tessman’s case for 
having identified an overlooked moral harm of oppression. 
 
2. Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics and Oppression 
 
 In Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggle, Lisa Tessman brings 
the eudaimonist perspective—that the acquisition of the virtues and the pursuit of the 
good life are inseparable in human life—together with the moral demands of non-ideal 
theory—that ethical theory must attend to and illuminate the experience of the 
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oppressed.
1
 Tessman turns to the tradition of virtue ethics in order to provide a fuller 
analysis of the moral states of selves under oppression, and she finds virtue ethics useful 
for this task because it is agent-centered and foregrounds questions of character. Tessman 
argues that by tying together the ideas of flourishing and moral goodness, a eudaimonist 
perspective reveals oppression to be not only an impediment to freedom (which it often 
is) but also an impediment to the attempt to become a morally good person, with the kind 
of character that enables full human flourishing. If oppression can be shown to interfere 
with good character, then eudaimonism will also provide a way of articulating the 
uniquely moral harms of oppression. Tessman argues oppression does, in fact, disrupt the 
relationship between virtue and flourishing by putting the agent in impossible situations 
in which the best possible response (given the circumstances) is cultivating character 
traits that undermine the psychological conditions of flourishing. She calls these traits 
“burdened virtues.”  
 In this way, Tessman argues a eudaimonist moral framework reveals another 
aspect of the “double-bind” oppression so characteristically entails. According to Marilyn 
Frye, the most characteristic feature of oppression is its tendency to create a double-bind, 
a situation in which “options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose one to 
penalty, censure or deprivation.”2 As I will use the term—and I take this to be consistent 
with Tessman’s usage as well—oppression names systemic injustice that affects 
individuals, not as individuals per se, but as members of a group. As Marilyn Frye 
                                                 
1
 On ideal versus non-ideal theory in ethics, see Charles W. Mills, “ ‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” Hypatia 
20, no. 3 (2005); Onora O’Neill, “Abstraction, Idealization and Ideology in Ethics,” Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Supplement 22 (1987); Lisa Schwartzman, “Abstraction, Idealization, and Oppression,” 
Metaphilosophy 37, no. 5 (2006); and Lisa Tessman, “Feminist Eudaimonism: Eudaimonism as Non-Ideal 
Theory,” in Feminist Ethics and Social and Political Philosophy: Theorizing the Non-Ideal, ed. Lisa 
Tessman (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2009). 
2
 Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality (Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press, 1983), 2. 
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observes in her classic analysis, “The root of the word ‘oppression’ is the element ‘press.’ 
. . . Something pressed is something caught between or among forces and barriers which 
are so related to each other that jointly they restrain, restrict or prevent the thing’s motion 
or mobility.”3 The experience of oppression is of “being caged in: all avenues, in every 
direction, are blocked or booby trapped.”4 This speaks to the systemic nature of the harm, 
but this systematic hemming in can come in a variety of forms. Iris Marion Young 
identifies the five “faces” of oppression as exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, 
cultural imperialism and violence. Though Young distinguishes oppression from 
domination, which she defines as “institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people 
from participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions,”5 
domination is often related to oppression, since it presses people into relationships in 
which the constraints under which they act function to advantage and sustain undue 
privilege accruing to another. While there are some commonalities amongst different 
kinds of oppression (gender-based, race-based, class-based, etc.), it is useful to keep in 
mind one need not experience, or experience the threat of, every “face” of oppression for 
the category to apply.  
 The importance of character for responding to oppression and the possibility 
character change is needed to overcome one’s own oppression has been recognized in 
some feminist theory—particularly within the politics of personal transformation.6 Within 
                                                 
3
 Frye, The Politics of Reality, 4. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1990), 38. 
6
 Representative essays in the politics of personal transformation include Sandra Lee Bartky, “Feminine 
Masochism and the Politics of Personal Transformation,” in Femininity and Domination: Studies in the 
Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: Routledge, 1990); Claudia Card, The Unnatural Lottery: 
Character and Moral Luck (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1996); Ann Ferguson, “Feminist 
Communities and Moral Revolution,” in Feminism and Community, ed. Marilyn Friedman and Penny 
240 
 
the feminist movement, the politics of personal transformation seeks to understand and 
correct for the ways women’s subordination is sustained and perpetuated through the 
formation of women’s psychological dispositions to be, for example, reflexively 
deferential,
7
 or to endorse sexist standards of femininity and beauty,
8
 or to be sexually 
aroused by degrading images and sexual acts.
9
 It has been argued that one important 
aspect of overcoming oppression requires rooting out sexist dispositions and cultivating 
dispositions that align with feminist principles. This is important for two reasons. First, 
being able to have emotional and attitudinal dispositions that align with one’s principles 
is important for a kind of psychological integrity without which one’s psychological life 
will be a jumble of warring desires and principles.
10
 Second, beyond the value of 
psychological integrity for its own sake, psychological integrity has implications for 
moral motivation. Having dispositions that conflict with one’s avowed principles will 
present motivational obstacles to acting on one’s principles.11 On the other hand, having 
dispositions consistent with one’s principles provides motivational support for acting in 
accordance with one’s principles. Because of this, developing the kinds of psychological 
traits that bring one’s dispositions into line with one’s principles is important for 
empowering women to fight their own oppression.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Weiss (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1995); Marilyn Frye, “White Woman Feminist, 1983-
1992,” in Willful Virgin: Essays in Feminism, 1976-1992 (Freedom, CA: The Crossing Press, 1992); bell 
hooks, Sisters of the Yam: Black Women and Self-Recovery (Boston: South End, 1993); Sonia Kruks, 
“Simone de Beauvoir and the Politics of Privilege,” Hypatia 20, no. 1 (2005). Many of these authors both 
call for self-transformation as an important way of resisting oppression and problematize the idea one can 
simply choose to enact the kind of self-transformation needed. 
7
 Thomas E. Hill, Jr., “Servility and Self-Respect,” The Monist 57 (1973). 
8
 Bartky, “Narcissism, Femininity, and Alienation.” 
9
 Bartky, “Feminine Masochism and the Politics of Personal Transformation.” 
 
10
 Card, The Unnatural Lottery, see esp. chap. 2. 
11
 If one adopts a distinction such as Aristotle recognizes between “full virtue” and “continence,” a failure 
of psychological integrity will also mean one is barred from full virtue in this realm. 
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 Tessman is one of a number of feminist theorists to have suggested that 
eudaimonism may offer unique resources for providing an analysis of oppression.
12
 A 
eudaimonist moral perspective brings attention to the kind of self one needs to be in order 
to flourish. While this is present in the politics of personal transformation, Tessman 
argues this movement has at times been too narrowly focused on changing dispositions 
for the sake of motivating the kinds of actions needed to over-come oppression, and this 
has obscured the harm the inculcation of the demanding traits and dispositions 
recommended by this movement can do to the self who adopts them. Taking flourishing 
lives as the ultimately goal of political resistance to oppression, what character traits 
would we recommend either as instrumentally useful in surviving or fighting oppression 
or constitutively necessary for realizing the kind of flourishing political resistance hopes 
to achieve? 
 As a starting point for analyzing the moral state of selves confronting oppression, 
Tessman favors Aristotle’s eudaimonism. She is attracted to the Aristotelian tradition of 
virtue ethics precisely because it is eudaimonistic, maintaining that “the pursuit of 
flourishing—qualified in certain ways and especially by the requirement that one develop 
and maintain the virtues—is morally praiseworthy.”13 Furthermore, Aristotelian 
eudaimonism acknowledges that although virtue is necessary for flourishing, virtue may 
not be sufficient if the external conditions for flourishing are not present. Without 
acknowledging the relevance of external conditions for flourishing, it is difficult to see 
                                                 
12
 See also Nancy Snow, “Virtue and the Oppression of Women,” in Feminist Moral Philosophy, ed. 
Samantha Brennan (Calgary, AB: University of Calgary Press, 2002); in environmental ethics, see Chris 
Cuomo, Feminism and Ecological Communities: An Ethic of Flourishing (New York: Routledge, 1998). 
13
 Lisa Tessman, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 3. 
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how feminists would use a eudaimonist framework to give an analysis of the effects of 
oppression. 
 Despite her optimism about the perspective afforded by a eudaimonist framework, 
Tessman maintains that, for feminist purposes, there are a number of revisions to 
Aristotle’s eudaimonism that are necessary. For one, traditional Aristotelian accounts of 
the virtues assume agents are operating within a basically just social order. However, the 
character traits that reliably promote human flourishing in a just social order may be 
inadequate to deal with the struggles and challenges confronting agents in an unjust 
social order.
14
 Therefore, a feminist eudaimonism should depart from Aristotle by 
assuming non-ideal background conditions. If we assume a background social context 
shaped by pervasive forms of systemic injustice, might there be other, non-standard 
character traits we should consider to be “virtuous” in the pursuit of flourishing? Looking 
to the politics of personal transformation, Tessman catalogues a number of traits that 
have been identified by feminist and anti-racist theorists as virtues, useful for enabling 
agents to either survive or resist their own oppression. These include courage, loyalty and 
anger, among others. To the extent survival and resistance of oppression are necessary if 
one is to have any hope of eventual flourishing, traits that would enable resistance and 
survival have an important relationship to flourishing. 
                                                 
14
 Although Hursthouse assumes a basically just social order for the purposes of elucidating and justifying 
the virtues, she also acknowledges that living in “evil times” could impact what counts as a virtue. She 
acknowledges that parents doing their best to raise children under oppressive and dangerous regimes have 
often taught their children “versions [of the virtues] tailored to the extreme circumstances in which they 
live; no doubt they have to lay great emphasis on prudence, to teach a caution about, and detachment from, 
others that would count as lacking trust and being callous in a better society.” Still, Hursthouse seems 
unwilling to go as far as Tessman does to tailor the virtues to contexts of oppression, saying instead “In 
times of great evil, it can indeed cease to be true that those who have and exercise the virtues 
characteristically achieve eudaimonia. . . . But even in such times, it is still not the case that there is some 
other reliable way. In evil times, life for most people is, or threatens to be, nasty, brutish, and short, and 
eudaimonia is something that will be impossible until better times come.” Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 176-177.  
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 To arrive at a table of virtues, Tessman proposes a feminist eudaimonism will 
involve a methodological departure from Aristotle in working from a conception of 
flourishing to a table of virtues, rather than as Aristotle does, beginning with a conception 
of virtue and defining flourishing in its terms. As Tessman notes, “Flourishing, at least 
for Aristotle, is defined in terms of virtue (NE 1098a16-17), which in turn is understood 
as excellence of a specifically human function (NE 1097b22-1098a15).”15 At points, it 
appears Aristotle actually starts from the beliefs of those who have been well-raised 
about virtue and who the “virtuous” and “excellent” man is and what he does, and he 
allows this to guide his judgment about the requirements of the best kind of life.
16
 While 
he certainly conceptualizes flourishing in terms of the virtues, Aristotle also appeals to 
human nature to support his account of flourishing, and the underlying idea is that we 
must know what it is to be human in order to know what it is to live well as a human. 
Aristotle appeals to the idea that there is a characteristically human function to forge this 
link.
17
 In this way, excellent human functioning is constitutive of flourishing for 
Aristotle. But whether argued for on the basis of common beliefs about the virtues, or by 
appeal to human nature, the idea of flourishing for Aristotle is articulated through the 
prior ideas of virtue and excellent functioning rather than the other way around. 
                                                 
15
 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 51. 
16
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Terence Irwin, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1999), 1095b5-6. 
[Hereafter cited as EN.] See Peter Simpson, “Contemporary Virtue Ethics and Aristotle,” in Virtue Ethics: 
A Critical Reader, ed. Daniel Statman (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997); c.f. 
Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 51 ftnt 14. 
17
 Aristotle, EN, 1097b22-1098a21. It is important to note that in his arguments about the nature of virtue 
and flourishing, it is actually the appeal to human nature that gives Aristotle’s ethics the potential for 
egalitarian application, even though he himself did not apply it in this way. 
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 Methodologically, Tessman proposes to avoid “the sticky issue of a human 
function”18 and to work in reverse: from a conception of human flourishing to a table of 
the virtues instrumentally or constitutively necessary for achieving such a state. Tessman 
acknowledges this methodology will be complicated and messy at points because of the 
ways oppression disrupts the relationship between virtue and flourishing.
19
 Furthermore, 
we will need a prior understanding of flourishing to get this method off the ground. 
Tessman proposes a feminist eudaimonism might profitably take its conception of 
flourishing from the implicit beliefs about flourishing found in the feminist and black 
liberation movements of the 20
th
 century. As she rightly observes,  
Those fighting oppression must already hold certain implicit beliefs about 
what a flourishing or good life is. Without some notion of what is a greater 
                                                 
18
 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 51. I interpret Tessman as pursuing, in the main, a strategy of avoidance 
when it comes to questions of human nature. But because Tessman does not take an explicit stand on the 
proper methodological role of human nature, it is difficult to see what her position is. (See also her remarks 
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fundamentally social. In Burdened Virtues, an appeal to human sociality is fundamental to Tessman’s 
justification of other-regarding character traits as “virtues.” Following Aristotle’s lead, Tessman argues 
flourishing is impossible without other-regarding virtues because as social beings, we are dependent on 
others to achieve our own good. (For explicit recognition that this is the argumentative strategy in 
Burdened Virtues, see her “Reply to Critics,” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 23, no. 3 (2008).) 
We need at least a minimum of other-regarding virtues such as justice, generosity and loyalty to sustain our 
collective social life. But Tessman thinks the needs of our social, interdependent nature can be fulfilled 
without the other-regarding virtues being extended to all others. One might restrict the exercise of other-
regarding virtues to members of one’s own “tribe” (however conceived), and thereby realize the flourishing 
of an exclusive as opposed to an inclusive social collectivity. So, although Tessman is willing to take a 
stand against the individualistic atomism that would make egoism a real strategy for human flourishing, she 
must think that a more robustly evaluative conception of human nature as only capable of fulfillment in a 
genuinely inclusive social order is indefensible. I suspect she is trying to avoid what she perceives as 
“controversial” claims about human nature, and Aristotelian sociality—within certain intellectual circles—
is so widely accepted that she feels entitled to this assumption but not to anything more. Like Hursthouse, 
what Tessman needs, but does not have, is a substantive conception of human nature. She is already 
committed to a thin, teleological conception of human nature as only capable of having its needs met in an 
exclusive social collectivity. My argument here is that her moral vision depends on going further. 
19
 In circumstances of institutionalized social injustice, flourishing may be completely out of reach. In this 
case, the ideal is out of reach and the question becomes instead, “Given these circumstances, what is best?” 
We look, then, not for the best traits, but for the second-best, and second-best might be something that 
would never be choiceworthy, but for the circumstances. What is choiceworthy and desirable in an 
oppressive social context might be akin to Aristotle’s “mixed actions,” (EN, Bk III, i) something no one 
would choose but for the dire conditions. (See Tessman’s illuminating discussion of this in Burdened 
Virtues, 109-114). Oppression disrupts the relationship between virtue and flourishing when the best traits 
to cultivate, given the circumstances, still do not conduce to flourishing. 
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rather than a less degree of flourishing or, put differently, a better rather 
than a worse sort of life, one would not have any basis for objecting to 
oppression; one would not struggle for social changes if one did not 
believe the changes to be for the good.
20
 
 
 One of the most important aspects of a flourishing life identified within these 
movements, and one I will return to later, is psychological health. Implicit concern for 
psychological health is shown through the persistent concern to understand and find ways 
to protect against or remedy the psychological damage inflicted by oppression. Of 
particular importance here is the concept of ‘psychological oppression’ where the 
oppressed come to internalize judgments about their own inferiority.
21
 This can lead to 
the belief that the unjust treatment they receive is justified. Tessman also lists as possible 
indicators of psychic damage “a tendency to feel guilt or resignation instead of anger 
when one is wronged, a disposition to feel persistent hopelessness, a habit of 
manipulating or lying to others, a lack of self-confidence.”22 
 In contrast, at least part of what psychological health entails is an accurate 
estimation of one’s own worth and dignity. In order to achieve such a state, one would 
have to avoid internalizing dominant narratives that imply one’s own worthlessness or 
general insignificance in comparison with others.
23
 Psychological health would also seem 
to entail a certain degree of hope, or at least not despair. In manifesting a concern to 
overcome psychic damage and realize a state of psychological health, activists and 
theorists in both the feminist and black liberation movement have embraced 
psychological health as an important aspect of the kind of life they are striving to make 
possible. 
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 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 52. 
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 Bartky, “On Psychological Oppression.” 
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 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 37. 
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 Ibid., 49. 
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 Finally, Tessman believes feminists will need to not only recognize the 
insufficiency of virtue for flourishing, as Aristotle does, but they will need to emphasize 
the ways virtue will be insufficient for flourishing in a context of oppression that is 
constantly disrupting the relationship between virtue and flourishing.
24
 
 Following upon the changes to classical eudaimonism, what emerges from 
Tessman’s analysis is disturbing to say the least. What emerges is a set of virtues that, 
despite being either necessary for surviving oppression or praiseworthy in manifesting 
moral opposition to oppression, are detrimental to the flourishing of their bearer. They 
are detrimental primarily because they are incompatible with the psychological health 
and well-being of their bearer. Tessman calls such virtues the “burdened virtues” to 
signal the fact that, despite being praiseworthy in a certain respect and thus virtuous, they 
come with a significant cost to their bearer. 
 How does Tessman arrive at this conclusion? Starting with an Aristotelian 
conception of virtue as a character trait that either conduces to or is constitutive of the 
flourishing of its bearer, Tessman argues that in a context of oppression, character traits 
that contribute to the survival of their possessor (a minimum requirement of flourishing) 
or to the resistance of oppression (and hence to eventual flourishing) will count as 
virtues. A number of character traits have been recommended by feminist and critical 
race theorists as useful for surviving or resisting oppression. Of particular note are 
courage, loyalty and anger. Tessman gives extended attention to each of these as 
paradigmatically “burdened virtues.”25 I will focus here just on anger. 
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There are a number of feminist theorists who have developed an analysis of anger 
as having a significant role to play in resisting oppression. According to Marilyn Frye, 
anger disrupts the narrative framework of male supremacy that says women do not merit 
respect outside of the sphere of concerns proper to womanhood. Anger is often 
represented as unjustified if it is a woman’s anger on her own behalf in response to 
denigrations or denials of her competence, rights, autonomy, or interests. Anger at 
injustice can function as an assertion of one’s status in the face of the denial of that status 
because anger “claims that one is in certain ways and dimensions respectable. One makes 
claims upon respect.”26 Whether it gets uptake or not, anger registers at least the belief 
one has a legitimate claim on respect that is being ignored. On a related note, Elizabeth 
Spelman elucidates the insubordination inherent in some expressions of anger. A 
woman’s anger expressed at a man in response to the perception of having been wronged 
communicates that she regards herself as a legitimate judge of his conduct: “If he is in 
other ways regarded as my superior, when I get angry at him I at least on that occasion 
am regarding him as no more and no less than my equal. So my anger is in such a case an 
act of insubordination. . . .”27 Understood this way, the failure to get angry when one has 
been disrespected may itself be symptomatic of psychological oppression, indicating 
either a failure to perceive oneself as valuable and worthy of respect or a failure to 
recognize this kind of treatment as disrespectful.  
                                                 
26
 Frye, The Politics of Reality, 90; quoted in Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 118. 
27
 Elizabeth V. Spelman, “Anger and Insubordination,” in Women, Knowledge, and Reality, ed. Ann Garry 
and Marilyn Pearsall (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 266; quoted in Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 118. 
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Anger may also be useful epistemically for gaining knowledge of oppression and 
of its costs.
28
 Diana Tietjens Meyers develops the idea of “heterodox moral perception,” 
which she believes can be facilitated through the experience of anger. Meyers does not 
advise that women attempt to become chronically angry, but she does advocate that 
oppositional groups attend carefully to people who already are: “If social groups were 
organized to seize upon claims kindled by hypersensitivity, paranoia, anger, and 
bitterness and to give them a good airing and a fair hearing, insightful moral perception 
might be greatly increased and emancipation might be hastened.”29 
On an Aristotelian understanding, the person who gets angry at injustice is 
virtuous so long as his anger is directed “at the right things and with the right people, and 
further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought.”30 As Tessman observes, 
feminist understandings (as articulated above) of the proper role of anger are compatible 
in many ways with Aristotle’s understanding of anger. “Anger, for Aristotle, is a feeling 
of pain at being unjustifiably harmed by another, especially if one is harmed by being 
slighted, that is, denied the respect that one deserves. . . .”31 Additionally, Tessman thinks 
the uses of anger mentioned above might be conformable to the thought that virtue is a 
mean that avoids extremes. Tessman recounts the various ways in which feminists 
advocating the importance of anger have cautioned against the danger of it being 
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 Macalester Bell, “Review of Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles,” Notre Dame 
Philosophical Reviews (2006), https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/25046-burdened-virtues-virtue-ethics-for-
liberatory-struggles/. 
29
 Diana Tietjens Meyers, “Emotion and Heterodox Moral Perception: An Essay in Moral Social 
Psychology,” in Feminists Rethink the Self, ed. Diana T. Meyers (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 213; 
quoted in Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 119. 
30
 Aristotle, EN 1125b32-33; quoted in Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 120.  
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 Burdened Virtues, 120; citing Aristotle, Rhetoric, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), bk. II, chaps. 2-3. 
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misdirected toward other subordinated persons,
32
 or of it being excessive and thereby 
unjustified.
33
 It needs to be directed at the right person and in the right way. 
 But if there is a kind of anger that communicates a demand to be respected as one 
ought to be, and this can be considered virtuous, there is another kind of anger Tessman 
judges to be more problematic. This is the kind of anger María Lugones has called 
“second-level anger.” The kind of anger discussed thus far she calls “first-level” anger. 
The intent of first-level anger is communicative. Through it, subordinated peoples 
attempt to “communicate their refusal to accept subordination and their demand of 
respect for themselves as moral agents.”34 Lugones describes how second-level anger is 
quite different, and when it expresses itself “the gestures are wild or extremely hieratic, 
contained; the voice loud; the use of space extensive; the body flushed.”35 Second-level 
anger does not aim to be communicative, in part, because it is a total rejection of the 
“world of sense” within which the relations of subordination that have inspired this anger 
exist. When anger is permitted to take on such huge proportions, Tessman calls it 
“separatist anger,” and she maintains its radical potential lies in its “very refusal to be 
toned down or moderated.”36 A form of anger like this is appropriately described as rage. 
Such rage is imagined to exist, when it does, perpetually beneath the surface. It need not 
always be manifest in the way Lugones described above, but the idea is that, ever-
present, it could become manifest. 
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 If the purpose of such anger is not to communicate, what good or purpose is this 
kind of anger supposed to achieve? Tessman suggests cultivating this kind of anger may 
make one capable of sustaining a “refusal to extend any sympathy toward those whom 
one must politically oppose.”37 Such a consistent and principled refusal to sympathize 
with another human being will run counter to most people’s dispositions and will 
therefore be very difficult to consistently sustain over and against the evidence of 
humanity in one’s oppressors (particularly in the face of their vulnerability, pain, and 
emotional suffering). But Tessman maintains this might be necessary in some 
circumstances, and for this purpose rage might be considered a virtue, useful for resisting 
oppression.
38
 
 It is harder to square such an extreme state with the Aristotelian understanding of 
virtue being 1) a mean between extremes that 2) expresses the proper response on the part 
of the agent. Of course, by a “mean,” Aristotle does not necessarily intend a moderate 
state. He gives the example of Milo, the wrestler, who, by comparison with most people, 
eats an incredibly large amount of food. However, the proper amount of food, not too 
little and not too much, relative to the situation in which Milo finds himself—engaged in 
rigorous, daily training—is an extremely large amount of food when compared to other 
people not so situated. The mean for Milo is quite a bit more than would be healthy for 
other people not in his situation.
39
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 Where oppression names injustice that is systematic and institutionally enforced 
and therefore pervasive, what does the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean prescribe? 
Tessman points out, “It can be confusing to evaluate anger of enormous proportions, for 
under conditions of unrelenting injustice, such anger can be characterized (surprisingly) 
as a deficiency even as it appears as an excess; there may be no moderate state that 
allows one to be angry all the times one ought to be.”40 Given the magnitude and 
pervasiveness of the oppressive forces, anything but a proportional and unrelenting anger 
can seem inadequate, since with anything less one is not being angry at all the times one 
ought. On the other hand, an unrelenting anger is likely to be excessive when evaluated in 
relationship to the psychological well-being and capacity of the agent to bear such anger. 
Thus, even though “proper anger,” given the circumstances, might be something like 
rage, it is highly probable this is going to be excessive and harmful for the person who is 
so angry. 
 Thinking again about Milo, Tessman wryly observes, “While Milo presumably is 
able to metabolize his supersized meals—so that the food is actually good for his 
health—it is far from likely that raging political resisters can metabolize their anger.”41 If 
systemic injustice calls for an all-pervasive rage that habituates the oppressed into the 
ability to refuse sympathy to their oppressors, it is hard to see how such anger would not 
be corrosive to the person who embodies it. 
 Tessman maintains that such an extreme kind of anger is preferable to worse 
states, such as resignation or depression, but it is difficult to imagine such a seething rage 
figuring in a full, flourishing human life. Thus, rage is a paradigmatically “burdened 
                                                 
40
 Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 120. 
41
 Ibid., 124. 
252 
 
virtue,” a “morally praiseworthy trait that is at the same time bad for its bearer, 
disconnected from its bearer’s well-being.”42 “Burdened virtues” emerge from within 
circumstances that require the oppressed to develop character traits necessary either for 
survival or well-being in the present (for example, a lack of anger would seem to imply 
an acceptance of one’s own inferiority or that one deserves the treatment received) or for 
helping their possessor to fight to overcome the injustices they face (for example, anger 
might be useful for motivating on-going resistance or for maintaining an unsympathetic 
resolve). But “burdened virtues” are, in another respect, disjoined from their bearer’s 
flourishing because they harm a person’s psychological capacity for flourishing. The kind 
of person one becomes in the course of inculcating these traits is a kind of person for 
whom full human flourishing will be out of reach. Furthermore, because we are 
imagining the inculcation of stable psychological dispositions that affect one’s 
perceptive, affective and cognitive responsivity to the world, we are imagining changing 
the self in ways that will not be easily “undone” or easily repaired. Having sensitized 
oneself to injustice to the point that one is capable of sustaining a chronic state of anger, 
one may not be able to “turn it off.” To call rage a “virtue” implies it is the best response 
possible given the situation, but—as this analysis suggests—the best that is possible may 
not be very good. For Tessman, rage is a candidate for virtue because it manifests a noble 
opposition to oppression and because it is useful for political resistance, but it is a 
character trait she also thinks is psychologically damaging. Because the burdened virtues, 
such as rage, harm a person’s psychological capacity for flourishing, burdened virtues 
might also be considered a form of moral damage. 
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 In light of this, Tessman argues that a critical virtue ethics, which is attentive to 
the dynamics of oppression and operating out of a eudaimonist perspective, gives rise to a 
powerful argument demonstrating an overlooked moral harm of oppression. If the 
requirements of flourishing in a given social context demand that certain people cultivate 
burdened virtues as a way of surviving and resisting their own oppression, then 
oppression constitutes not only an external barrier to flourishing but an internal barrier as 
well, since the selves politically resistant, oppressed peoples are required to become are 
selves that are incapable of full human flourishing.
43
  
 To summarize: Rage, on Tessman’s account is a ‘virtue’ because it is 
praiseworthy in manifesting a noble opposition to one’s own oppression but 
‘burdensome’ from a eudaimonist perspective because it interferes with the psychological 
conditions of personal flourishing. Insofar as the purpose of the virtues is to enable 
flourishing lives and the character traits required by a context of oppression work against 
flourishing, the agent is doubly harmed by oppression: both the internal and the external 
conditions of flourishing are disrupted. 
 How should we evaluate Tessman’s claim to identify a set of character traits, 
praiseworthy in contexts of oppression and therefore deserving of our approbation and 
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yet constituting a form of damage to their bearers? The burdened virtues are neither 
desirable nor choiceworthy from the perspective of the ideal world that politically 
resistant selves hope to realize in the fight for justice and equality, free from the overt 
domination or covert coercion that are so pervasive in our world. And so, from the 
perspective of flourishing, it can seem positively anti-eudaimonist to call these traits 
“virtues.” The burdened virtues may be instrumentally valuable for promoting or securing 
good states of affairs, but they create internal barriers to flourishing. Recognizing this and 
yet recommending them raises the question of what work the eudaimonic perspective is 
really doing.
44
 It appears that the burdened virtues are regarded as virtues rather than 
vices on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis where the eventual benefits to be realized in 
terms of good states of affairs are judged to outweigh the harms imposed by the burdened 
virtues themselves. This would seem to be a consequentialist analysis of virtue. As 
Tessman presents it, the category of a “burdened virtue” seems to threaten to collapse a 
eudaimonist analysis of the virtues into a consequentialist analysis. 
 Additionally, accepting Tessman’s conclusion means embracing a deeply tragic 
view of the world, since the situation of the oppressed is much worse than is generally 
recognized. The double-bind with which the oppressed are faced on Tessman’s account is 
deeply disturbing. The burdened virtues are both the best that is possible and 
psychologically damaging. Given the conception of flourishing implicit in the liberatory 
movements to which she points, are these traits the best that is possible? It is this claim 
especially that merits careful scrutiny. 
 First, to call these traits “virtues” is to recommend them. One might make this 
recommendation with the recognition that they are something to be regretted, but 
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nevertheless see them as the best that is possible, given the horrors with which a person 
must cope. All of this acknowledged, to call the “burdened virtues,” “virtues” is to 
recommend them.
45
  
 Second, endorsing the idea of a ‘burdened virtue’ and recommending them for 
contexts of oppression is potentially perilous. The claim these troublesome traits are the 
best that is possible depends upon the claim there are no other better alternatives 
available. For if there are other alternatives that we have overlooked, and some people 
take us at our word, voluntarily adopting the traits we are recommending as the “best 
possible,” then we who have recommended them will be morally responsible for the 
burdens they incur. Our blindness to alternatives will be partly responsible for their 
consequent inability to flourish. Acknowledging this should not distract us from the fact 
that the root of the problem is the systems of oppression that put agents in situations 
where it is so difficult to know how to properly respond. But I do say this to bring the full 
gravity of the situation to the fore. The burdened virtues are supposed to provide trait 
guidance, and recommending a morally damaging course of character formation is 
dangerous. 
 This raises the question: Are there alternative characterological responses to 
oppression that have been overlooked? Are there alternative visions of flourishing in light 
of which these alternative responses would be deemed the “appropriate” or “best” 
response possible? While not challenging Tessman’s choice to take her conception of 
flourishing from the goals implicit in the liberatory movements of the 20
th
 century, I do 
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want to examine “the goals” of this movement more carefully. The goals of various 
factions of this movement were not in fact monolithic or even potentially harmonious and 
this suggests there were different, even competing, visions of flourishing internal to the 
liberatory movement Tessman takes as the cornerstone of her analysis. In the next 
section, I will compare the visions of flourishing articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. 
and Malcolm X, taking them as spokespersons who were uniquely articulate about the 
goals and purposes of two important factions of the black liberation movement in the 
United States.
46
 While Martin and Malcolm shared many things in common (that often 
went unrecognized), the differences in their views about black liberation and 
flourishing—and hence the goals they set—were not inconsequential. I will argue 
Tessman’s own view is identical to neither. This suggests she must be working with her 
own conception of flourishing. Furthermore, maintaining her own position against Martin 
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and Malcolm presupposes a certain view of human nature, a view that I will argue is not 
shared by either Martin or Malcolm.
47
  
 In the conclusion, I’ll suggest what I think this view of human nature must be. If 
Tessman is willing to embrace this, two consequences follow: the status of the burdened 
virtues as both burdensome and virtues can be more clearly articulated and defended, 
and, in the course of doing so, we see what resources Tessman has to avoid the charge 
that introducing the category of “burdened virtues” threatens to collapse her eudaimonist 
perspective into a consequentialist one. Once we see the way Tessman’s claims about the 
burdened virtues depend upon a certain account of human nature, we can also see how 
human nature serves as a resource for defending claims about the damage inflicted by 
oppression. In this way, this chapter provides further support to the central thesis of this 
dissertation, that within a flourishing-based moral framework, human nature is a critical 
resource for articulating and defending feminist claims about the moral harms of 
oppression. 
 
3. Malcolm and Martin: Two Visions of Flourishing 
 
 The twentieth-century black freedom movement in the United States was powered 
by a variety of different (and sometimes competing) intellectual commitments, 
commitments that were philosophical, religious, cultural and historical in nature. These 
commitments found expression predominantly in two political philosophies: 
integrationism and separatism (otherwise known as nationalism). We can take Martin 
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Luther King, Jr. as representative of the integrationist branch and Malcolm X as 
representative of the separatist branch of the black freedom movement, since both were 
widely recognized as public spokespersons for these two philosophies. 
 Martin and Malcolm were often depicted as standing in diametrical opposition to 
one another (especially by the white media), so it is important to recognize at the outset 
of any discussion of these two figures that they ultimately came to share much in 
common. About their differences, Malcolm said: 
All of our people have the same goals, the same objective. That objective 
is freedom, justice and equality. All of us want recognition and respect as 
human beings. We don’t want to be integrationists. Nor do we want to be 
separationists. We want to be human beings.
48
 
 
Martin and Malcolm gave their lives to the black freedom struggle, and the way Malcolm 
ultimately came to see their differences and disagreements is significant. James H. Cone, 
Lewis V. Baldwin, and other scholars who emphasize the complementarity of Malcolm 
and Martin are probably correct to insist that what we have to learn about freedom and 
the quest for human dignity from these two leaders will come from synthesizing their 
insights rather than blindly following one and rejecting the other.
49
 However, while what 
Malcolm said (quoted above) is true, to cast their relationship as a mere disagreement 
over means papers over significant differences in the ways Malcolm and Martin thought 
about the world that could realize meaningful freedom, equality, justice, and respect for 
black persons given their history in America and the ongoing reality of entrenched racial 
prejudice. These terms are not totally empty, and there are real ways Martin and 
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Malcolm’s positions converged at the end of their lives,50 but what I want to stress is at 
the height of their influence, they gave voice to quite different visions of black liberation, 
and these differing visions imply significantly different character traits as virtues in the 
struggle. In particular, I will focus on their different conceptions of psychological health 
and damage. When it comes to evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of these 
competing visions of liberation, and the traits their visions called for, understanding the 
underlying convictions about human nature are crucial for making a reasonable judgment.  
 As James H. Cone has described, Martin’s vision centered on integration, insisted 
on nonviolence and idealized agape love—even to the point of love of enemy—as the 
basis of self-respect. Malcolm’s vision, by contrast, centered on separation, insisted on 
the right of every person to self-defense, and idealized self-love as the basis of self-
respect.
51
 
 I will discuss Martin’s vision first, then Malcolm’s in order to show that they do 
not share a single concept of flourishing. 
 Martin’s liberatory vision centered on the goal of an ‘integrated society,’ which 
he often called ‘the beloved community.’ His ideal of integration went beyond mere 
desegregation, and its realization depended on “the welcome acceptance of Negroes into 
the total range of human activities.”52 Desegregation without integration would represent 
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a society in which “elbows are together and hearts are apart.”53 Integration’s goal was 
redemption, reconciliation, friendship and understanding between whites and blacks.
54
 As 
such, integration expressed the ideal of true community between persons, and its 
realization depended on the recognition of the worth and dignity of every person. 
Nonviolence was the nonnegotiable means to this end. 
 Martin believed it would be totally impossible to achieve the beloved community 
through violent means. Directed at oppressors, it would not bring about repentance, only 
further bitterness and hatred; thus, violence would only continue the cycle of hatred-
violence-hatred, further preventing reconciliation, which was what was truly needed to 
bring about the beloved community. Second, Martin believed that the discipline of 
nonviolence makes public the dignity and courage of the resister, thus inspiring self-
respect and commanding respect from others.  
The nonviolence approach does not immediately change the heart of the 
oppressor. It first does something to the hearts and souls of those 
committed to it. It gives them self-respect; it calls up resources of strength 
and courage that they did not know they had. Finally it reaches the 
opponent and so stirs his conscience that reconciliation becomes a reality. 
I suggest this approach because I think it is the only way to reestablish the 
broken community.
55
 
 
Martin speaks of nonviolence as “thwarting the growth of bitterness” even as it gives an 
avenue of positive action to “long-repressed feelings of anger and frustration.”56 While 
violence directed at persons is a pragmatic denial of their value, nonviolence “exalts the 
personality of the segregator as well as the segregated.”57 
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 The realization of the beloved community, nonviolent resistance, and the respect 
for persons upon which these were predicated, were intimately connected for Martin to 
the ideal of agape love—the love of God for all human beings operating in the human 
heart—which enables us to love even our enemies. Love of one’s enemies in this case 
meant love of white segregationists and white supremacists who were behind the 
bombing of churches, the terrorizing of black communities, and the mistreatment of 
nonviolent demonstrators. Martin tried to distinguish agape love from sentimental liking 
or affectionate emotion. “It would be nonsense to ask men to love their oppressors in an 
affectionate sense,” said Martin. What I am talking about “means understanding, 
redeeming good will for all men, an ever-owing love which seeks nothing in return. . . . It 
is the love of God operating in the human heart.”58  
 Martin taught that this kind of love was fully consistent with “loving the person 
who does the evil deed, while hating the deed that the person does.”59 This kind of love 
did not require liking, but it did require resisting hatred. Hatred, Martin said, “is as 
injurious to the hater as it is to the hated. It distorts the personality and scars the soul.”60  
 The beauty of nonviolence was that it provided a creative channel not only for the 
sort of anger at injustice that was appropriate—Martin called such anger “sound and 
healthy”61—but also for the active opposition to injustice that was morally necessitated, 
since he saw doing nothing to oppose injustice as itself a form of evil-doing.
62
 The 
challenge lay in keeping appropriate anger at injustice from boiling over into anger at and 
hatred of the person committing the injustice. Martin always associates hatred with the 
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desire to see others suffer and the willingness to do violence, but since he believed 
violence could only end in more violence and could never bring about the true justice and 
true peace, which were the foundation of the beloved community, hatred had to be 
avoided.  
 Rooted in the Christian tradition, his antidote to hatred was love—even to the 
point of love of one’s enemies—and for Martin this implied that one must be willing to 
accept suffering rather than to inflict suffering on others. Speaking on this point, Martin 
said,  
To suffer in a righteous cause is to grow to our humanity’s full stature. If 
only to save himself from bitterness, the Negro needs the vision to see the 
ordeals of this generation as the opportunity to transfigure himself and 
American society.
63
 
 
Martin’s belief that unearned suffering could be redemptive may be the hardest aspect of 
his philosophy to follow. Malcolm certainly could not.  
 Whereas Martin’s liberatory vision of black flourishing involved integration, 
nonviolent resistance to injustice and love of one’s enemies, Malcolm’s vision of 
flourishing called for the separation of blacks from whites, an absolute commitment to 
the right of self-defense and the principle of black self-love. 
 Malcolm believed separation from whites and unity between blacks was a pre-
condition to any (possible, eventual) integration with whites.
64
 Separatism was, in his 
mind, essential for black people to learn to love and respect themselves and to stop 
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accepting a value hierarchy that placed black lives at “the bottom of the pile.” According 
to James H. Cone,  
Malcolm totally disagreed with Martin’s identification of freedom with 
integration. Integration meant begging whites to accept blacks. . . . Insofar 
as Martin equated freedom with the recognition of the dignity and worth 
of black people as human beings, Malcolm regarded him as an ally. They 
parted company when Martin advocated that integration with whites 
would bring about self-respect for blacks. Malcolm regarded that belief as 
nonsense. Black people, he contended, would never be regarded as human 
beings as long as that regard was dependent upon their association with 
white people. If whites can be human without being integrated with 
blacks, then blacks can be human without associating with whites.
65
  
 
As Malcolm understood it, the desire to integrate was itself a sign of self-hatred and 
symptomatic of a damaged black psyche.
66
 “Any Negro trying to integrate is actually 
admitting his inferiority, because he is admitting that he wants to become a part of a 
‘superior’ society,” Malcolm said.67 
 For Malcolm, a righteous rage at injustice and at those who perpetrated it was a 
genuinely indispensable weapon in the fight to overcome oppression. First, he saw it as 
the only appropriate response to the blatant disregard for black life that suffused white 
society. He “could not understand how anyone could be a human being and not be angry 
about what white people had done to black people in America.”68 And, second, he saw 
black rage as a necessary catalyst for psychic transformation. According to Cornel West, 
“Malcolm X’s notion of psychic conversion depends on the idea that black spaces, in 
which black community, humanity, love, care, concern, and support flourish, will emerge 
from a boiling black rage.”69 Through his rhetoric Malcolm sought to inspire the black 
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rage that would re-kindle the embers of black self-love and bring about a psychic 
transformation leading to self-respect. Malcolm was proud to be known as the “angriest 
Negro in America.”70 
 Malcolm became most critical of Martin when Martin called on blacks to exhibit 
love by “turning the other cheek” and rejecting violence, even violence in self-defense.71 
Malcolm believed that, as a person, one had a moral right to defend one’s life, by any 
means necessary. “He did not believe that one could be a person without defending his or 
her life.”72 Hence, to deny a person this right was to make them a non-person. Malcolm 
saw Martin’s teaching of non-violent resistance in a context of overt white hostility as 
essentially an attack on the personhood of blacks. Malcolm went so far as to call this 
teaching “a crime.”73 One of the major obstacles to Malcolm’s joining with Martin in the 
civil rights coalition was his principled commitment to the right of self-defense. Many 
others were willing to commit to nonviolent resistance as a practical tool, even though 
they were not committed in principle to nonviolence, the way Martin was. On principle, 
Malcolm would not. This makes sense if Malcolm saw non-violence as an attack on 
personhood and not just an ineffective means. 
 Now, let me put a point on the differences we’ve seen. When we look at the 
visions of flourishing articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X, we see their 
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disagreements were not just over means to an agreed-upon end. It is true they both sought 
human freedom and dignity and respect for black people as human beings, but they had 
substantively different conceptions of what it was to be fully human and, hence, of what 
is was to flourish as a human being. Thus, they had different ideas of what would realize 
meaningful freedom, dignity and respect. What Martin saw as a condition of healing for 
the black psyche, Malcolm saw as pathological. For example, Martin pursued integration 
because he thought the self-respect of black people in America depended (at least in part) 
on their being accepted as full, participating members of society. Malcolm saw the desire 
to integrate into white society as itself symptomatic of black self-hatred, and therefore a 
sign of psychic damage.  
 On the other hand, what Malcolm saw as an assertion of one’s humanity, Martin 
saw as an indication of the true depth of one’s despair. This is exemplified in their 
attitudes toward violence in self-defense. Malcolm held that in the nature of what it is to 
be a person—a human being with moral standing—is the right to freedom and self-
defense. He thought the call to repudiate violence was dehumanizing. Malcolm was no 
philosopher, but it is revealing that he called blacks who endorsed Martin’s teaching in 
this regard “subhuman.”74 Malcolm believed that, as a person, one had a moral right to 
defend one’s life and freedom, by any means necessary. Martin, on the other hand, held 
that the nobility of our humanity was revealed precisely in the refusal of violence. To 
voluntarily “suffer in a righteous cause is to grow to our humanity’s full stature,”75 he 
said. And while anger at the injustice was most certainly appropriate, one had to resist 
hatred for the person and instead (somehow) maintain an attitude of “redeeming good 
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will”76 toward the oppressor in the face of injustice. To be violent was a symptom of true 
despair. 
 It is difficult to see how one could judge between these two different visions 
without taking some stand on the questions that underlie Malcolm and Martin’s 
differences: questions of human fulfillment, the requirements of psychological health, 
and what it is to be fully human—in short, on questions of human nature. While one 
might have gut-instincts about which of these is better, or why neither is acceptable, 
giving an account of this requires sifting the sorts of considerations that gave the 
psychologist Kenneth Clark—a friend of both Martin and Malcolm—pause over 
endorsing either.  
‘On the surface, King’s philosophy appears to reflect health and stability, 
while the black nationalists betray pathology and instability. A deeper 
analysis, however, might reveal that there is also an unrealistic, if not 
pathological, basis in King’s doctrine. It is questionable whether the 
masses of an oppressed group can in fact “love” their oppressor. The 
natural reactions to injustice, oppression, and humiliation are bitterness 
and resentment. The form which such bitterness takes need not be overtly 
violent but the corrosion of the human spirit which is involved seems 
inevitable. It would seem, then, that any demand that the victims of 
oppression be required to love those who oppress them places an 
additional and probably intolerable psychological burden upon these 
victims.
77
  
 
Clark suspects that Martin’s call to love one’s enemies is an unrealistic ideal, given 
human nature. Clark does not appear to believe it is totally unrealistic to think some 
human beings could be capable of understanding and healthfully implementing the kind 
of love Martin calls for, but whether the majority could is another question. Clark was 
particularly concerned that without a pretty high degree of philosophical sophistication to 
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distinguish between the agape love Martin called for and the emotion popularly 
associated with the word “love,” the suffering of the masses under Martin’s moral 
influence would be compounded as they condemned themselves for their moral failure to 
“love their enemies.”78  
 If love is not a realistic ideal, the psychologically healthy response to oppression 
might rather be akin to what the psychologists William Grier and Price Cobbs describe in 
Black Rage: anger manifests the will of the oppressed to overcome. Grier and Cobbs 
describe anger as healthy in so far as it represents a move beyond a state of depression or 
dejected resignation. “When the mourner lashes out in anger, it is a relief to those who 
love him, for they know he has now returned to health.”79 This suggests that those 
advocating rage as a virtue of resistance do not see it as psychologically harmful. It may 
actually be a sign of psychological health. This seems to be how Malcolm regarded 
anger. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 The disagreements between Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X rest not only 
on differing judgments about the best means to achieve their ends, but different 
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 There are at least two distinct possibilities here. First, while some exceptional human beings might be 
able to live up to Martin’s ideal, in general, the majority of us cannot. If we propose as an ideal something 
that is not going to be widely achievable, we risk setting the majority of people up for failure. Clark 
suggests that the majority will fail because the ideal is so sophisticated that they will mistake what is 
required of them. Then, trying to force themselves to feel the affectionate liking for their oppressors (which 
even Martin thought was ludicrous), their suffering will be compounded as they condemn themselves for 
their moral failings. Second, even if love of enemy is generally possible, to place this obligation on people 
who have been scarred by the bitterness and hatred that are the natural human reactions to systemic 
injustice and to demand that they rise above their circumstances and love their enemies is simply too 
demanding. In this case, even if love of enemies is possible as an ideal, and it is possible for most if not all 
of us, it might be so demanding that it can be understood as another instance of a burdened virtue. 
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Tessman, Burdened Virtues, 124.  
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judgments about human nature and human flourishing—particularly the features of a 
healthy black psychology. Recognizing this is significant, since Tessman’s claims about 
the burdened virtues depend on the claim that they are both ideal for us and 
psychologically damaging for us. Tessman is making two distinct claims when she argues 
that rage—particularly the type that could propel the separatist movement championed by 
Malcolm X—is a burdened virtue. First, anger of this magnitude is a morally 
praiseworthy response to oppression and injustice, and given the circumstances, it is the 
ideal response. Second, this kind of anger is psychologically unhealthy and incompatible 
with full human flourishing. The thought that anger of this order would be 
psychologically damaging is intuitively plausible, and I think Martin Luther King, Jr. 
would agree, but of course, he would not accept that rage is a virtue. Malcolm X would 
accept that rage can be a virtue, but contrary to Tessman, he does not see it as 
psychologically harmful. He thinks it is a sign of psychological health. So in Martin 
Luther King, Jr.’s view rage is psychologically damaging but not a virtue, while in 
Malcolm X’s view rage is a virtue but not intrinsically damaging. In Tessman’s view, 
rage is a virtue, and it is psychologically damaging. This suggests that Tessman is not 
simply adopting the vision of flourishing implicit in the liberatory movement of which 
Martin and Malcolm were both a part, but that she, like them, has her own conception of 
flourishing. This allows her to judge—contrary to both of them—that anger is both (1) 
the best response possible, given the circumstances, and (2) psychologically damaging. 
 This is the point at which underlying claims about human nature are inescapable, 
and being clear about these claims is important for defending one’s conception of 
flourishing and sustaining claims about oppression and the harm it causes. On the one 
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hand, inculcating the burdened virtue of rage can only be the best possible response in 
these very bad circumstances if Martin Luther King, Jr. is wrong in at least one respect. 
He must be wrong to think there is a better alternative response available in love. For he 
thinks oppression can be overcome through love, and if this is true, then there is an 
alternative response that is better than anger because it enables the agent to resist 
oppression—and thereby do what is morally praiseworthy—without incurring the terrible 
consequences that rage entails. On the other hand, in order for Tessman’s account of rage 
as a psychologically damaging “burden” to hold up, Malcolm X must also be wrong in at 
least one respect. He must be wrong to think rage is a sign of psychological health. 
 For the burdened virtues to hold up, it needs to be the case that rage really is 
psychologically damaging for human beings, and yet it is the best possible response in 
these situations. This could be true if Martin’s ideal of love is psychologically unrealistic 
for most people and setting love of enemy as the ideal is going to backfire by, for 
example, inducing an excessive and damaging form of guilt when we inevitably fail or 
else by introducing or depending upon some other kind of pathology. This is, essentially, 
the worry Clark raises. For the category of a “burdened virtue” to hold up under scrutiny, 
human nature must be such that no better response is possible (all the other alternative 
being either unrealistic or introducing even more devastating consequences), and yet the 
best that is possible is very bad, given our psychological constitution, and how it will 
affect us. 
 One who is generally sympathetic to the idea that rage is the appropriate and 
virtuous response to gross systemic injustice, many want to hold on to the idea that the 
kind of anger called for in these circumstances is an anger the effects of which can be 
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mitigated. Wouldn’t it be possible to be appropriately angry, but self-monitor and 
disengage when needed for the purpose of self-care? In this way, anger could be endorsed 
as a virtue, and yet the worst effects on the self might be mitigated. Suggestions like this 
can be understood as a variant on Martin Luther King, Jr.’s position. He takes a certain 
kind of anger at injustice to be appropriate and virtuous—there is an anger he calls 
“sound and healthy.” However, one’s anger must be managed so that it is directed at acts 
of injustice rather than at persons. On Martin’s view, one avoids the corrosive effects of 
anger by maintaining love and a redeeming good will for the person who commits the 
injustice. Notice that both of these positions present anger as virtuous, but this kind of 
anger is not a burdened virtue because it lies in a space that is not psychologically 
damaging.  
 Tessman’s claim to have identified in the burdened virtues a uniquely moral harm 
of oppression depends upon the claim that the best possible response to oppression lies in 
a space that involves deep psychological harm. Any response, akin to the above, that 
would suggest the best response to oppression is one that (somehow or other) mitigates 
the psychological harms of the response is actually a denial of Tessman’s claim that the 
situation of the oppressed is one of tragedy where the best possible response is also 
deeply damaging. If the best possible response is not in fact so damaging, the oppressed 
are still harmed by oppression in manifold other ways, but their situation vis-à-vis 
character formation is not as dire as Tessman’s analysis implies.  
 Thus, Tessman’s analysis of the burdened virtues depends upon accepting a 
certain interpretation of our nature, one that situates human beings in an intermediate 
space of possibility in which the best that it is possible for us to achieve, given our 
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constitution, is also deeply damaging, given our constitution. How we understand the 
nature and extent of the double-bind(s) that oppression so characteristically creates 
depends in no small measure on a prior set of judgments about our nature, on what we 
take to be our limits and capabilities, and hence, on what is desirable and attainable for 
beings such as we are. 
 When it comes to theorizing, making one’s understanding of human nature 
explicit may help to resolve some disagreements about the nature and extent of 
oppression, but it may have little effect on others. In the latter kinds of cases, making 
these issues about human nature explicit will only make explicit another source of 
disagreement between the parties. Given alternative understandings of our nature, of our 
possibilities and limitations, different alternatives will present themselves as both 
possible and desirable. 
 A certain interpretation of our nature is indispensable for defending Tessman’s 
claim that there exist a set of character traits that are at once desirable and ideal for 
responding to oppression and regretfully damaging to the selves who cultivate them. 
Once we see how central such an interpretation of our nature is to Tessman’s claim about 
the burdened virtues, we also see a path forward for responding to the worry that 
Tessman’s eudaimonist perspective, in admitting such a morally troublesome set of 
character traits as “virtues,” has collapsed into a form of consequentialism. Macalester 
Bell raises this concern and suggests the only thing separating “burdened virtues” from 
“vices” is that the benefits outweigh the costs.80 Unlinked from the flourishing of their 
bearer, they are only virtues because of the valuable states of affairs they help to realize. 
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 Still, Tessman herself suggests the cost-benefit analysis when she says, “the idea 
of a burden attached to a trait is that there is some level of cost that is to be weighed 
against what is otherwise excellent about the trait. But somewhere on this continuum, a 
burden becomes so great that it no longer makes sense to assess the trait as good.”81 If 
this is all that distinguishes virtue from vice, it is hard to see how this is not a 
consequentialist analysis, and then it is far from clear that the appeal to eudaimonism is 
adding anything significant to our understanding of virtue in contexts of oppression.  
There may be one way in which this charge is improperly leveled. Tessman’s 
analysis does not dub the burdened virtues unqualifiedly good simply because the 
benefits outweigh the harms; they are only virtues in the sense that they name the best 
that is possible, given the (terrible) circumstances. There is, in a sense, an asterisk 
attached to the appellation, and Tessman maintains that the virtuous person who bears up 
under them will do so with regret, recognizing that these traits are only choiceworthy 
given the bad circumstances.  
However, I do not believe that Tessman’s analysis of the burdened virtues can be 
reduced to a form of cost-benefit consequentialism. With the implicit claim about human 
nature made explicit and placed firmly in view, we can see Tessman’s analysis is not, in 
fact, reducible to a cost-benefit analysis. It is not simply that the benefits achieved by the 
burdened virtues outweigh the costs associated with them. The burdened virtues are 
“virtues” because they are the best that is possible, given our nature. No matter what the 
cost of these traits is, they are still the best that is possible. What is good is often very 
difficult to achieve, and striving toward the ideal may be exceedingly demanding. In 
contexts of oppression there are even greater obstacles to realizing what is good. 
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Tessman’s eudaimonist framework shows us often overlooked psychological costs to 
cultivating the best kind of traits possible. Her view is eudaimonist because it continues 
to foreground and prioritize the well-being of the person. It does not justify sacrificing 
the well-being of the person for the sake of achieving some good state of affairs, 
independent of the agent. Rather, it attends to the costs incurred by the individual even 
when they realize the best traits that are possible for them. Her view is ultimately tragic 
because, given her understanding of our nature, in a context of oppression, the best that is 
possible is not very good. 
 At the end of the day, whether we think Martin Luther King, Jr. or Malcolm X or 
Lisa Tessman has authentic insight into the ideals that will best promote flourishing, our 
judgment depends in part on an assessment of human nature, on what is realistic and what 
is ideal—what is healthy and what is pathological—for beings such as we are.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
HUMAN NATURE: FROM OBSTACLE TO RESOURCE 
 
 
1. Confronting the Problem of Human Nature 
 
 A number of feminist moral philosophers have proposed appropriating a 
flourishing-based ethical perspective as the basis of a feminist moral theory. Aristotle’s 
eudaimonist virtue ethics has been one of the principle models and sources of inspiration 
in this project. However, significant questions remain about what exactly a feminist 
flourishing-based ethical theory is going to look like. While Aristotle has been a principle 
inspiration here, making the moral philosophy developed by Aristotle compatible with 
feminist principles presents a number of challenges. One of the main challenges of 
Aristotle’s eudaimonism from a feminist perspective is the role played by a theory of 
human nature. Feminist philosophers are generally skeptical of appeals to human nature 
because of the way theories of human nature have functioned to legitimize and maintain 
the social and legal subordination of women.  
Against this backdrop, I have argued that a theory of human nature can be a 
critical resource for a feminist ethic of flourishing. First, theories of human nature can 
articulate the reasons agents have to live as the theory prescribes by making clear why 
this account of flourishing is good for the agent, given the human condition. As such, 
theories of human nature articulate a particularly important set of reasons agents have for 
making sense of a flourishing-based ethical theory’s answer to the question “How should 
I live?” Second, theories of human nature can support a flourishing-based analysis of 
oppression, making clear the ways oppression constitutes a harm. While it is widely 
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believed that feminist objections to appeals to nature are rooted in opposition to the 
essentialist metaphysics implied by a theory of human nature, I have argued that 
metaphysical essentialism is not really the root problem for feminism, since both 
essentialist and anti-essentialist theoretical frameworks are subject to the criticisms that 
have been leveled under the guise of rooting out “essentialism.” The root of the problem 
is really the Problem of Representation and the exclusionary political effects arising from 
this. The Problem of Representation identified here names two problematic phenomena. 
First, there are occasions when, in the course of offering philosophical analysis of ethical 
or political subjects, normative ideals are advanced under the guise of neutral description. 
Second, the ideals thus disguised very typically reflect the social position and form of life 
of the theorizer, thus reinforcing the norms and values of the one doing the theorizing as 
the norm of what it is to be the kind of thing or subject in question. 
When it comes to ethics and the appeal to human nature, the appeal to a 
supposedly value-neutral description of what it is to be human colludes with the 
assumption that the purpose of a theory of human nature is to ground ethical claims in 
uncontroversial matters of fact. But, as I have argued, this is not the role a theory of 
human nature plays in a flourishing-based ethic. A flourishing-based ethic requires a 
theory of human nature which is teleological, encoding evaluative judgments about the 
proper ends of human development. I believe that effectively addressing the Problem of 
Representation means being transparent about the kind of theory of human nature 
required by an ethic of flourishing. A certain kind of theory of human nature can then be 
a critical resource for a feminist ethic of flourishing.  
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My case for this conclusion has unfolded gradually. In approaching the problem 
human nature (at least on its face) poses for a feminist ethic of flourishing, my first goal 
was to gain a clearer understanding of the methodological role a theory of human nature 
has, historically, been accorded in a flourishing-based ethical theory. Here, the 
motivating thought was that understanding the role played by human nature would make 
it more clear how essential or dispensable a conception of human nature is to such a 
moral perspective. This I took up in chapter two. My second goal was to evaluate 
contemporary flourishing-based ethical theories that appeared promising as the basis of 
feminist ethic of flourishing in order to assess their prospects and potential to serve in this 
capacity, which I did in chapters three, four, and five. 
 The conclusion I drew in chapter two is that a certain conception of human nature, 
as teleological, plays an inescapable role in substantiating the normative authority of 
moral judgments in a flourishing-based ethical theory. In order to make this case, I 
distinguished two conceptual aspects of a theory of human nature: the “substantive 
conception of human nature” and the “concept of nature in general.” I described the 
concept of nature in general as “framing” the content or substance of one’s conception of 
human nature. Or, using Aristotle’s form/matter distinction as an analogy, the concept of 
nature in general is like the “form,” shaping the “matter” of one’s theory. Through an 
analysis of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx, I argued that there are two broad ways of 
conceiving of nature in general. In Aristotle and the early Marx, we have a “teleological” 
concept of nature in general. In Hume and the later Marx, we find an “empirical” concept 
of nature in general.  
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 A teleological concept of nature in general involves evaluative judgments about 
the proper endpoints of human development and relies on this to make judgments about 
what makes for fulfillment or frustration in human life. As such a teleological concept of 
nature is explicitly normative, distinguishing between those capacities and tendencies that 
will contribute to human good and those that will thwart it. A teleological concept of 
nature in general carries significant normative weight because it articulates what is good 
for us. 
 An empirical concept of nature in general draws no such distinctions. It aims to 
offer a descriptive account of human nature as the totality of characteristics, capacities, 
and tendencies universally exhibited by members of the human species. On an empirical 
conception of our nature, tendencies and capacities that undermine or work against 
human fulfillment are no less a part of human nature than those that promote it. On the 
empirical view of nature in general, what is “natural” simply signifies the way things 
stand with us—what we commonly find to be the case in human life. “Natural” in this 
sense means “usual” or “common,” and human nature encompasses everything which is 
universally common to members of the human species. 
 A teleological conception of human nature is a necessary element of any 
adequately normative flourishing-based moral theory, because such a theory needs to be 
able to explain why the ideals it advances as constitutive of human flourishing are good 
for us. Because it distinguishes between the many possible ends of human life—marking 
off those that are forms of fulfillment from those that are not—a teleological theory of 
human nature articulates important reasons agents have to live as the theory prescribes. 
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 For example, Marx’s condemnation of capitalism depends on a teleological 
conception of human nature and the proper end of human life. This allows him to 
distinguish real needs from false needs based on whether they contribute to human 
fulfillment. In the early Marx, we find, in no uncertain terms, an indictment of the 
capitalist mode of production. Capitalism is bad for human beings because the way 
production is organized in a capitalist economy alienates the worker from her labor, from 
the product of her labor, from her community, and ultimately, from herself. What fulfills 
and creates for a fully human life, by contrast, is the person’s ability to engage in praxis, 
that is, conscious, free, social, and productive activity. For the early Marx, we are 
essentially working beings, beings whose needs—not only physical, but psychic and 
social as well—are met through the exercise of our capacity for conscious, free, social, 
and productive labor. Only in a context where praxis is properly supported can we truly 
flourish. 
 Marx’s moral critique of capitalism depends on his ability to substantiate the 
claim that capitalism harms individuals by failing to meet their needs. However, in his 
later “scientific” writings, Marx abandons the theory of human nature advanced in his 
early humanistic writings and substitutes an empirical concept of human nature, 
according to which human nature (and its essential needs) are contingently constituted by 
the given social mode of production. According to the later Marx, human needs are 
constituted by the mode of production. Capitalism creates ever new and more expansive 
needs and then meets them in order to augment the value of capital. In doing so, human 
nature itself is transformed: as our needs change, so does our nature. But if these new 
needs created by capitalism are our true needs, then it is not clear that capitalism is 
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harming us or that our needs are not being met. Given that Marx sees human nature as 
constituted by human need and that our needs are a product of the capitalist mode of 
production, it is unclear on what grounds Marx in his later works can criticize capitalism. 
The teleological conception of human nature turns out to be essential for Marx’s 
normative critique of capitalism. Without it, there is little reason to work toward or strive 
for the socialist vision of flourishing because it is not clear that capitalism is bad for us or 
that socialism is better. Whether or not Marx’s conception of human nature is true or his 
critique of capitalism justified, the point, methodologically, is that the normative force of 
his critique depends upon a teleological conception of human nature. Through the 
analysis of Aristotle, Hume, and Marx I argued that a normatively adequate ethic of 
flourishing requires the conceptual resources of a teleological conception of human 
nature.  
 Turning to the second task, in chapter three, I examined the flourishing-based 
virtue ethics developed by Rosalind Hursthouse and the prospect that her unique form of 
neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism can serve as the basis for a feminist ethic of 
flourishing. Using the conceptual categories developed in chapter two, I argued that the 
teleological concept of nature to which Hursthouse appeals gives human nature the right 
methodological role in support of the account of flourishing. She rightly recognizes that 
the appeal to nature is not an appeal to a normatively flat, empirical conception of human 
nature, but rather to an evaluative, ethically informed conception of human nature. Her 
account of human nature as properly ordered by the five naturalistic ends clearly shows 
the goods to be achieved and the reasons we have to develop the virtues. However, 
Hursthouse’s substantive conception of human nature is not sufficiently robust to draw 
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the necessary moral distinctions between feminist and patriarchal understandings of the 
virtues. Feminists interested in the neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism developed by 
Hursthouse will require a more substantive account of human nature, one which is not 
restricted to the ends the biological sciences can license. I concluded that a feminist ethic 
of flourishing working on the basis of a neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism will need a 
thicker account of the ends of human nature to defend a feminist moral perspective on the 
virtues. 
In chapter four, I turned to the ethic of flourishing articulated and defended by 
Martha Nussbaum in the capabilities approach. The chapter brings together two central 
themes of the dissertation: first, an analysis of the methodological role played by a theory 
of human nature in the capabilities approach and, second, feminist objections to an ethic 
grounded in a substantive conception of human nature related to what I called in chapter 
one the Problem of Representation. The capabilities approach seeks to provide a theory of 
social justice uniquely suited to addressing the harms women face by articulating and 
defending a list of human capabilities. The capabilities approach argues that each person 
has a right to choose to exercise certain fundamental human capabilities on the grounds 
that the capability to function in the areas named by the capabilities list is constitutive of 
a life with dignity. To be denied these central capabilities is to be denied the flourishing 
to which each and every person has a legitimate claim in virtue of their standing as a 
human being. Again, using the conceptual categories developed in chapter two, I 
examined the methodological role played by human nature. Again, I distinguished the 
concept of nature in general from the substantive content of the account. In the case of 
Nussbaum, I argued that while Nussbaum’s substantive account of the capabilities is 
281 
 
“thick” enough to defend a liberal vision of flourishing, Nussbaum is ambiguous about 
the concept of nature in general and, hence, ambiguous about the methodological role of 
appeals to human nature. To the extent that she claims the capabilities list is based on an 
empirical investigation into human nature, she misconstrues the role of a theory of human 
nature. If the capabilities list is based on an empirical conception of human nature, then it 
will not be able to play the normative role the capabilities approach requires. On the other 
hand, if the capabilities list is the product of an evaluative judgment about which 
capabilities—amongst the many human beings possess—are most significant for human 
fulfillment, then the capabilities approach is implicitly relying on a teleological 
conception of human nature. Acknowledging this means acknowledging the contentious 
status of the capabilities list, but it has the virtue of making clear why these capabilities 
and not others are given the privileged status they are. Because Nussbaum has been 
ambiguous about the status of the capabilities list, a number of feminist moral 
philosophers have been quite critical of the capabilities approach. I argued that being 
transparent about the status of these claims is an important part of responding to these 
criticisms. 
 Finally, chapter five brings the argument of the previous chapters to bear on Lisa 
Tessman’s Burdened Virtues, in which she develops a feminist eudaimonism for the 
purpose of bringing to light the uniquely moral harms suffered by members of oppressed 
groups who are committed to resisting their own oppression through character 
transformation. Tessman argues that there is a set of virtues that are both morally 
requisite for resisting oppression and harmful to their bearer. She calls such traits 
“burdened virtues,” because even though they are praiseworthy in helping their bearer 
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either survive or resist oppression, they are psychologically damaging because they are 
destructive of the psychological traits needed for leading a truly good life. If this is true, 
Tessman’s analysis reveals an overlooked moral harm of oppression. Oppression 
constitutes a moral harm to victims by making character traits which undermine the 
psychological capacity of a person to flourish necessary for surviving or resisting 
oppression. Thereby, the burdened virtues name a double-bind of oppression by which 
the oppressed are kept from flourishing whether they resist their own oppression or not. 
 While Tessman tries to sidestep controversial questions about human nature, I 
have argued that embracing a teleological conception of human nature would give her 
theory additional resources for defending her claims about the burdened virtues and the 
moral harm that oppression inflicts on the oppressed. Without denying that oppression 
harms the oppressed in other ways, one might deny that oppression causes the uniquely 
moral harm Tessman claims to have identified through the concept of a burdened virtue. 
For her thesis to hold up, there must be a set of character traits that are both the best 
possible for us in these circumstances and, at the same time, psychologically damaging. If 
either of these claims fall, then so does Tessman’s claim to have identified a uniquely 
moral harm of oppression. 
 In order to show the significance of a theory of human nature for defending 
Tessman’s claim, I examined a single instance of a burdened virtue—rage—and three 
distinct attitudes toward rage as a character trait useful for resisting oppression. Tessman 
believes rage is both a virtue and ultimately psychologically damaging because corrosive 
to its bearer. She argues that such a view of rage is consistent with the implicit beliefs 
about flourishing held by members of liberatory activist communities. She cites 
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especially the beliefs held by feminist and civil rights leaders. I question whether there is 
a consistent vision of flourishing implicit in these liberatory activist communities and 
whether the claim that rage is a burdened virtue can be sustained by looking more closely 
at the visions for black liberation articulated by Martin Luther King, Jr. and Malcolm X. I 
conclude that on neither view can it be maintained that rage is a burdened virtue. For 
Malcolm, rage is a virtue, but he does not judge it to be psychologically damaging. The 
kind of rage he judges a virtue he also maintains is a sign of psychological health. On the 
other hand, Martin Luther King, Jr. seems to agree with Tessman’s assessment that rage 
is psychologically damaging, but he does not regard it as a virtue. Martin sees an 
alternative response to oppression in love and judges that love is the ideal character trait 
to cultivate, not rage. For the burdened virtues to be both the best traits possible for us 
and at the same time harmful for us, human nature must be such that there is no better 
alternative trait we can realistically cultivate while, at the same time, the trait called for in 
this circumstance must be psychologically unmanageable and damaging. Our nature must 
be such that no alternative response is attainable and yet the response open to us is 
damaging. This tragic understanding of our capacities and limitations is ultimately what 
can sustain Tessman’s claims about the burdened virtues. Equally, it is this view of our 
nature that makes sense of the thought that, despite being difficult—to the point of 
inflicting psychological damage—this is the course we ought to take, since this is the best 
that is possible for us given the terrible circumstances. 
 Thus, I argue that implicit in Tessman’s claims about the burdened virtues is a 
view of our nature as well-realized and suited to certain psychological states but damaged 
by others, and damaged in ways so deep that they maim our basic capacity to flourish in a 
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fully human way. Tessman does not acknowledge the theory’s dependence on a certain 
understanding of our nature, but acknowledging this and being articulate about it would 
give Tessman’s theory resources to defend the claim that the burdened virtues are 
character traits that are at once the best that is possible for us, given the circumstances, 
and yet deeply damaging. Thus, having this account would enable her to more fully 
defend the claim that oppression constitutes a moral harm to the oppressed. In this way, a 
certain kind of theory of human nature plays an important role in analyzing oppression 
and substantiating claims about the harms of oppression in light of a vision of full human 
flourishing. A certain conception of human nature enables us to articulate both the harms 
that oppression inflicts and the virtues agents have good reason to cultivate. 
 
2. A New Perspective on an Old Dilemma 
 
 I have argued that a theory of human nature plays an indispensable 
methodological role in a flourishing-based moral framework. It is indispensable because 
a theory of human nature articulates a particularly important set of reasons we have for 
living as the theory prescribes. Without this, we lack a major resource which can clarify 
the reasons agents should act in accordance with the ideals articulated by the theory. As 
such, a theory of human nature is an important normative resource for a theory of 
flourishing. But, recognizing that not just any theory of human nature can fulfill this 
function, I have argued that the theory must be teleological in form: it must draw 
evaluative distinctions among the possible ends of human life, distinguishing those which 
are fulfillments from those which are not.  
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 In contrast, if a theory of human nature is reduced to a description of the 
characteristics and tendencies we can empirically document as universally exhibited in 
the human species, a theory of human nature will not imply anything about what we have 
reason to do or how we have reason to live. For example, I take it that we are 
sympathetically constituted in the sense Hume described, and this means we have an 
innate tendency to experience pleasure at the pleasure of others and pain at their pain. We 
are also self-interested, meaning we have a tendency to pursue that which we perceive to 
be beneficial and to avoid that which we perceive to be harmful. Similarly, unless an 
individual is affected by a physical or mental disability, human beings characteristically 
possess all of the capabilities on the capabilities list formulated by Martha Nussbaum. 
However, human beings also characteristically possess capabilities for deception, 
exploitation, unimaginable forms of cruelty, and revenge, among other less savory 
capabilities. From these kinds of facts about ourselves, nothing follows about what we 
ought to do or how we ought to live. In such a description of human nature, 
indistinguishably lumped together are intractable characteristics that we could not change 
if we wanted, or that we could only change at an exceedingly high cost, and others which 
are malleable, susceptible to development in a number of ways, where the outcome 
depends in large part upon the environment and the support or barriers one encounters. 
From such a list, nothing follows about whether these human universals ought to be 
supported and respected, begrudgingly accepted and accommodated, or resisted and 
repressed. 
Teleological conceptions of human nature articulate evaluative understandings of 
human life, distinguishing amongst the possible ends of human life those which are 
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fulfillments and realizations of a human form of life from those which are not. However 
flourishing is understood, it must be possible to interpret it as a condition in which human 
beings are fulfilled—made capable of “wholeness” and psychological integrity—at a 
minimum, in other words, able to be psychologically, emotionally, socially, and 
biologically “healthy.” There are undoubtedly other characterizations we could draw on 
to describe a “fully human life.” But, in any case, whatever flourishing is taken to consist 
of, it cannot be a condition that can be characterized as a kind of alienation, 
“brokenness,” perpetual frustration of our aspirations and capacities, or psychological 
damage, nor can it constitute a “maiming” of the capacities that make for a full human 
life. Teleological conceptions of our nature can express these distinctions in a number of 
different ways—contrasting states of health and unhealth, fulfillment and alienation, and 
so on. In doing so, they articulate possible goods to be achieved through different courses 
of action, and thereby serve to articulate reasons we can draw on to answer the question 
“How should I live?” Empirical conceptions of human nature expressly avoid drawing 
any such distinctions and, by that very fact, fail to be reason-giving. 
Here a difficult question arises: without already accepting the evaluative 
interpretation of human life expressed by a teleological conception of human nature, in 
what sense can any such account be persuasive to agents who wonder if they really ought 
to live as a theory of flourishing prescribes? 
We are, in a sense, back to the concerns Louise Antony raised when she argued 
that no conception of human nature can, ultimately, play the role it is called upon to play. 
As Antony understands it, “the trick in constructing a rhetorically effective argument 
from nature is to make . . . what is ‘true by nature’ seem a matter of simple observation or 
287 
 
an uncontroversial finding from a neutral science—while at the same time preserving the 
modal or normative import that the term ‘nature’ frequently carries.”1  
I have argued that the normative adequacy of a flourishing-based ethical theory 
depends on a teleological conception of human nature. Furthermore, a feminist ethic of 
flourishing will need to endorse a rather robust account of our nature. A “thin” 
teleological account of the sort Hursthouse endorses will not be adequate to substantiate 
feminist evaluations of virtues such as ‘patriarchal benevolence.’ The kind of account of 
human nature that will be robust enough to make sense of feminist rejections of such 
“virtues” will also be contentious enough to be disputable. 
I have essentially argued that the indispensable kind of nature claims that inform 
moral reasoning in a flourishing-based ethical theory are not a “matter of simple 
observation or an uncontroversial finding from a neutral science.” They are evaluative 
interpretations of our form of life and what is important for us for the purpose of living 
well. Teleological conceptions of human nature are based on evaluative judgments about 
the proper ends of human development. But if this is true, then can reasoning tied to 
considerations of human nature be “rhetorically effective”? Can it really persuade?  
In one sense, I believe yes, it can. Teleological conceptions of human nature 
persuade in the way that any interpretation of a complex phenomenon persuades: by 
convincing us that it makes the best sense out of the most important features of the 
phenomenon. I have been focused on what a flourishing-based theory needs in order to 
motivate the agent to act or live as the theory prescribes, and for this purpose a 
teleological conception of human nature is indispensable. By contrast, empirical 
conceptions of our nature are clearly inadequate for this purpose.  
                                                 
1
 Louise M. Antony, "Natures and Norms," Ethics 111, no. 1 (2000): 13. 
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 From the first-person perspective, having accepted a certain interpretation of our 
nature, I think it is clear that a teleological conception of human nature can, in fact, be 
persuasive in motivating an agent to act as the theory prescribes. It does so by giving her 
reasons that this form of life or course of action is good for her. Thinking again about the 
case for Tessman’s burdened virtues, if we accept the view of human nature I argued her 
account really needs, it seems clear we should cultivate the burdened virtue of rage. 
Despite the difficulties and steep consequences, this is the best that is possible for us, 
given the circumstances, and given human nature.
2
  
 But in another sense, it is not so clear whether a teleological conception of human 
nature will be able to persuade. To be “rhetorically effective,” Antony clearly believes a 
theory of human nature must settle the question of ethical objectivity. A theory of human 
nature, she is thinking, must settle whether these moral judgments are objectively valid 
because true. There is a question over the accuracy or adequacy of a particular claim, 
(e.g., a moral judgment or a theory of human flourishing). Facts about human nature, it is 
assumed, must persuade us that this claim is true (or show us that it is false). However, 
the appeal to human nature can only do this effectively if it is an appeal to a fact that is 
uncontroversially true. I believe it is this line of reasoning that has led many—not just 
Antony—to conclude that the attempt to draw human nature into moral reasoning is a 
complete dead end, or at best it does not take us very far. The only claims about human 
                                                 
2
 Recall that her theory of the burdened virtues entails both that rage is psychologically unhealthy because 
it is corrosive, but also that human nature cannot sustain any alternative response to the persistent 
disrespect that oppressed peoples confront that would be better. Love of enemy, for instance, as advocated 
by Martin Luther King, Jr. has to be judged unrealistic (probably because it is too demanding), while the 
response that is available and realistic for us is, tragically, not good for us. So, the response that it is 
realistic to expect (given human nature) is one that has tragic consequences (given human nature). While it 
is difficult to know who is right and what is (generally) to be regarded as a realistic possibility, if we judge 
that the love Martin Luther King, Jr. called for is not a psychologically realistic alternative, the reason we 
should adopt the burdened virtue of rage is clear. Despite the difficulties and steep consequences, this is the 
best that is possible for us. 
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nature that would be uncontroversial would be embedded in an empirical conception of 
human nature, but from facts like this about our nature, without other controversial 
premises to do the real lifting, nothing follows. On this approach, human nature is being 
expected to play the role of an uncontroversial, value-neutral foundation from which 
normative judgments can be objectively justified. 
 If this approach should be successful in bridging the ‘is/ought gap,’ it will be 
because in the “neutral description” of what it is to be human, someone has smuggled in 
normatively loaded concepts which make this conception of what it is to be human 
significant for ethical thinking and give it weight in considerations of how we should live 
and what we should do. Thinking in light of the insights of feminist theory, it will be 
unsurprising if the ideals being passed off as “uncontroversial description” reflect the 
social position and ideals of the person behind the theory. In short, it will be unsurprising 
if this approach comes to grief over the Problem of Representation.  
 The way I have proposed a feminist flourishing-based ethic ought to avoid this 
pitfall is to be transparent about both the proper role of a theory of human nature in the 
wider context of a theory of flourishing, and to be clear that the kind of theory of human 
nature employed in moral reasoning is strongly evaluative, making no pretensions 
otherwise. 
 This move shifts the conceptual model for how a theory of human nature relates 
to an ethic of flourishing. Teleological theories of human nature give reasons that support 
the account of flourishing, but these reasons are themselves ethically informed. The 
relation of support is probably best understood as making transparent (or testing, as the 
case may be) the coherence of our conception of human nature—especially surrounding 
290 
 
what we take to be the boundaries of what is possible—in light of the ideals embodied in 
our conception of flourishing. Successfully making these elements cohere is no guarantee 
of truth, but their failure to cohere can be a symptom of falsehood. This picture of the 
relationship between a theory of human nature and an ethic of flourishing abandons the 
aspiration to ground value judgments about flourishing in a realm of indisputable facts 
about “how human beings are.” To the extent that the reasons given by a teleological 
conception of human nature “justify” the moral judgments of a flourishing-based ethical 
theory, they do not justify in this way.  
 The methodological role for human nature and the structure of the theory that I 
am proposing as a viable path forward for a feminist flourishing-based ethic is one which 
is broadly consistent with the proposals of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalists such as 
Julia Annas and Rosalind Hursthouse—though as discussed in chapter three, Hursthouse 
stakes out a teleological conception of human nature which continues to aspire to be 
uncontroversial.
3
 One of the major meta-ethical questions facing neo-Aristotelian ethical 
naturalism is whether human nature can provide the right sort of normativity. I have 
argued that a teleological conception of human nature is an indispensable source of 
normativity for a flourishing-based ethic, and this is the role often given to human nature 
by those advancing a form of neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism. But whether one can, 
from human nature, establish a strong form of moral normativity or only a weak form of 
prudential normativity based on the perceived interests of the agent is a serious question. 
I have argued that a teleological conception of human nature is reason-giving and so 
capable of making a flourishing-based ethical theory adequately normative, but I think a 
                                                 
3
 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Rosalind 
Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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question lingers over whether these are the right kind of reasons. This raises the 
possibility that a theory of human nature is necessary, but it is not sufficient. If this turns 
out to be the case, then the claim I have defended here will need to be revisited. It might 
rather be the case that a teleological conception of human nature provides a “minimally 
adequate” normativity, but not a “truly adequate” normativity for a flourishing-based 
ethical theory. 
 
3. Further Avenues for Research 
 
 One possible avenue for future research lies in the direction of epistemological 
methods and arguments that can be offered in support of the teleological conceptions of 
human nature that flourishing-based ethical theories require. Prior to pursuing the 
arguments, it is impossible to know what the outcomes will be, but it seems exceedingly 
unlikely that the kinds of arguments and considerations available in favor of any 
teleological account of human nature will be arguments that put its truth beyond question. 
But if this is true, why is it true? A theory of human nature should give an account of the 
essential features of human beings, and it is not immediately evident why this should be 
so difficult or why it should entail such controversy. W.B. Gallie has argued that there are 
some concepts which are “essentially contested.” According to Gallie, “There are 
concepts which are essentially contested, concepts the proper use of which inevitably 
involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users.”4 What Gallie 
intended by this and how it might help us to think about theories of human nature as they 
inform our ethical thought I cannot develop here, but Gallie’s idea of essentially 
                                                 
4
 W.B. Gallie, “Essentially Contested Concepts,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 176. 
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contested concepts is provocative when applied to the question of human nature because 
his concern was precisely with how a concept could entail endless dispute necessarily, by 
virtue of the very concept it is, and yet those disputes could in some sense be both 
‘objective’ and ‘reasonable.’ 
Much of this study has been devoted to methodological questions concerning 
flourishing-based ethical theories. Flourishing-based ethical theories are, in general, 
consequentialist in character, but a concern was raised in chapter five that Lisa Tessman’s 
analysis of the burdened virtues might not be eudaimonistic because it simply reduces to 
a form of simple consequentialism. If eudaimonism is, as this study has assumed, one 
kind of flourishing-based ethical theory, and flourishing-based ethical theories are 
consequentialist, this raises the puzzle of why it should be thought that there is a 
distinction between eudaimonism and consequentialism. The degree to which a 
eudaimonist moral theory is distinct from simple consequentialist moral theory is 
interesting, and the analysis given in chapter five suggests it may have to do with the 
unique role played by a robust theory of human nature. Substantiating this suggestion is 
another area for further research. 
With respect to employing a flourishing-based ethical theory to define the 
feminist alternative to oppression, a flourishing-based account may be able to provide a 
much more robust account of the antithesis to oppression. A cursory review of literature 
on oppression suggests that the most common conception of oppression’s antithesis is a 
thin conception of freedom.
5
 Feminist theorists have recognized the inadequacies of 
                                                 
5
 See the literature reviews of two recent dissertations on oppression: Kira Tomsons, “Oppression: A 
Conceptual Analysis” (Ph.D., Dalhousie University (Canada), 2006); Daniel M. Silvermint, “Oppression 
and Victim Agency” (Ph.D., The University of Arizona, 2012). 
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purely negative conceptions of freedom,
6
 but have understandable reservations with 
positive conceptions of freedom.
7
 A flourishing-based ethical framework with the 
resources of a robust conception of human nature may provide resources for such a task. 
 
4. Cultivating the Resource 
On the model advanced here, human nature is an indispensable conceptual 
resource because of the role it plays in answering normative questions in a flourishing-
based ethical theory (e.g., “How should I live?” and “What reasons do I have to live this 
way?”). Feminist moral philosophy needs a moral theory with adequate normative 
authority because (the vast majority of?) feminist moral insights challenge the status quo 
privileges of the powerful. One needs to be able to provide oneself (and others) with 
sufficiently good reasons to do what one morally ought to do, even if it is hard or painful 
or against one’s interests in some way. Absent gaining power and changing the status quo 
by force, the success of feminist political and social goals depends on the moral authority 
of the cause, so having a moral theory with reasons that can be compelling to those who 
need to sacrifice privilege in order to do what morality requires is crucial.  
Furthermore, an articulated conception of human nature is a necessary normative 
resource even if questions remain about the objectivity of the account. And a teleological 
conception of human nature is necessary even if questions of ethical objectivity are more 
complicated with a teleological conception of human nature than with an empirical 
conception of human nature. 
                                                 
6
 Ann Cudd, Analyzing Oppression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
7
 “Negative” and “positive” in the sense defined by Isaiah Berlin in his classic 1958 essay republished in 
Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
294 
 
 The truth of the teleological conception of human nature which a flourishing-
based ethical theory invokes is an important question, and some account needs to be 
given, but it is unlikely that the account given is going to satisfy the demand that it be 
“uncontroversially true.” Teleological conceptions of human nature give reasons, but they 
are not uncontroversial reasons. Rather than see a teleological conception of human 
nature as the uncontroversial set of facts upon which an ethic of flourishing is grounded, 
it is more plausible to construe a theory of human nature as one part of the ethical theory 
itself. A theory of human nature is not outside the ethical theory, but an aspect of the 
theory that (ideally) coheres with and makes sense of the other elements within the 
theory. 
The kind of teleological theory of human nature that supports an ethics of 
flourishing is liable to challenge and contestation, but developing such an account is 
important for being able to explain why it is good to live as the theory prescribes. 
Without such, our ethical beliefs about flourishing are less intelligible, and we have fewer 
normative resources to draw upon to explain—both to ourselves and to others—what is 
harmful and what is beneficial, what should be avoided and what should be pursued for 
the sake of a good human life. For this reason, cultivating an articulated account of 
human nature and offering reasoned justification for it is an important task for any ethic 
of flourishing. If we neglect to articulate an intellectual understanding of the meaning and 
significant of human life—with its distinctive set of capacities and limitations, longings 
and aspirations—we lose an important resource for intellectually supporting and making 
sense of the kind of life we might otherwise aspire to realize. The resource can become a 
wasteland if we refuse to make such evaluative judgments. Failing to recognize the 
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evaluative nature of the account creates other problems. But with adequate care and 
attention, human nature is a conceptual resource that can nourish and sustain the ethics of 
flourishing and provide necessary resources for articulating and defending a feminist 
vision of flourishing. 
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